





THE BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROPERTIES CHILDREN 
































Presented to the Department of Psychology 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 






DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Naomi Ruth Aguiar 
 
Title: The Biological, Psychological and Social Properties Children and Adults Attribute 
to Virtual Agents 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Psychology by: 
 
Marjorie Taylor Chairperson/Advisor 
Dare Baldwin Core Member 
Lou Moses Core Member 




Scott L. Pratt Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 

























Naomi Ruth Aguiar 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 




Title: The Biological, Psychological and Social Properties Children and Adults Attribute 
to Virtual Agents 
 
 
For children, high quality friendships are associated with adaptive social, emotional 
and academic functioning.  There is also evidence that children experience real and 
imaginary friendships in similar ways, and that imagined relationships could have an 
impact on development.  However, less is known about the relationships made possible by 
virtual agents in digital media.  This dissertation research was designed to provide 
preliminary data about children’s concepts of virtual agents, and the social opportunities 
they attribute to such entities.   
In Studies 1 and 2 (combined N = 48), preschool aged children differentiated the 
social affordances of a stuffed dog and a virtual dog.  Participants played a game in 
which they guessed whether a child in a video was referring to a stuffed dog or a virtual 
dog in a series of statements.  Items designed to assess high quality friendships, such as 
comfort, protection and love, were attributed more to the stuffed dog than the virtual dog. 
Studies 3 and 4 examined adult and child concepts of a virtual child, and how 
concepts of this entity might differ from a real child, a child on a video chat program 
(e.g., Skype™) and an inanimate doll.  Adults and children attributed a range of 




as well as opportunities for relationships.  In Study 3 (N = 144), adults did not 
differentiate between the virtual child and the doll on the social property; however, they 
favored the doll on opportunities for unilateral relationships.  In Study 4 (N = 30), five to 
eight-year-old children indicated an overall preference for the doll on the social property, 
as well as on opportunities for reciprocal relationships. Children also favored the doll on 
opportunities for love, companionship, and intimate disclosure. 
Altogether, these findings suggest that virtual agents afford more limited social 
opportunities than inanimate artifacts, and they are less likely to be loved by children and 
adults alike.  These results raise important questions about the design goals for virtual 
agents, and the functions they are intended to serve in our everyday lives.   
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Friendships play an important role in children’s lives.  Having high quality 
friendships is associated with their sense of well-being (Hartup & Sevens, 1999; Rubin, 
Bowker, McDonald, & Menzer, 2013) and predicts adaptive social and emotional 
functioning (Rubin et al., 2013).  Although most research on friendship has focused on 
the flesh and blood variety, there is growing evidence that imaginary friendships should 
also be included in discussions of children’s social networks.  In particular, imaginary 
companions -- the invisible characters and personified objects that children interact with 
and talk about on a regular basis -- are often experienced in ways that are similar to real 
friendships (Gleason, 2013; Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006) and are capable 
of providing real-life support (Taylor, 1999).  However, less is known about the 
relationships that have been made possible by recent technological advances in the 
programming of virtual agents in apps, websites and videogames.  Unlike the static media 
characters of the past, virtual entities present children with opportunities to engage in 
exchanges that simulate the reciprocal patterns of behavior found in real-life 
relationships.  Artificial agents such as virtual characters and social robots could become 
a stable part of children’s larger social networks, and could be capable of influencing 
their social, emotional and moral development (Kahn et al., 2013).   
This dissertation was designed to examine how children and adults conceptualize 
virtual agents and the social opportunities they potentially provide.  In Studies 1 and 2, I 





of a virtual dog that simulated social behaviors and a stuffed animal similar to those used 
in pretend play (Aguiar & Taylor, 2015).  These studies were published in a special issue 
of Cognitive Development, “Cognizing the Unreal”, and were co-authored with Marjorie 
Taylor, Ph.D1.   In Study 3, I investigated the biological, psychological, and social 
properties adults attribute to a humanoid agent as compared with attributions to a real 
person and an inanimate doll.  Items that successfully captured biological, psychological 
and social functioning were then used in a follow-up pilot study with 5- to 8-year-old 
children (Study 4).  In Study 4, I examined children’s concepts of a child virtual agent, as 
compared with their concepts of a real child and an inanimate doll.  
In this chapter, I review the literature on children’s friendships with real-life peers 
and with imaginary companions, and explore how these relationships inform the study of 
children’s relationships with virtual agents.  First, the literatures on children’s friendships 
with real peers and with imaginary companions are reviewed, discussing similarities and 
differences in the characteristics and significance of these relationships.  Next, the 
literature on avatars, social robots and virtual agents is reviewed, examining how children 
conceptualize and interact with these agents, as well as the extent to which children view 
them as potential friendship partners.  Finally, findings across these literatures are 
synthesized into key themes that motivated this dissertation research.   
Children’s Friendships with Real-life Peers 
Rubin and his colleagues define friendship as a close, voluntary relationship 
between two people that is reciprocal in nature (Rubin et al., 2013; Rubin, Bukowski, & 
                                                 
1 Reprinted from Cognitive Development, Volume 34, Naomi R. Aguiar & Marjorie 
Taylor, “Children's concepts of the social affordances of a virtual dog and a stuffed dog”, 






Parker, 2006).  Among pre-verbal children, friendships are generally indexed by 
behavioral patterns that are socially contingent and displayed by both partners, such as 
seeking proximity, showing mutual displays of positive affect during play and engaging 
in complementary play behaviors (e.g., chasing and being chased) (Howes, 1983; Howes, 
1996; Rubin et al., 2013).  For school-age children and adolescents, friendships are 
generally identified in two ways: (1) children list each other when asked to indicate their 
best friend on a class roster (peer nomination method), and (2) children mutually express 
feelings of affection and positive regard for each other in self-report questionnaires, 
interviews, and other sociometric measures (Furman, 1996; Rubin et al., 2013). 
Approximately 91% of typically developing infant, toddler and pre-school age 
children meet the criteria for friendship with at least one peer (Howes, 1983) and this 
percentage remains high as children’s friendship networks expand with age (Hartup, 
2006; Rubin et al., 2013).  Once friendships are formed, these social bonds vary in their 
duration.  In general, dyadic friendships stabilize as children age (Poulin & Chan, 2010; 
Hartup, 2006; Rubin et al., 2013).  Friendships are the least stable during early 
adolescence, but the termination of friendships in any given developmental window is not 
uncommon (Poulin & Chan, 2010; Rubin et al., 2013).  Reasons for the dissolution of 
friendship vary, and include both attributes (e.g., aggressiveness) of the children involved 
in the relationship, as well as the overall quality of the friendship (Crick, Murray-Close, 
Marks, & Mohajeri-Nelson, 2009; Poulin & Chan, 2010).  Children in high quality 
friendships are more likely to sustain these relationships over time (Berndt, 2004; Rubin 






Friendship Formation   
Previous research has identified the dyadic behavioral patterns that have been 
observed in young children as they become friends, such as proximity seeking, 
coordinated and socially contingent play, as well as the display of positive affect during 
play (Howes, 1983; Hartup, 1992).  For example, in two controlled experiments, Gottman 
(1983) compared the conversations between preschool age children who were friends and 
children who were strangers to determine the features that differentiated friends from 
non-friends (i.e., agreement ratios).  This criterion variable was then used to predict the 
progress towards friendship among children randomly assigned to dyadic pairs for three 
audio-recorded play sessions.  During the first session, children who “hit it off” 
communicated clearly, and were able to exchange information, resolve conflict and 
establish common play activities.  In subsequent sessions, exploring similarities and 
differences and self-disclosure became increasingly important for friendship formation.  
Based on these findings, Gottman and Hartup (1992) describe friendship formation as a 
dynamic process in which children must effectively communicate, exchange, and 
coordinate information in order to establish common ground, resolve disagreements, 
explore similarities and resolve differences.  Although less is know about the process in 
which older children become friends, Hartup (1992) cites unpublished work by Furman 
and Childs (1981) showing that similar processes are involved among school age 
children. 
Friendship Quality  
According to Berndt and colleagues, the overall quality of a friendship is 





relationship (Berndt, 2002, 1996; Berndt & McCandless, 2009).  They broadly define 
high quality friendships as dyadic peer relationships that possess more positive features 
or that are higher on positive features (e.g., prosocial behaviors) than negative features 
(e.g., conflict).  However, in many studies the assessment of friendship quality focuses 
exclusively on the number or extent of positive features. 
There are a variety of methods used to collect information about the features of 
children’s friendships.  Young children are sometimes asked to report about their general 
concepts of friendship (e.g., “What is a friend?”) (e.g., Furman & Bierman, 1983), but 
most of the research is with school-age children and adolescents using a peer nomination 
approach, sociometric approach, or combination of both (Berndt, 1996; Furman, 1996).  
Typically, children are asked to rate the features of a friendship on Likert scales that 
indicate either how true a particular feature is of their friendship (e.g., Parker & Asher, 
1993), or how often a particular type of feature occurs within that friendship (e.g., Berndt 
& Keefe, 1995) (see also Bukowski, Boivin, & Hoza, 1994; Furman & Adler, 1982; 
Furman & Burhmester, 1985).    
In early childhood, children describe features of friendship that are more 
superficial in nature, focusing predominantly on physical proximity (e.g., “he lives next 
door”), concrete behaviors (e.g., “we play”), and common activities (e.g., “we do things 
together”) (Bigelow, 1977; Bigelow & LaGaipa, 1980; Furman & Bierman, 1983; Hayes, 
Gershman, & Bolin, 1980).  Although some features are endorsed across age groups (e.g., 
common activities, reciprocal liking, and “ego” reinforcement), older children 
increasingly describe and endorse features of friendship that are less superficial and more 





acceptance (Bigelow, 1977; Furman & Bierman, 1983; Furman & Bierman, 1984).  
Using a cluster analysis, Bigelow proposed a cumulative, three-stage model of 
development in which early concepts of friendship (e.g., physical proximity and common 
activities) form the basis upon which subsequent concepts of friendship are developed 
(e.g., loyalty, commitment, intimacy).  
Dimensions of friendship quality.  While there is some agreement among 
researchers, the particular dimensions that define friendship quality vary in two ways 
among the established inventories.  First, the number of dimensions can differ 
dramatically from one inventory to the next; Bigelow (1997) assessed children’s 
friendships on 21 positive dimensions, whereas Berndt and Keefe (1995) examined only 
four dimensions of friendship quality.  And although factor solutions generally support 
the number of dimensions that comprise a given inventory (see Furman for a review), 
Berndt (1996; 2002) argues that friendship quality consists of two overarching 
dimensions: positive features (e.g., prosocial behavior) and negative features (e.g., 
conflict).  This claim is based on evidence indicating that positive and negative features 
of friendship are not highly correlated, and therefore represent separate dimensions (see 
Berndt, 2002). Second, although the defining dimensions of friendship quality overlap to 
some degree across measures, but there is still a great deal of disagreement about the 
specific dimensions that comprise friendship quality (e.g., see Furman, 1996 and Berndt 
and McCandless, 2009 for comparisons).  
The existing variations among these measures make it difficult to decide how 
friendship quality should be measured in a given study.  Although Furman (1996) argues 





few inventories are theoretically motivated.  In his review, Furman cites only two 
measures derived from theory: (1) Furman and Burhmester’s (1985) Network of 
Relationships Inventory (NRI), which is based on social provisions theory (Weiss, 1974), 
positing that the social interactions inherent in different relationships foster opportunities 
for specific social affordances or “provisions” and  (2) Furman and Wehner’s (1994) 
Behavioral Systems Questionnaire (BSQ), which is based on attachment systems theory, 
positing that friendships provide children with a secure base from which to establish the 
emotional intimacy necessary for adult romantic relationships (see Hartup, 2009). 
In addition to theoretical motivation, the specific goals of the study also might 
make one measure more appropriate than another.  For example, Furman and 
Burhmester’s (1985) NRI was specifically designed for making comparisons across 
different types of relationship partners (e.g., siblings, parents, and peers).  This inventory 
had also been successfully adapted to compare friendships with real peers and imaginary 
companions (e.g., Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006).  
 The developmental significance of high quality friendships.  Although there is 
some contradictory evidence regarding the importance of friendship quality (see Berndt, 
2002), high quality friendships are associated with decreased feelings of loneliness 
(Ladd, Kochenderfer, & Coleman, 1996; Parker & Asher, 1993) and adaptive functioning 
in academic settings (see Hartup, 1996 and Hartup & Stevens, 1997 for reviews).  
Children in high quality friendships have more positive attitudes towards school (e.g., 
Berndt, Hawkins, & Jiao, 1999), adapt well to transitions in school (e.g., Ladd, 
Kochenderfer, & Coleman, 1996), and are more involved in school activities (e.g., Berndt 





popularity at school (Cauce, 1986), positive attitudes towards peers (Berndt, 1989), and 
higher academic performance (Cauce). 
 High quality friendships might also mitigate the effects of peer victimization on 
social and emotional well-being (Hodges, Boivin, Vitaro, & Bukowski, 1999; Schmidt & 
Bagwell, 2007).  Schmidt and Bagwell (2007) found that school age girls in high quality 
friendships reported lower levels of social concerns when faced with relational and overt 
victimization by peers (e.g., emotional threats and physical aggression).  Additionally, 
girls in high quality friendships experienced lower levels of depression in the context of 
physical victimization.  Specifically, dimensions of help and security served as buffers 
against the negative effects of peer victimization, which included items about reliability, 
dependability, protection, help, and conflict resolution.  Similarly Hodges et al. (1999) 
found that school age children with teacher-reported internalizing problems were less 
likely to be victimized over the course of one-year if they were in high quality, protective 
friendships.  
Summary 
 The literature on children’s friendships with real-life peers provides a wealth of 
information about the prevalence, course, and significance of early friendships, the 
dimensions that describe friendship, and the measures that can be used to study friendship 
at different ages and for different goals. It is clear from this literature that reciprocity is 
key to understanding friendship.  By definition, friendships with real-life peers are 
reciprocal relationships, in which children nominate each other as friends, report mutual 
liking, and show socially contingent, affective and synchronous play styles.  Children are 





behavioral reciprocities to effectively establish and maintain common ground during 
play.  These observed reciprocities form the basis of high and low quality friendships.  
Indeed, friendships in which positive features are mutually provided are likely to thrive, 
whereas friendships in which negative features are mutually reinforced are likely to 
dissolve.  
 The importance of reciprocity is particularly intriguing to consider from the point 
of view of research investigating imaginary relationships in which any reciprocity has to 
be wholly imagined.  In friendships with real-life peers, two individuals contribute to the 
relationship and the reciprocities are observable.  However, what happens when the 
relationship is imaginary?  For example, there is only one vehicle (the child) in a 
relationship with an imaginary companion.  To the extent that the relationship involves 
reciprocity, that experience has to be entirely imagined.  Given the importance of 
reciprocity in friendships with real-life peers, is it even appropriate to describe an 
imaginary relationship as friendship?   
 In what follows, I review the literature on imaginary companions, making the case 
that these relationships have at least some of the characteristics of real-life friendships – 
including reciprocity.  The topic of reciprocity continues in the final sections on 
relationships with virtual agents.  The combination of programmed and imagined 
reciprocities that characterize interactions with virtual agents raise interesting questions 
about the perception of these entities, as well as their potential to be friendship partners.  
Children’s Friendships with Imaginary Companions 
Gleason (2013) defines two key tenets of imaginary relationships: (1) they are 





reciprocal in nature (i.e., the child has imagined exchanges with the made up character).  
Thus, like friendships with real children, reciprocity is considered to be an important 
component of children’s imaginary relationships, despite the fact that these reciprocities 
have one vehicle (the child) and that these exchanges are entirely imagined.   
Among preschool-age children, imaginary friendships generally take the form of 
an “imaginary companion”, originally defined by Svendsen (1934) as: “an invisible 
character, named and referred to in conversation with other persons or played with 
directly for a period of time, at least several months, having an air of reality for the child, 
but no objective basis” (p. 988).  This definition excludes special toys that children imbue 
with personalities (i.e., personified objects) (Newson & Newson, 1968).  However, if 
these toys possess human-like characteristics (e.g., personalities) that go beyond 
providing the child with comfort, more current research includes them in the general 
definition (e.g., Klausen & Passman, 2007; Singer & Singer, 1981; Taylor, 1999).  
The presence of an imaginary companion is typically assessed via self-report 
measures (e.g., Bonne, Canetti, Bachar, De-Nour, & Shalev, 1998; Pearson et al., 2001; 
Schaefer, 1969; Seiffge-Krenke, 1993).  However, for younger children, researchers often 
supplement child reports with parent interviews (see Taylor, 1999).  In general, methods 
that rely solely on parent or on child reports can be misleading.  According to Taylor 
(1999), child reports are necessary because parents are not always aware of their 
children’s imaginary companions, or have limited or inaccurate information regarding the 
characteristics of these companions.  On the other hand, parent reports are helpful 
because some children might make up an imaginary companion during the interview 





corroborate the presence and general description of the imaginary companion, and 
children can provide detailed information about the nature and function of their imagined 
friends (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). 
Friendships with imaginary companions are less common than friendships with 
real peers, but the incidence can be quite high for children aged 7-years-old and younger.  
Depending on how imaginary companions are defined, frequencies can range from 23% 
for invisible friends (Pearson et al., 2001) to 65% for both invisible friends and for 
personified objects (Taylor, Carlson, Maring, Gerow & Charley, 2004).  Although 
imaginary companions tend to disappear as children age (Pearson et al. 2001), the 
creation of an imaginary companion is not limited to the preschool years.  Several studies 
have found that both school-age children (Hoff, 2005; Pearson et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 
2004) and adolescents (Bonne et al., 1998; Pearson et al.; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Taylor, 
Hulette, & Dishion, 2010) maintain their childhood companions, or create new ones.  
Diary-based companions (Seiffge-Krenke, 1993) and imagined relationships with 
celebrities and other media figures (i.e., “parasocial relationships”) are also found among 
younger and older age cohorts (Bond & Calvert, 2014; Gleason, 2013).  Although 
parasocial relationships are based on either real people or characters made up by other 
people, if the relationship has features that transcend reality (e.g., relationship qualities 
that have no real world basis), then these relationships are included in the general 
definition of an imaginary relationship (Gleason, 2013).   
Attributes of Imaginary Companions 
In real friendships, children are friends with peers who are similar to themselves 





2006).  However, many imaginary companions differ substantially from their creators, 
both in physical attributes and personality (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Mannering, 2006; 
Taylor, Shawber, & Mannering, 2009).  Some children create companions that are 
human, and are the same sex and age as their creator, but many children create invisible 
friends that are animals, objects, or unique fantastical creatures.  Taylor and Mannering 
(2006) found that in a sample of approximately 600 descriptions of imaginary 
companions, 40% were personified objects based on special toys and 60% were invisible 
friends.  Of these invisible friends, 34% of imaginary companions were described as 
ordinary people, 16% were humans with extraordinary powers (e.g., could fly), 15% were 
invisible animals, 8% were superheroes, ghosts or spirits, and 7% were fantastical or 
made up creatures (e.g., a world traveling Cyclops). 
Additionally, children vary in the extent to which they create imaginary 
companions with wholly positive personality traits or characteristics.  Some imaginary 
companions are described as possessing mostly positive qualities, such as being friendly, 
helpful, and compliant (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Mannering, 2006).  However, it is not 
uncommon for imaginary companions to have negative features as well, such as being 
bossy, annoying or argumentative (Taylor; Taylor & Mannering).  In the literature, these 
negative features are typically used as an index of the level of autonomy experienced by 
children when interacting with their imaginary companions (Gleason, 2013).  Although 
imaginary companions who always agree and comply with the child’s wishes might still 
be experienced as autonomous by the child, autonomy is more unambiguous when 
imaginary companions are described as willful, argumentative and non-compliant.  





relationships with their imaginary companions is considered normative, and not 
indicative of problems with reality monitoring (Taylor, Carlson, & Shawber, 2007).  
Typically-developing children are aware that their imaginary companions are not real, 
and many children explicitly point out the fantasy status of their imaginary companions 
in interviews with researchers (Taylor, Shawber & Mannering, 2009).  
Variations in autonomous behaviors are also described in terms of the social, 
emotional and physical “competencies” of the imaginary companion. The competence of 
the imaginary companion might depend partly on whether the friend is invisible or a 
personified object and on the creators’ gender.  Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup (2000) found 
that 80% of mothers of children with personified objects described children’s 
relationships with these toys as hierarchical, in which the child cared for and nurtured a 
less competent companion, whereas 57% of mothers of children with invisible friends 
described their children’s relationships with these imagined characters as egalitarian (i.e. 
in which both the child and the imaginary companion were equally competent).  Harter 
and Chao (1992) found that the competency of children’s invisible imaginary friends 
might vary in relation to gender.  In their sample, girls tended to create friends that were 
less competent (e.g., needing care), whereas boys tended to create friends that were more 
competent (e.g., could do things that the boys admired).  However, Coetzee and Shute 
(2003) found that both boys and girls rated their invisible imaginary companions as less 
competent than themselves and other research has found that imaginary companions are 








To date, little is known about the processes in which relationships with imaginary 
companions are formed.  Instead, efforts have been made to capture the reasons why 
children might create them.  Frequently, studies indicate that children create imaginary 
companions: (1) for fun and companionship (2) as a means to evade loneliness or 
boredom (3) to avoid blame for wrongdoings and (4) to bolster self esteem (Ames & 
Learned, 1946; Harter & Chao, 1992; Hoff, 2005; Klausen & Passman, 2007; Nagera, 
1969; Newson & Newson, 1968; Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, 1999).  Additionally, 
researchers frequently suggest that children might create imaginary companions as a 
means of coping with a range of environmental, situational, internal or chronic problems 
(Bender & Vogel, 1941; Carlson, Tahiroglu, & Taylor, 2008; Hoff, 2005; Singer, 1993; 
Singer & Streiner, 1966; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Sadeh, Hen-Gal, & Tikotzky, 2008; 
Taylor et al., 2010).  For example, Singer and Streiner found that blind children created 
imaginary companions who were sighted and could do things that the children themselves 
could not do (e.g., find hidden objects, read mail).  The authors suggest that blind 
children might create imaginary companions to cope with or compensate for their 
perceptual limitations. 
Friendship Quality in Imaginary Companions 
In spontaneous descriptions of imaginary companions, children often include the 
hallmarks of high quality friendships identified in the friendship literature, such as shared 
activities, mutual affection, and intimate exchange (e.g., Parker & Asher, 1993).  For 
example, school-age children frequently described their imaginary companions as 





homework), and emotional support for coping with negative emotions and difficult life 
experiences (Taylor & Aguiar, 2013).   
According to Gleason and colleagues (Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Hohmann, 
2006), children conceptualize their relationships with imaginary companions in ways that 
are similar to real friends.  In two separate studies, children were asked to report on the 
dimensions of friendship quality with real friends and imaginary companions. The 
procedure was adapted from a version of the NRI (Furman & Burhmester, 1985), which 
is based on Weiss’s (1974) social provisions theory.  In this theory, relationships are 
described as affording six social provisions (attachment, guidance, nurturance, reliable 
alliance, reassurance of worth, social integration).  Of these six provisions, one primary 
provision is what distinguishes one relationship from another (Cutrona & Russell, 1987).  
For example, nurturance might serve as the primary provision for parent child 
relationships, whereas reassurance of worth might serve as the primary provision for 
relationships with peers.  Multiple provisions can be obtained from one relationship, and 
these provisions can vary in importance based on context and development (e.g., the need 
for nurturance from parents might decrease as children age).     
In the first study (Gleason, 2002), 4-year-old children were asked to report on 
dimensions of conflict, instrumental help, power and nurturance for parents, siblings, a 
best friend and an imaginary companion.  Children with imaginary companions were 
more likely to attribute nurturance to their imaginary companion compared to a best 
friend (driven primarily by personified objects).  Additionally, children with invisible 
friends were more likely to attribute instrumental help to a best friend, whereas children 





their best friends.  However, across relationship affordances, children with either 
invisible friends or personified objects did not significantly differentiate imaginary 
companions and best friends, suggesting that overall, children conceptualize these 
relationships in ways that are similar.   
These findings were replicated in a subsequent study (Gleason & Hohmann, 
2006) examining children’s concepts of reciprocal friends, unilateral friends, non-friends 
and imaginary companions.  In this study, 4- and 5-year-old children nominated three 
friends from a class roster, who were later identified by experimenters as reciprocal 
friends or unilateral friends based on how often the dyadic pairings reported playing with 
each other (e.g., “play with a lot/not very much”).  Non-friends were identified as dyadic 
pairings in which children did not nominate each other as a friend, and indicated that they 
did not play with each other very often.  Children were then interviewed about imaginary 
companions.  In a follow-up session, children were asked to report on positive 
dimensions of friendship quality based on an adapted version of the NRI, including 
companionship, reliable alliance, affection and enhancement of worth for the four 
relationship types.  Children with imaginary companions rated all three types of 
friendships (imaginary companions, reciprocal friends, and unilateral friends) as 
providing greater levels of these positive dimensions compared to non-friends.  
Additionally, these positive dimensions were attributed more to imaginary companions 
than unilateral friends.  However, there were no statistical differences between imaginary 
companions and reciprocal friends across all five dimensions.  As in the original study 
(Gleason, 2002), these findings indicate that children conceptualized their imaginary 





The Developmental Significance of Imaginary Companions 
For children’s real friends, the absence of a close peer relationship is associated 
with risk, but for imaginary companions, it is the presence of a close relationship that has 
sometimes been regarded as a possible “red flag” for problematic psychological 
functioning- particularity in older children (Benson & Pryor, 1973; Freud, 1968; 
Svendsen, 1934).  However, research findings with both younger and older age cohorts 
are not consistent with this negative view.  Children might create imaginary companions 
when bored, lonely, or as a vehicle for coping, but they are not shy, withdrawn, or 
without real friends (Gleason, 2004; Mauro, 1991).  Studies examining the correlates of 
children with imaginary companions indicate that these children tend to be less shy than 
their peers (Mauro; Taylor, Sachet, Mannering & Maring, 2013), are well liked at school 
(Gleason), and are functioning well emotionally and psychologically (Taylor, 1999).  
Additionally, some studies have found that children with imaginary companions have 
advanced social understanding skills (Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014; Taylor & Carlson, 
1997).  Children with imaginary companions might also derive real benefits from these 
imagined friends in ways that are similar to real friendships.  
The most compelling evidence for the benefits of imaginary companions comes 
from studies examining how imaginary companions might help children cope with a 
range of environmental, situational, internal or chronic problems (Bender & Vogel, 1941; 
Hoff, 2005; Sadeh, Hen-Gal, & Tikotzky, 2008; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Singer, 1993; 
Singer & Streiner, 1966; Taylor et al., 2010).  For example, recent empirical work 
indicates that imaginary companions – like real friends – can be a protective buffer 





between imaginary companions and coping in adolescence, 152 at-risk 12-year-olds 
reported instances of imaginary companions (past, current or none), and were assessed 
for peer acceptance, problem behaviors and coping strategies (Taylor et al., 2010).  
Adolescents with current imaginary companions (9% of the sample) were found to 
endorse positive coping strategies, but also exhibited more problem behaviors and were 
rejected by their peers.  However, in a longitudinal follow-up after high school, 
adolescents who reported a current imaginary companion at age 12 showed more positive 
outcomes (i.e., high school diploma, no history of arrest, no record of substance abuse, 
and no mental health diagnoses) compared other adolescents in the sample.  
Currently, one of the most compelling studies examining the role of imaginary 
companions in coping with adversity comes from an intervention with personified objects 
(Sadeh et al., 2008).  In this study, 2 – 7-year-old Israeli children living in temporary war 
camps during the 2006 Israeli/Lebanon conflict experienced high levels of trauma-
induced stress, including trouble sleeping, separation anxiety, disinterest in play and 
increased startle responses.  To help children transition to their lives back at home when 
it was deemed safe, Sadeh and colleagues administered an intervention designed to 
ameliorate children’s stress related symptoms and to activate internal coping strategies. 
Children were randomly assigned to a standard educational intervention group for parents 
or the “Huggy Puppy” group in which children were given stuffed animals that were 
described as being far from home, emotionally vulnerable, and in need of care.  Children 
in the Huggy Puppy intervention group were then asked to care for the stuffed animal by 
playing with it, hugging it, and sleeping with it at night.  After three weeks, a 





decrease in the number and severity of stress related symptoms for children in the Huggy 
Puppy group.  Additionally, higher levels of attachment with the stuffed animal were 
associated with lower scores on the stress reaction checklist.  These results were later 
replicated on a larger sample of elementary school children who had also been adversely 
affected by the war.  
Considered together, descriptions of imaginary companions and empirical work 
suggest that children might rely on imaginary companions in ways that are similar to their 
real friendships.  As with real friends, children might turn to imaginary companions for 
comfort, companionship, protection and security.  And like children’s real friends, the 
benefits from relationships with these imagined friends could be not only real, but long 
lasting.   
Summary 
 Although children’s real and imaginary friendships diverge in a number of ways 
(prevalence, forms, and attributes), reciprocities are a defining feature of both types of 
relationships.  In friendships with imaginary companions, children act as the sole vehicle 
of imagined reciprocities that, with some exceptions (e.g., when a child gives voice to an 
imaginary companion), are unobservable to others outside of the relationship.  Some 
imaginary companions are more clearly autonomous than others, with personalities 
described by children as wild, bossy or unruly.  However, children who create imaginary 
companions are not out of touch with reality; they readily recognize that these friendships 
are not real.   
Nevertheless, children conceptualize their relationships with imaginary 





children frequently describe features found in high quality friendships with real peers, 
such as affection, guidance, and intimate exchange.  Additionally, statistical comparisons 
between real and imaginary friends have shown that children attribute similar features to 
both types of relationships, such as companionship, reliable alliance and enhancement of 
worth.  Children might also derive real benefits from their imaginary companions, in 
ways that are similar to real friendships. Imaginary companions could provide 
companionship and comfort during stressful life events, and might serve as a protective 
factor in high-risk social environments.  Additionally, imaginary companions might help 
children reduce internalizing symptoms by activating their own internal resources for 
coping with extreme environmental stressors.  Together, these findings suggest that 
children’s imaginary companions can have a real and potentially lasting impact on 
development. 
If relationships with imaginary companions affect children’s development, can the 
same case be made for relationships with the virtual agents encountered on apps, websites 
and videogames?  In imaginary relationships, children create their companions and 
facilitate imagined interactions with them.  On the other hand, programmers develop 
virtual agents that are capable of responding socially to children in observable ways.  
How might this ontological ambiguity – being not alive but able to respond in ways that 
appear real – affect children’s concepts of these agents as potential friendship partners?  
In the following section, I review the extant literature on children’s concepts of and 
interactions with virtual agents, as well as complementary research on avatars, social 
robots and other traditional media platforms (i.e. television).  Drawing from research on 





complex social entity, affording both unique and overlapping relationship qualities with 
children’s real and imaginary friends.   
Relationships with Virtual Agents 
Virtual agents fall under the umbrella of personified conversational agents -- 
technologies designed to mimic gestural and affective behaviors, personality traits, and 
social scripts for the purposes of simulating real life relationships (Freier, 2008).  Also 
referred to as embodied conversational agents (Cassell, 2000), virtual agents can take on 
a variety of forms, including embodied virtual agents encountered in apps, websites and 
videogames, as well as disembodied voice interfaces encountered in smart phones (e.g., 
“Siri”), automated checkouts, and voice-activated navigations systems (Freier, 2008).   It 
is important to note that these agents are all operated by Artificial Intelligence (AI); thus, 
“avatars” are not considered virtual agents.  Avatars, unlike virtual agents, are embodied 
representations of a human operator in a screen-based or fully immersive virtual 
environment (Fox et al., 2015).  Additionally, social robots fall under the umbrella of 
personified conversational agents, but are also not classified as virtual agents because 
they are embodied in physical (rather than digitized) space.  However, to fill gaps in the 
research on virtual agents, studies with both avatars and social robots will be discussed. 
Currently, children’s exposure to sophisticated virtual agents remains limited, 
particularly for younger age cohorts (Rideout, 2013).  However, according to Blascovich 
and Bailenson (2011), the foray into virtual environments with increasingly sophisticated 
virtual agents is inevitable -- even for very young children.  Indeed, the advent of touch 
technologies has made it possible for children under the age of one to interact with 





38% of children under the age of two have used mobile screen-based devices to access 
digital media (Rideout, 2013).  Given that these data are now three years old, is it is likely 
that the number of children exposed to digital content at younger ages has continued to 
rise as digital media and portable devices evolve.   
Attributes of Virtual Agents 
The form of embodied virtual agents is constrained only by the programmer’s 
imagination. They can be animals, humans, artifacts (e.g., Microsoft’s “Clippy”), or 
fantastical novel creatures.  In research settings, embodied forms vary widely, but in 
video games, agents are constrained in visual appearance (e.g., a narrow range of 
fantastical creatures), and in their functions (e.g., enemy combatants). Video games for 
younger children often have animal agents, whereas games for older children are more 
likely to have humanoid agents.  Additionally, boys and girls cite different motivations 
for playing videogames (Olsen, 2010), which might lead them to interactions with 
different types of virtual agents.  For example, in research with adults, men report 
preferring role-playing games where they are likely to encounter more sophisticated 
agents, whereas women report preferring more traditional types of games (e.g., virtual 
board games) that might include less sophisticated or disembodied agents (Lucas & 
Sherry, 2004).      
Not much information has been documented about the personalities and 
competencies of agents currently available to children in apps, websites and games.  
However, context generally provides clues as to their nature and functions.  In some 
educational studies, teaching and learning are programmed as a reciprocal exchange, 





Finkelstein et al., 2013).  Thus, in this context, the agent should be perceived as equally 
competent, and in some cases more competent than the child player.  In naturalistic 
settings, many video games for younger children are designed to teach them to nurture 
and care for a virtual pet that is less competent than the child and dependent on 
“affection” and instructional input from the child player.  Additionally, virtual pets and 
other synthetic agents (such as social robots) are programmed to “learn” from human 
input.  For example, Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO, responds to tactile input, which can 
discourage or reinforce certain behaviors, thus shaping the robot’s “personality” (Kahn et 
al., 2013).  Therefore, children often have some creative control over these types of 
agents, although there are significant limitations due to the context and the level of 
programming sophistication.  
The Formation of Relationships with Virtual Agents 
Currently, there is a paucity of research examining the processes by which 
children might develop relationships with virtual agents.  However, Blascovich and 
Bailenson, (2011) describe a general theory of virtual behavior that provides a useful 
framework for discussing ways in which children might relate to and be influenced by 
virtual agents.  According to Blascovich and Bailenson, there are five tenets that govern 
behavior towards avatars and agents:  (1) the degree to which the agent is perceived as 
sentient, (2) the “communicative realism” of the agent (in both form and social 
behaviors), (3) how children and adults consciously and unconsciously respond to the 
agent, (4) the degree to which the agent is socially relevant to the child, and (5) the 





Concepts of sentience.  Much of the research examining children’s concepts of 
personified technologies has focused on social robots.  Initial studies have examined the 
ways in which children might view robotic artifacts as possessing agency, biological 
properties, volition, emotions, and mental states (Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kahn, 
Friedman, Pérez-Granados, & Freier, 2006).  Although young children clearly recognized 
robotic entities as non-living, they attribute psychological characteristics, such as 
intentions and mental states to these artifacts (Kahn et al., 2006).  This incongruence in 
children’s concepts has been captured in the “new ontological category” hypothesis 
(Kahn, Gray, & Shen, 2013), which attempts to account for children’s complex and 
multifaceted judgments about the reality status of social robots (Jipson & Gelman; 
Severson & Carlson, 2010).  According to this view, children and adults treat new 
technologies that simulate both social exchanges and social relationships as a new and 
unique category of human artifacts -- non-biological agents that are neither “alive” nor 
“not alive” (Kahn et al., 2013; Severson & Carlson, 2010).   
Subsequent research on human/robot interactions is consistent with the new 
ontological category hypothesis (Kahn et al., 2006; Kahn et al., 2013; Turkle, 2007). 
Both children and adults treat social robots – even those that vary in their level of 
sophistication – as sentient beings that are capable of thinking, feeling and experiencing 
discomfort or pain.  For example, in an experiment conducted by Baird (as cited in 
Turkle, 2011), adults were willing to hold a Barbie doll upside down significantly longer 
than the popular robotic pet “Furby.” The adults knew Furby could not actually 





suffering.  However, an alternative explanation is that the adults simply wanted to turn 
off Furby’s wails of “discomfort” that occurred until the toy was turned upright.  
In a more convincing demonstration, Kahn et al. (2012) found that school age 
children attributed mental states (i.e., the ability to have feelings and experience sadness) 
to a humanoid robot, Robovie, after an experimenter interrupted its turn during a game 
and made it return to its closet.  Finally, in one of the first studies to examine children’s 
concepts of virtual agents, Freier (2008) found that school-age children attributed moral 
standing to a female agent.  In this study, an experimenter chided a virtual agent for 
making a mistake during a game of tic-tac-toe.  In the experimental condition in which 
the agent expressed psychological harm (e.g., “hurt feelings”), children described the act 
of chiding as morally wrong.  
 Communicative realism.  According to Blascovich and Bailenson (2011), 
virtual agents are more likely to have social influence on children and adults if they can 
successfully simulate human forms of non-verbal communication. These forms include 
photorealism (in which the agent looks human) and movement realism (in which the 
gestures, facial expressions and postures appear human).  
In research with adults, the presence of a face is the most necessary feature for a 
sense of communicative realism (Yee, Bailenson, & Rickertsen, 2007; Blascovich & 
Bailenson, 2011).  In a meta analysis conducted by Yee et al. (2007), the presence of a 
face was more influential than faceless shapes and disembodied voices; however, effect 
sizes did not differ as a function of photorealism, indicating that the level of photorealism 
was not as important for social influence in virtual environments.  In fact, high levels of 





“uncanny valley” phenomenon first described by the roboticist, Masahiro Mori (1970).  
According to this theory, there is a tipping point in photorealism where familiarity with 
the agent plummets as a function of discomfort or repulsion, which is further enhanced 
by movement.  However, research directly testing the uncanny valley has produced 
mixed results (e.g., Bartneck, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2009; Seyama & Nagayama, 
2007).  For example, Bartneck et al. (2009) found that adults rated a highly realistic 
doppelgänger robot as equally likeable compared to its human counterpart, whereas 
Seyama and Nagayama (2007) found that morphed virtual faces were rated by adults as 
significantly less pleasant when they crossed a critical threshold from unrealistic to 
highly realistic (i.e., when participants detected “buggy” eyes in the face of a virtual 
agent).   
In research with children, the development of virtual agents has largely focused 
on both verbal and non-verbal forms of communication that can help build rapport 
between the child and the agent in interventions or instructional settings (e.g., Cassell, 
2000; Yu, Gerritsen, Ogan, Black, & Cassell, 2013; Zhao, Papangelis, & Cassell, 2014).  
In these studies, computational models are built based on children’s dyadic interactions 
with friends.  These models are then used to program the socially contingent behaviors of 
a virtual agent (e.g., appropriate eye gaze, head movements, physical gestures and 
linguistic corpus).  Thus, computational models are built to enable the agent to engage in 
the appropriate social reciprocities found in children’s real friendships.  However, 






Conscious and unconscious responses.  Blascovich and Bailenson (2011) 
discuss how adults respond to agents in ways that are outside their conscious control.  For 
example, adults flinch when thrown a virtual punch, even though they are consciously 
aware that a virtual punch cannot cause pain (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011).  Conscious 
and unconscious responses are further demonstrated in the incongruencies between 
adults’ verbal and behavioral responses to computers (Freier, 2008; Nass & Yen, 2010).  
Nass, Moon, & Green (1997) provide a particularly compelling example of this 
incongruence in a study in which adults unconsciously treated computers as “gendered”. 
Adults were randomly assigned to receive tutorials about love/relationships or physics 
from a computer with a male or female voice.  In general, computers with male voices 
were rated as friendlier and more competent than computers with female voices.  
However, there was a significant interaction between tutorial subject and computer voice.  
Participants who heard the love/relationship tutorial from a female voice and the physics 
tutorial from a male voice rated the computers as more competent than computers that did 
not have voices matched for these stereotypically gendered subjects. When asked about 
the gender of the computer’s voice, participants denied being influenced by the gender of 
the voice or harboring gendered stereotypes and did not believe that the voice represented 
the identity of the programmer, who they uniformly described as male. 
In children, verbal and behavioral inconsistencies are common across a broad 
range of studies, including the fantasy reality distinction, mathematical equivalences, and 
concepts of personified technologies (Kahn et al., 2006; Woolley, 2006).  For example, 
children in Kahn et al.’s study attributed the experience of pain to both a stuffed dog and 





stuffed dog during a free-play session.  Because children are developing ontological 
knowledge about social agents and knowledge about social expectations, inconsistencies 
between verbal and behavioral measures afford the opportunity to examine how children 
conceptualize personified agents. Woolley (2006) cites several possible explanations for 
inconsistencies in verbal and behavioral responses that can help inform future research on 
children’s concepts of virtual agents, including task difficulty, levels of uncertainty, as 
well as the child’s goals during the task.  Thus, any task examining children’s concepts of 
virtual agents should use multiple measures, and should consider how the task difficulty 
and goals might influence the child’s responses across measures. 
Social relevance.  In research examining young children’s ability to learn from 
video, Krcmar (2010) and Lauricella, Gola, and Calvert (2011) describe social relevance 
as the identity of the actor or character (e.g., beloved or unknown media character), and 
the perception that the actor or character can respond to the child in ways that are socially 
contingent (e.g., looking at the child, pausing for a reply).  Although there is no current 
research examining the effects of social relevance on children’s relationships with virtual 
agents, there is empirical support for this idea with more traditional media platforms.  
Lauricella et al. found that toddlers were best able to perform a serialization task when 
learning from a video with a socially relevant media character (Elmo from Sesame Street) 
compared with a less relevant media character (DoDo, a puppet popular in Taiwan). 
Therefore, the social relevance of the virtual agent might be particularly meaningful for 
the development of a relationship. 
Context.  Finally, Blascovich and Bailenson (2011) suggest that the four other 





communicative realism, conscious and unconscious responses, and social relevance) 
depend on context.  Context can be based on the type of platform (e.g., immersive vs. 
non-immersive), the content or function of the virtual reality (e.g., video game vs. social 
networking site), and/or the type of personified technology (e.g., avatar vs. agent).  For 
example, adults are generally more influenced by avatars than by virtual agents, but fully 
immersive virtual reality closes this gap in social influence (Fox et al., 2015).  Given the 
diversity of the virtual environments available to children, future research will need to 
consider how the particular context might shape children’s concepts of and interactions 
with virtual agents.   
Relationship Qualities with Virtual Agents 
Across studies examining child and adult interactions with personified 
technologies, research findings support the hypothesis that these agents are 
conceptualized as an emerging social category (Kahn et al., 2013), and are capable of 
influencing human behavior (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011).  However, there are a 
limited number of studies directly examining children’s relationships with virtual agents.  
To date, much of the existing empirical and qualitative work has been conducted with 
social robots.  In general, both children and adults conceptualize and treat these social 
agents as relationship partners.  In a study conducted by Kahn et al. (2006), the majority 
of preschool age children indicted that it would be possible to have a reciprocal 
relationship with the sophisticated robotic dog, AIBO, based on mutual “liking” and 
reciprocated feelings of friendship.  In addition, qualitative studies conducted by Turkle 
and colleagues have shown that young children, adults, and the elderly form strong 





human/animal relationships (e.g., confiding in them, communicating verbal and physical 
affection, and describing them as irreplaceable if broken or taken away) (see Turkle, 
2011 for a review).  Based on these findings, it is possible that children might 
conceptualize virtual agents as potential friendship partners, and form attachments to 
them. 
However, these findings raise questions regarding the role of creative control in 
children’s relationships with personified agents.  In relationships with imaginary 
companions, there are minimal constraints on the forms, functions and features of these 
friendships, and the ways they can evolve over time.  However, virtual agents are 
currently limited by the level of programming sophistication, and by the inputs available 
to the child for modifications of the agent’s form and functions.  Therefore, programming 
constraints might produce a set of tightly scripted social exchanges that cannot evolve 
through continued interactions.  Thus, it is possible that programming might actually 
hinder the development of a friendship with an agent. 
Developmental Significance of Relationships with Virtual Agents 
To date, little is known about the extent to which virtual agents might influence 
children’s social, emotional and moral functioning.  However, recent and on-going 
intervention research suggests that, like children’s real friendships, virtual agents could 
have the capacity to influence academic functioning (Cassell et al., 2009; Finkelstein et 
al., 2013), the development of social skills (Milne, Luerssen, Lewis, Leibbrandt, & 
Powers, 2010), and the development of empathy (Tsai & Kaufman, 2009).  For example, 
Cassell and colleagues have developed “virtual peers” that are currently being used to 





children (Cassell et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012). These 
studies have shown that discrepancies in familiar and academic language could account 
for differences in scientific learning, and virtual peers are being successfully utilized to 
bridge this divide (Finkelstein et al., 2013).  Additionally, Milne and colleagues (2010) 
have developed a virtual agent that helps children with Autism Spectrum Disorders gain 
conversational skills and cope with bullying.  
Finally, a recent study Tsai and Kaufman (2009), has shown that virtual pets can 
be used to enhance empathy and humane attitudes towards animals.  In this study, school 
age children with no pets at home were given the Nintendogs® virtual pet game for three 
weeks, and asked to care for a virtual dog by cleaning it, feeding it, taking it on walks, 
and providing it with affection. Ninety-two percent of the children in this study described 
the virtual agent as akin to a real pet because it behaved like a real dog and because it 
needed to be cared for.  Additionally, compared to pre-test scores, both girls and boys 
showed improved scores on measures of empathy and humane attitudes towards animals.   
Summary 
Reciprocity is paramount to the study and development of virtual agents because 
virtual agents are being programmed to simulate human relationships.  Current research 
on virtual agents and other personified technologies has focused on the anthropomorphic 
attributes and the socially contingent forms of non-verbal communication that can help 
establish rapport with virtual agents and facilitate social influence in virtual 
environments.  For example, researchers like Cassell and colleagues have used 
computational models of dyadic interactions between friends to program these 





The observable reciprocities that are part of the programming of virtual agents 
present an ontological dilemma: virtual agents are not embodied in the real world, but 
their movements are viewable, their “voices” are audible, and their “emotions” are 
detectable.  It is likely that this ambiguity shapes children’s concepts of virtual agents, 
and the qualities that characterize relationships with these entities.  However, little is 
known about how children conceptualize these agents, and the extent to which they view 
them as friendship partners.  Research with social robots indicates that children recognize 
that robots are not alive, but still attribute psychological and perceptual properties to 
these agents.  Additionally, children believe friendships are possible with social robots, 
although the qualities that might comprise these relationships are unknown.  
Goals of the Dissertation 
Across relationships with peers, imaginary companions and virtual agents, two 
themes emerge that inform the study of children’s relationships with virtual agents.  First, 
real and imagined reciprocities are key to understanding friendships with real and 
imaginary others.  By definition, the reciprocities inherent in children’s real and 
imaginary friendships are fundamental features of these relationships, and differ only in 
the extent to which these reciprocities are within or outside a child’s creative control 
(Gleason, 2013).  It is not always straightforward to make this determination.  For 
example, according to Gleason (2013), video game characters should be viewed as 
imaginary companions because their reality status falls within the continuum of 
companionships based on real life (e.g., an imaginary companion based on a real friend) 
and those based purely on fantasy (e.g., a fantastical creature made up by the child).  





games are capable of producing appropriate, socially contingent responses to the child 
player.  In other words the social exchanges that occur within these virtual worlds are at 
least partly outside the child’s creative control, and thus are more “real” than imagined.  
This ambiguity – being unreal but socially responsive – might influence both child and 
adult conceptions of these entities, and the relationship features they attribute to these 
entities. 
Second, real and imaginary friendships have both distinct and overlapping 
relationship qualities or affordances.  If children view virtual agents as potential 
friendship partners, then it is possible that relationships with these entities have both 
distinctive features and ones that overlap with the features of real and imaginary 
friendships. Given the importance of context in relationships on and offline (Blascovich 
& Bailenson; Weiss, 1974), it is possible the perceptions of virtual entities, as well as 
features of relationships with the entities, differ based on the embodied forms and the 
digital environment.  For example, children might attribute nurturance to an agent in a 
virtual pet game, but not to a humanoid agent in a learning/adventure game.   
Because so little is currently known about how children conceptualize virtual 
entities, the primary goals of this dissertation research were to investigate child concepts 
of virtual agents and the extent to which they are viewed as relationship partners.  I 
examined children’s concepts of these entities in two contexts: (1) with a virtual dog 
embedded in a virtual pet game and (2) with a novel humanoid agent described as being 
in a video game.  Across studies, children were also asked to attribute a range of social 
and non-social properties to other possible relationship partners, including inanimate toys 





which preschool-age children might differentiate the social affordances of virtual dog 
from a stuffed dog on features of high quality friendships, as well as opportunities for 
learning and entertainment.  Study 3 was conducted with adults with the goal of 
developing items that could be used in a follow up study with children assessing concepts 
of a humanoid agent.  I was also interested in exploring with adults the ways in which 
autonomy, creative control and embodiment might relate to concepts of a humanoid 
agent.  Items that successfully captured a range of properties including biological, 
psychological and social functioning were then used in Study 4 with preschool and 
school age children.  
In Chapter II, I report on Studies 1 and 2, which were conducted in collaboration 
with Marjorie Taylor, Ph.D. and published in 2015.  Due to requirements mandated by 
the journal, these studies are reproduced as they originally appeared in the special issue 
















STUDIES 1 AND 2: CHILDREN’S CONCEPTS OF THE SOCIAL AFFORDANCES 
OF A VIRTUAL DOG AND A STUFFED DOG 
Overview of this Published Work 
The studies described in this chapter were co-authored with Marjorie Taylor, 
Ph.D.  Together, Dr. Taylor and I developed the Social Affordances Task that was used 
with participants in both studies, as well as individual items that were used in the task 
itself.  I drafted the original content of this manuscript, with editing support from Dr. 
Taylor.  The finalized version of the manuscript consists of a combination of my original 
work, revisions made by Dr. Taylor, and incorporated suggestions made by the experts 
who reviewed this manuscript, including Angeline Lillard, Ph.D. and Jacqueline 
Woolley, Ph.D. 
These studies were published in a special issue of Cognitive Development, 
“Cognizing the Unreal” (Volume 34), in 2015.  They are reproduced here with 
permission from Elsevier as they originally appeared in the journal. 
Introduction 
The social lives of young children are filled with a wide range of relationship 
partners, including parents, siblings, caretakers, and peers.  This diverse social network 
provides experiences that help children appreciate the special social affordances of 
friendship (Gleason & Hohmann, 2006).  Children as young as 20 months engage in the 
reciprocal patterns of behavior found in friendships (Ross, Conant, Cheyne, & Alevizos, 
1992) and by four years of age, they conceptualize friendships in terms of shared 





According to Gleason (2013), discussions of the social networks of both children 
and adults should include relationships with a wide range of imaginary others, in addition 
to relationships with real people.  In this analysis, Gleason discusses relationships with 
imaginary companions, diary friends, celebrities, deceased loved ones, and the fictional 
characters in novels.  In addition, advances in Artificial Intelligence are providing many 
new opportunities for imaginary relationships with robots and with virtual characters 
portrayed on technological devices.  There is a growing literature on children’s 
relationships with social robots (e.g., Kahn, Gary, & Shen, 2013), but little is known 
about their relationships with the virtual entities encountered on websites and in computer 
games.  Our research provides some preliminary information by exploring children’s 
intuitions about the social affordances of a virtual character in a Nintendogs game.  
Social Robots vs. Stuffed Animals as Social Partners 
According to Turkle (2011), the goals for smart toys have shifted from building 
knowledge or helping children practice skills to providing companionship.  “For decades 
computers have asked us to think with them; these days, computers and robots, deemed 
sociable, affective and relational, ask us to feel for and with them” (p. 39).  Social robots 
are programmed to express needs and solicit caregiving, with updated versions providing 
increasingly realistic cues to mimic intentionality, personality, and emotions, as well as 
greater capacities for voice, facial, and emotional recognition (Kahn et al., 2013; Minato, 
Shimada, Ishiguro & Itakura, 2004). Research investigating children’s concepts of robots 
suggests that although they recognize that robots are not alive (Jipson & Gelman, 2007), 
they nevertheless believe that friendships are possible, and attempt to engage them in 





Kahn and his colleagues have conducted much of the work in this area, focusing 
on how children think about and interact with a sophisticated robotic dog named AIBO 
(Friedman, Kahn & Hagman, 2003).  In one study, 3- to 6-year-old children’s answers to 
yes/no questions about animacy, biological properties, mental states, moral standing, and 
social rapport were very similar for AIBO and a stuffed dog (Kahn et al., 2006). 
However, children’s behavior with AIBO over an interactive play session (about 35 
minutes) reflected an expectation of reciprocity, whereas their behavior with the stuffed 
dog included more animations (e.g., making it move).  Children recognized that the robot 
dog generated behaviors, but that they were controlling the behaviors of the stuffed dog.  
Given AIBO’s impressive ability to initiate interactions and respond to children’s 
behaviors, it might seem surprising that children did not clearly differentiate AIBO from 
a stuffed dog when they were asked about the possibility of friendship.  However, 
children often conceptualize personified objects in ways that are similar to real 
friendships (Gleason, 2002) and their descriptions often include Parker and Asher’s 
(1993) hallmarks of high quality friendships (e.g., shared activities, caring, and intimate 
exchange).  In addition, children often describe these toys as autonomous agents capable 
of thinking, feeling, and acting (e.g., a stuffed dog that likes to ride in cars and go 
camping, but is afraid of the dark) (Taylor, Sachet, Maring, & Mannering, 2013).  
Moreover, stuffed animals can contribute to real-world resilience.  In two experiments 
conducted after the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, children (3- to 6 years) who were given a 
stuffed dog to care for were rated by their parents as having fewer stress-related 
symptoms at a two-month follow up than children in a control condition (Sadeh, Hen-





Clearly, it is important not to underestimate children’s capacity to form 
attachments to stuffed animals and the potential of these imagined relationships to 
provide real world comforts.  Instead of expecting that social robots might be even more 
readily adopted as social partners, one might ask if the programmed behaviors of a social 
robot might reduce children’s control over interactions, ultimately making the social 
robot a less attractive partner for the exchange and affection that characterize friendship.  
Virtual Characters vs. Stuffed Animals as Social Partners  
Research on anthropomorphism–the attribution of human-like traits to non-human 
animals and inanimate objects–suggests that preschool children readily endow inanimate 
objects with intentionality, emotions, and personalities, even without all the cues 
provided by advanced social robots (Piaget, 1929).  However, anthropomorphism 
research also reveals how important the characteristics of movement are to the attribution 
of intentionality and animacy (e.g., whether the movement is autonomous) (Epley, 
Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007).  The body movements and facial expressiveness of social 
robots are improving with every upgrade, but the realism and subtlety of movement and 
expression that is possible on a screen are currently far beyond what any social robot can 
achieve.  Even simple two-dimensional geometric shapes moving around a screen can 
communicate complex social interactions.  By five years of age, many children provided 
anthropomorphic interpretations of Heider and Simmel’s (1944) animated film of 
geometric shapes (e.g., a “mean” large triangle scaring a small triangle that was “afraid”) 
(Springer, Meier, & Berry, 1996).  
The strong anthropomorphic cues that are possible with screen-based characters 





relationships.  But from our point of view, an equally important motivation for this 
research is the increasing presence of virtual entities.  Social robots like AIBO are 
expensive (about $2000) and do not yet pervade children’s lives.  But recent 
technological advances provide many new ways for children to engage with virtual 
characters and children’s interactions with virtual characters in apps, websites and 
videogames are substantial.  American children between five and eight years spend an 
average of 29 minutes per day playing video and computer games (Rideout, 2013).    
Intangible virtual characters have particularly compelling movement cues to 
intentionality, and, like social robots, many come equipped with programmed responses 
intended to simulate the reciprocal patterns of behavior found in human and 
human/animal relationships.  For example, in Nintendogs, virtual dogs appear tired and 
dirty when they need to be fed and bathed, and lick the screen to elicit "physical" 
affection.  Children respond to these cues for caretaking, but do they confide in a virtual 
character or tell it stories?  The programming elicits reciprocity that might make the 
potential for friendship salient to young children.  On the other hand, limitations in the 
range of programmed behaviors might constrain the nature of children’s interactions with 
the character. In the case of stuffed animals, children have creative control over the 
interactions, but reciprocity–which is fundamental to friendship–is entirely imagined.  
In two exploratory studies, we investigated how children differentiate the social 
affordances of a virtual screen-based dog and a stuffed dog.  To avoid the response biases 
that can characterize children’s responses to a long series of yes/no questions, we used a 
guessing game in which children indicated whether another child might be talking about 





allowed for a more sensitive measure of possible differences in children’s intuitions.  For 
example, children might consider both dogs to be potential friends (and thus answer 
“yes” in response to yes/no questions about friendship), but consider friendship to be a 
stronger possibility for the stuffed dog (and thus choose the stuffed dog when given a 
forced choice).  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants.  The participants were 16 European-American children and their 
mothers (n = 15), including 1 pair of siblings, recruited from a database of children in a 
middle class community (M = 66.56 months, range = 48 – 83 months, 8 girls and 8 boys).  
One additional child was dropped because she was below chance on distracter items that 
were designed to determine if children understood the Social Affordances Task. 
Materials.  A stuffed dog wearing a red collar and a virtual dog wearing a yellow 
collar (both fawn-colored pugs with black faces) were used in the experiment.  The 
virtual dog was part of the videogame Nintendogs® displayed on a Nintendo 3DS® game 
console. During the introductory phase of the experiment, real and virtual brushes, as 
well as feeding props (a real dog bone and bowl, virtual dog treats) were used.  The 
virtual props were chosen because they were accessible in a side bar menu in the 
Nintendogs® game.  Items used in the Social Affordances Task were presented in a video 
featuring a child who was approximately the same age as the participant.  Eight videos 
were used, four with a boy (shown to the male participants) and four with a girl (shown to 
the female participants), with the introduction order of the two dogs and the location of 





played on a 13" laptop computer.  Three 3.5" × 4.5" pictures (see Figure 1) representing 
the response options were used for the Social Affordances Task (i.e., pictures of the 
stuffed dog, the virtual dog, and both dogs separated by a backslash symbol).   
 
 
Figure 1. Picture stimuli corresponding to the response options. 
 
Procedure.  Following the informed consent procedures, experimenters escorted 
the children and their parents to separate rooms.  Parents were asked demographic 
questions and questions about their children’s familiarity with the Nintendo 3DS® 
console, the Nintendogs® game, and other virtual pet games/apps.  The children were 
introduced to a stuffed dog (“Stuffy”) and a virtual dog (“iPuppy”), with the order 
counterbalanced across participants.  The experimenter modeled petting, feeding, and 
brushing both dogs using the props and asked participants to repeat these actions.  
In the Social Affordances Task, children were asked whether each of a series of 34 
statements referred to the stuffed dog or the virtual dog, or could refer to either dog.  
Twenty-eight statements concerned a range of social affordances.  These items were 
inspired by research on dimensions of friendship quality (Parker & Asher, 1993), 
relationships with imaginary companions (Gleason, 2002; Taylor, 1999), and the claims 
about education and entertainment in materials used to promote the Nintendogs® game.  





were not clear.2 In addition, there were six distracters, including two unambiguous 
descriptions of the stuffed dog, two unambiguous descriptions of the virtual dog, and two 
ambiguous descriptions that could refer to either dog.  The 25 social affordance 
items(excluding the three omitted items) are listed in Table 1 as they appeared in the 
video, along with the six distracters.  
The experimenter introduced the video, saying, “Now I’m going to show you a 
video of a little boy/girl named Noah/Sarah.  Noah/Sarah has both dogs at home.  Let me 
show you what I mean by that.” The experimenter played the first part of the video in 
which Noah or Sarah introduced the stuffed dog and virtual dog.  Then the experimenter 
told participants that the child would tell them about his/her dogs. “Sometimes 
Noah/Sarah will be talking about Stuffy, sometimes Noah/Sarah will be talking about 
iPuppy, and sometimes you just can’t tell–he/she could be talking about either Stuffy or 
iPuppy.”  As the experimenter stated these possibilities, the pictures representing the 
response options were placed on the table in the same location as the stuffed dog and 
virtual dog appeared in the video.  The picture representing the “either one” response was 
placed between the pictures of the stuffed and virtual dog.  After the child in the video 
made each statement, participants indicated which dog he or she was talking about.  
                                                 
2 The item “S/He’s just a toy” was dropped because children’s spontaneous comments 
indicated that some children interpreted the item as referring to whether or not the object 
was animate, whereas other children interpreted the item as meaning that the object was 
not more special than a regular toy (our intended meaning).  The items “I’d like to trade 
him/her in for a new one” and “Even when s/he gets old, I don’t want a new one; I just 
want him/her” were dropped because although their meanings are the opposite of each 
other, many children gave the same response to both questions.  This pattern suggested 
that children were interpreting the meaning differently than we intended or they were 





The task began with three practice statements.  The child in the video made an 
unambiguous statement about the stuffed dog (“S/He has a red collar”), then an 
unambiguous statement about the virtual dog (“S/He has a yellow collar), followed by a 
statement that could be about either dog (“S/He has a collar”).  After each statement, the 
video was paused and the experimenter asked, “Which dog do you think s/he’s talking 
about?  Point to the picture of the dog you think s/he’s talking about.”  All the children 
responded correctly to the three practice statements. 
Then the experimenter said, “Okay, now we’re ready to play the game.  
Noah/Sarah is going to tell you some things about his/her dogs and your job is to guess 
which one s/he is talking about.  If you think s/he’s talking about Stuffy, point to the 
picture of Stuffy, like this.  If you think s/he’s talking about iPuppy, point to the picture 
of iPuppy, like this.  And if it’s hard to tell -- if you think s/he could be talking about 
either Stuffy or iPuppy–point to this picture here (the either option), like this.”  For the 
first three items, the video was paused and the experimenter prompted children to 
respond (i.e., “Which dog do you think s/he’s talking about?”).  For the rest of the items, 
unless the child showed signs of hesitation, the experimenter played each item and 
paused the video to allow children to select a response.  The children were not given 
feedback.  The items were presented in a randomized order.  (We compared children’s 
responses for the first and second half of the items and found that endorsements for 
Stuffy, iPuppy, and “either” did not vary between the halves, suggesting that fatigue or 
practice did not affect the results.)   
In order to assess children’s interest in the two dogs, children chose one of the 





another research project (about 15 minutes).  Finally, children were asked which dog they 
liked better and why, and whether they had a stuffed dog, a real dog, or any other pets at 
home.  The session lasted about one hour and children were given $10 for participating. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows the number of children who selected the stuffed dog, the virtual 
dog, or the “either one” option.  Except for one child who was dropped, the children were 
accurate for the six distracters (Mcorrect = 4.94, SD = 1.18), indicating that they were 
attending to the task.  However, Table 1 shows that children did not differentiate between 
the stuffed dog and virtual dog for the social affordance items.  They frequently 
responded that the items could refer to either dog (3 of the 16 children chose  “either one” 
for 90% or more of the items).  When children did endorse a preference, binomial tests 
revealed that children’s responses were equally split between Stuffy and iPuppy, ps > .05, 
except for the two contact comfort items, which were attributed to the stuffed dog, ps < 
.05.  However, some children might have interpreted these questions as contrasting the 
stuffed dog vs. the virtual dog on the screen of the game console (which is impossible to 
hold) instead of the stuffed dog vs. the physical game console (which can be held).  
Nevertheless, the clear preference for Stuffy for these items indicates that the task can 
potentially show differences in children’s intuitions about the two dogs when those 
differences exist. 
When asked which dog they liked the best, 12 of the 16 children chose iPuppy 
and all 16 children chose iPuppy as the toy they wanted to play with.  Eleven of the 16 





and at least 15 of the 16 children had never played the Nintendogs® game (one parent did 
not respond to this question).   
 
Table 1 
Study 1: Children’s endorsements for the different response options 
 
However, despite their interest in the Nintendogs® game, children did not assume that 
the child in the video was talking about the virtual dog.  Even for items such as “I play 
Social Affordance Items Stuffy iPuppy Either 
S/He entertains me. 1 7 8 
I like to figure out what s/he can do. 5 3 8 
I know I can trust him/her. 6 2 8 
I always feel like checking to see what s/he is doing. 4 4 8 
S/He always does what I want him/her to do. 5 6 5 
I’m proud of him/her. 3 4 9 
S/He needs me to take care of him/her. 7 2 7 
Sometimes I think s/he’s boring.  6 5 5 
S/He helps me feel better when I am sad. 4 5 7 
I like to find ways to teach him/her new tricks. 6 6 4 
Hugging him/her makes me feel safe. 13 1 2 
I play with him/her every chance I get.  4 7 5 
S/He can sometimes surprise me. 6 6 4 
S/He protects me. 8 2 6 
S/He always wants to play, even when I’m busy. 7 5 4 
I tell him/her my secrets. 3 6 7 
I love him/her. 6 2 8 
S/He teaches me how to be a good dog owner. 4 3 9 
I play with him/her when there’s nothing else to do 5 5 6 
S/He’s a really good friend.  4 2 10 
S/He’s annoying sometimes. 3 3 10 
S/He keeps me company when I am lonely.  5 3 8 
S/He makes me laugh. 2 6 8 
I like to sleep with him/her at night.  16 0 0 
I teach him/her how to behave. 7 6 3 
Distracter Items    
I can feel his/her fur with my hand.  15 1 0 
S/He’s a stuffed animal.  16 0 0 
When I’m done playing with him/her, I have to turn him/her off.  1 13 2 
S/He’s on a screen that I hold in my hands.  1 14 1 
S/He’s got two ears.  3 0 13 





with him/her every chance I get,” children were equally likely to report that the child in 
the video could be referring to the stuffed dog or the virtual dog. Additionally, children 
did not differentiate between the two dogs for items that suggested independent agency 
(e.g., “S/He can sometimes surprise me”), even though Stuffy is an inert toy, whereas 
iPuppy moves almost continuously (e.g., wagging its tail).  This result suggests that the 
imagined agency of stuffed toys is vivid enough to compare with the observed agency of 
virtual characters.  
In summary, the results for the distracters and the contact comfort items indicate 
that the Social Affordance task has the potential to elicit children’s judgments about 
differences between a stuffed dog and a virtual one.  Nevertheless, the results suggest that 
children did not clearly differentiate between the relationships and interactions that are 
possible with the two types of toys. For the social affordance items, children frequently 
reported that a given item could refer to either dog, and when children did indicate a 
preference, these responses were equally split between Stuffy and iPuppy.  However, 
having the “either one” response option might have led to results underestimating the 
differentiation of the two toys.  Children might have selected  “either one” because they 
believed an item could pertain to either dog or because they were not sure about their 
answer.  Another problem was that many children pointed directly to the stuffed dog or 
the virtual dog in the “either one” picture, which might have reflected a choice between 
the two dogs rather than an “either one” response.  In Study 2, we eliminated the “either 
one” option.  In addition, we collected ratings from adults about the extent to which the 







In Study 2, we examined the extent to which children would differentiate the 
social affordances of a virtual dog and a stuffed dog when they were forced to choose 
between the two, without the option of reporting that the items could be about either dog.  
In addition, we collected ratings from adults for the 25 social affordance items to help 
with the interpretation of children’s response patterns.  We were particularly interested in 
children’s intuitions about the possibility of having a relationship with a virtual character 
and so adults were asked to rate the items for relevance to friendship and agency. We 
expected that children might tend to pick the stuffed dog for items that adults rated highly 
on friendship, but the prediction about their choices for agency was less clear.  The 
reciprocity that is fundamental to friendship depends upon agency (either real or 
imagined), and thus children who think of stuffed dogs in terms of friendship might pick 
the stuffed dog for agency items as well.  However, the almost continuous autonomous 
movement of a virtual dog makes its agency a salient feature.  Thus, children might 
expect that items describing agency refer to the virtual dog.  The adults also rated the 
items for relevance to education and entertainment because these are goals that are often 
associated with virtual games.  We expected that children might pick the virtual dog for 
items that were rated highly for education and entertainment.  
Method 
Participants.  The participants were 33 children (M = 66.39 months, range = 59 – 
80 months, 15 girls and 18 boys) and their parents (32 mothers and 1 father) who were 
recruited from a database of children born in a local, middle class community.  Six 





children were dropped because they scored below chance on distracters (4 children) or 
repeatedly selected responses before the statements were played (3 children).   
For the ratings, participants were 16 undergraduate students (M = 19.94 years, 
range = 18 – 29 years, 2 males and 14 females; 11 European American, 2 Asian, 2 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 1 unidentified) who received course credit.  Three additional 
participants were excluded because their responses did not correlate with the rest of the 
sample, ps >.05.  Their responses also did not correlate with each other, ps > .05, 
indicating a random pattern of responses.   
Materials for the Social Affordances Task.  Two changes were made to the 
materials used in Study 1: (1) the picture representing the “either one” response was 
dropped and (2) the two distracter items that could pertain to either the stuffed dog or the 
virtual dog were removed, leaving 4 distracter items and 25 social affordance items (29 
total items; the three additional social affordance items that were dropped in Study 1 were 
not used in Study 2). 
Procedure for child tasks.  The procedure was very similar to Study 1.  All 33 
children responded correctly to the first two practice statements.  After the third practice 
statement, the experimenter paused the video and said,  
“S/He said, ‘S/He has a collar.’  Well, Stuffy has a collar and iPuppy has a collar, 
too.  So it’s really hard to tell which one s/he’s talking about, right?  When that 
happens, it’s okay to just guess.  You just guess the dog that you think s/he’s 
talking about.  Which dog do you think Noah/Sarah is talking about?” 





Adult ratings of social affordance items.  Ratings were collected as part of a 
General Survey generated by Psychology researchers that is administered online using 
Qualtrics software, version 37,892 (Qualtrics Research Suite, 2013).  Participants were 
told that they would read statements that children had made about their toys and were 
asked to rate each statement for how relevant it was to four types of experiences: (1) 
agency (“whether or not the child experiences the toy as able to think/feel or act for 
itself”), (2) friendship (“whether or not the child has an interpersonal relationship with 
the toy”), (3) education (“whether or not child learns from the toy”), and (4) 
entertainment (“whether or not the child uses the toy for fun”).  Participants used a 1 – 7 
Likert scale, from “not at all relevant” to “highly relevant.”  Agreement for the 16 raters 
was high, Cronbach’s Alpha = .93.  
Results and Discussion 
Children’s responses on the Social Affordances Task.  Children were accurate 
in their responses to the four distracters (Mcorrect = 3.70, SD = 0.53).  Although children in 
Study 1 frequently chose “either one”, children in this study did not have difficulty 
choosing between the dogs: just .01% of the data (9 trials out of 825) were coding as 
missing because children could not choose. Binomial tests were conducted to identify the 
items for which children exhibited a preference for one dog over the other.  Table 2 
shows the 25 social affordance items ordered from the items that were mostly attributed 
to the stuffed animal, followed by the items that did not elicit a clear pattern, and ending 














Study 2: Children’s endorsements of the stuffed and virtual dog, with adult mean ratings on 1 – 7 scale for item category(ies) 
a
  N = 32 one child would not choose; 
b
  N = 31 two children would not choose; * Significantly higher than 4 (one tailed), p < .01 
 Stuffy iPuppy p Adult Ratings 
Preference for Stuffy    Agency Friendship Education Entertainment 
Hugging him/her makes me feel safe. 27 6 < .001 4.50 6.50* 2.06 2.94 
I like to sleep with him/her at night.
a
 27 5 < .001 3.69 6.19* 2.06 2.69 
S/He protects me. 25 8 .005 6.25* 6.25* 2.06 2.56 
I love him/her. 24 9 .01 5.00 6.44* 1.88 2.63 
S/He keeps me company when I am lonely.  23 10 .04 5.06 6.44* 1.88 3.63 
No Preference         
I like to figure out what s/he can do. 19 14 .49 5.06 3.94 4.31 5.00 
I always feel like checking to see what s/he is doing. 18 15 .73 6.06* 5.63* 2.13 3.25 
S/He helps me feel better when I am sad. 18 15 .73 5.31 6.25* 2.38 3.63 
Sometimes I think s/he’s boring.
a
  18 14 .60 4.81 3.88 2.13 4.38 
I tell him/her my secrets.
b
 18 13 .47 4.50 6.50* 2.06 2.81 
I teach him/her how to behave. 17 16 1.00 6.25* 4.88 4.25 3.38 
I play with him/her when there’s nothing else to do.
b
 16 15 1.00 3.38 4.31 2.19 5.75* 
S/He teaches me how to be a good dog owner. 15 18 .73 5.00 4.38 6.63* 3.00 
S/He’s a really good friend.
a
  15 17 .86 5.56* 6.81* 2.44 3.88 
S/He needs me to take care of him/her. 14 19 .49 5.75* 6.25* 2.88 3.00 
S/He can sometimes surprise me. 13 20 .30 6.50* 5.19 3.50 4.25 
S/He’s annoying sometimes. 13 20 .30 6.19* 5.69* 1.88 2.50 
S/He always does what I want him/her to do. 12 21 .16 5.75* 4.88 2.63 3.88 
I like to find ways to teach him/her new tricks. 12 21 .16 5.56* 5.19 4.25 5.31 
I know I can trust him/her. 12 21 .16 6.25* 6.19* 2.56 3.13 
I’m proud of him/her. 12 21 .16 5.88* 6.13* 2.81 3.81 
Preference for iPuppy        
I play with him/her every chance I get.
a
  9 23 .02 4.38 5.63* 2.88 5.63* 
S/He entertains me. 9 24 .01 5.00 4.50 2.00 6.50* 
S/He makes me laugh.
a
  8 24 .007 5.50* 5.88* 1.81 6.31* 





Adult ratings of social affordance items.  In addition to the children’s choices, 
Table 2 provides the adult ratings.  One-tailed t-tests were conducted to identify the items 
that had mean ratings significantly higher (p < .01) than the mid-point score of 4.  
Twenty-three of the items were rated as highly relevant to one or more of the four types 
of experiences.  Fourteen items were rated as primarily relevant to one type: friendship (6 
items), agency (5 items), entertainment (2 items), and education (1 item); eight were rated 
as highly relevant to two types: agency and friendship (7 items), friendship and 
entertainment (1 item); and one item was rated as highly relevant to three types: agency, 
friendship, and entertainment.   
The adult raters did not view many of the items as relevant to education or 
entertainment. This result might be due to the way in which education and entertainment 
were defined in the instructions, but it is also possible that these items did not reflect the 
experiences we intended to convey.  We were more successful in identifying items that 
were relevant to friendship and agency: six items were rated as mostly concerning 
friendship, five as mostly concerning agency, and eight were rated highly for both 
friendship and agency, with one of these also rated highly for entertainment.  Adults 
might have viewed the overlapping items as addressing reciprocal aspects of friendship, 
thus requiring that the toys have agency (provided or imagined).   
Patterns in children’s differentiation of the virtual dog and stuffed dog.  The 
five items that children tended to attribute to the stuffed dog were all rated highly for 
friendship by adults, including one item that was also rated highly for agency.  The 
pattern of endorsement for the virtual dog was more about entertainment.  Although two 





these items were equally or more highly rated for entertainment.  The preference for the 
virtual dog on the entertainment items is consistent with children’s interest in playing 
with the virtual dog and the goals of the videogame genre.  Indeed, some children 
spontaneously commented on the virtual dog as being a part of videogame experiences 
(e.g., “S/He’s on a DS.”)  
Given that virtual pet games are marketed to parents as educational tools, we 
expected that children might endorse the virtual dog for items related to education.  
However, only one item was rated as relevant to education and children were equally 
likely to attribute it to the stuffed dog or virtual dog.   In future research, it might be 
useful to generate items that more successfully capture the affordance of education; 
however, children might not think of a virtual dog as a vehicle for learning. 
Although there was some evidence that the stuffed dog was viewed more in terms 
of friendship, whereas the virtual dog was viewed more as a source of entertainment, 
many items did not elicit a clear preference.  For example, although the items endorsed 
for the stuffed dog concerned friendship, the item that was most explicitly about 
friendship (“S/He’s a really good friend”) did not show any preference.  In addition, four 
of the items that were rated as relevant to agency were equally likely to be attributed to 
either dog.  Thus, although the movements of the virtual dog create a powerful perception 
of an autonomous agent, this might not necessarily trump the imagined agency of a 
stuffed toy.  Note that the imagined agency of the stuffed dog might have been enhanced 
by the experimenter’s animation of the toy during the introductory procedure.  
The Ninendogs® game was relatively novel (one child had played the Nintedogs® game 





play with the virtual dog and 23 children said they liked the virtual dog better.  However, 
13 children were familiar with the Nintendo DS® console and/or had experience playing 
with a virtual pet.  To examine how familiarity with virtual characters might influence 
responses, we compared (1) the mean number of endorsements (out of 25) for the virtual 
dog for children with previous experience (M = 12.38, SD = 2.99, n = 13) and children 
without such experience (M = 12.75, SD = 3.06, n = 20) and (2) the mean number of 
endorsements for the virtual dog for the 15 items that were rated as highly relevant to 
friendship for the experienced children (M = 6.69, SD = 2.39, n = 13) and children 
without experience (M = 6.95, SD = 2.06, n = 20).  Neither of these tests was significant, 
t(31) = 0.34, p = .74, and t(31) = 0.33, p = .74, respectively.  
General Discussion 
This research was designed to provide preliminary data regarding children’s 
intuitions about the possibilities for relationships with screen-based entities. In two 
studies, we investigated the extent to which preschool children differentiate the social 
affordances of a virtual dog portrayed on a screen and a stuffed dog.  Perhaps the most 
striking result was the similarity in the social affordances attributed to the two types of 
toys, despite their obvious differences.  For example, although the virtual dog moved 
continuously on the screen and the stuffed dog had no independent movement, children 
did not differentiate between the two dogs across many items that reflected some type of 
agency.  Moreover, although the virtual dog was more novel and engaging to these 
children, they did not endorse the virtual dog significantly more overall and were equally 
likely to choose the stuffed dog for some items that concerned enjoyment of the toy.  In 





social affordance items could be referring to either dog.  However, even when children 
did not have the option of attributing items to either/both dogs (Study 2), many items did 
not elicit a strong preference for one dog over the other.  
The differentiation that did occur was consistent with the prediction that the 
virtual dog might be viewed as a source of entertainment, whereas the stuffed dog might 
be viewed in terms of friendship.  However, the results for individual items warrant 
caution.  For example, although the items that were associated with the stuffed dog were 
rated highly for friendship, not all the friendship items showed this pattern.  In addition, 
some of these items might suggest a hierarchical relationship in which the object provides 
comfort and care as much as friendship.  In the case of the virtual dog, although items 
that were associated with it tended to be about entertainment, children were equally likely 
to endorse the stuffed dog for one of the entertainment items.  
Our prediction regarding agency was less clear, and children did not did not 
differentiate the two dogs for many of the agency items, underscoring the extent to which 
children might imagine an inert stuffed dog as having its own agenda.  For example, 
children in Study 2 were equally likely to pick the stuffed dog as the virtual dog for many 
items that suggested the dog was capable of doing things on its own.  The imagined 
agency of stuffed animals might be related to children’s experience with stuffed animals 
and the tendency of American parents to encourage emotional attachment to such toys 
and refer to them as animate.  
Previous experience with the Nintendo 3DS, the Nintedogs game, and/or 
other virtual pet games was not associated with children’s concepts of the virtual dog, 





Children’s level of exposure to new technologies and the amount of time they spend 
immersed in digital devices increases with age (Rideout, Foehr, & Roberts, 2010); thus, 
children’s concepts of virtual characters might change as they become more immersed in 
technologies.  Still, given the novelty of the virtual dog, it was surprising that they did not 
pick the virtual dog more often overall in the guessing game.  Perhaps children did not 
equate their own personal thoughts about the two dogs with those of the child in the 
video. 
Note that the results of research using robotic dogs and virtual dogs should not be 
generalized to the broad category of artifacts designed to stimulate social relationships.  
We selected our target stimuli because children are familiar with dogs, dogs have been 
used in past work, and it was possible to acquire a virtual dog and stuffed dog that were 
nearly identical.  However, the virtual characters in apps, games, and websites are diverse 
and many have characteristics that are very different from our virtual pug.  For example, 
the virtual dog, iPuppy, like the robotic dog, AIBO, was programmed to act like a real 
dog and thus did not use verbal language.  However, many virtual characters and social 
robots act like people and are capable of speech. The lack of verbal language is only one 
of many ways that the virtual dog, iPuppy, might differ from other virtual characters.   
Our preliminary findings suggest several directions for future research.  In 
particular, it would be interesting to collect children’s intuitions about items that describe 
different types of social relationships (e.g., hierarchical vs. vertical) and unpack the 
concept of “friendship” more systematically.  However, care should be taken to avoid 
asking many questions in a single session.  Eight children from the 57 who participated in 





give their answers before they had heard the items stated in full. Given this issue, along 
with our relatively small sample size and narrow age range, our findings are preliminary 
and should be examined within a larger study. 
It would also be informative to determine if the guessing game task would elicit 
differentiated responses for virtual characters and social robots.  Qualitative studies have 
shown that young children, adults, and the elderly form attachments with social robots, 
and interact with them in ways akin to human or human/animal relationships (Turkle, 
2011).  Although Kahn et al.’s (2006) research indicates that children do not consider a 
social robot to be more strongly associated with the possibility of friendship than a 
stuffed dog, children might differentiate the social affordances of an intangible virtual 
character and a tangible social robot, perhaps based on differences in embodiment. 
Another consideration for future research is how the history of shared experiences 
and interactions with a favorite toy provides a context for children’s relationship with it, 
as well as how it affects their intuitions about social affordances.  The children in our 
studies were encountering iPuppy and Stuffy for the first time, but imaginary 
relationships, like real ones, take time to develop. Many types of objects can acquire 
personal significance over time (Hood, 2009), but stuffed animals might be particularly 
conducive to the extended involvement that promotes imaginary relationships. Indeed, 
children’s endorsements for the stuffed dog on the item, “I love him/her” suggests that 
children recognize the emotional investment in these types of toys.  Does a virtual 
character or social robot have the potential for relationship longevity?   
Creative control is another consideration in thinking about children’s relationships 





relationships that are possible with stuffed animals, but a virtual character often comes 
with a set of behaviors, commands that it responds to, and specified ways of interacting. 
Does programming get in the way of developing a personal relationship?  Are children 
more likely to love a toy when they create a relationship based purely on imagination?  
Our intuition is that adult efforts to increase the realism and autonomous 
behaviors of smart toys might not increase the scope of children’s interactions with them 
or make these toys preferred companions.  Generations of parents have watched their 
children push aside a fancy toy to play with the box it arrived in, but we still often 
underestimate children’s interest in exploring the open-ended possibilities of simple 
objects.  There is a growing market of sophisticated artifacts designed to simulate love, 





























STUDY 3: THE BIOLOGOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROPERTIES 
ADULTS ATTRIBUTE TO A VIRTUAL AGENT 
Introduction 
In Studies 1 and 2, preschool age children played a game in which they guessed 
whether a child in a video was referring to a stuffed dog or a virtual dog in a series of 
statements designed to assess opportunities for friendship, education and entertainment. 
When children differentiated between the two entities, the stuffed dog tended to be 
associated with items relevant to friendship, whereas the virtual dog tended to be 
associated with items relevant to entertainment. Overall, these results suggest that despite 
their sophisticated programming, virtual characters might not be superior to simple 
stuffed animals as relationship partners. 
However, some of the preschool-age children experienced difficulty sustaining 
their attention to the task, perhaps due to the number of items, and the repetitive nature of 
the video stimuli.  In addition, the forced choice procedure made it more difficult to 
capture variation in children’s intuitions about virtual agents and inanimate artifacts.  
Finally, because dogs were used as the target entities, results could not be generalized to 
other types of virtual agents and inanimate toys. 
 In Studies 3 and 4, I built upon this preliminary research by examining adult and 
child concepts of a humanoid virtual agent, and how concepts of this entity might differ 
from a range of other potential relationships partners.  In addition to changing the target 
agent from an animal to a humanoid entity, I extended the range of comparisons by 





doll.  I further refined the list of properties by dropping items that were identified by 
adult raters as weak in Studies 1 and 2, as well as adding items to capture the social 
reciprocities inherent in children’s real friendships.  The response options were also 
extended to capture greater variation in properties attributed to the virtual agent.  Finally, 
I increased the age range in Study 4 to increase the likelihood that children would be 
more familiar with virtual characters, as well as to begin to explore developmental 
change in children’s concepts. 
In order to explore a wide range of properties and refine the total number of items 
for a child task, I first began with an online study with adult participants (Study 3).  In 
Study 3, adult participants were introduced to the four target entities via online vignettes, 
and asked to attribute a range of properties to each entity using 6-point yes/no Likert 
scales.  The select items in Study 3 that were successful in capturing a range of properties 
with adults were then used to investigate children’s intuitions about the affordances of a 
humanoid virtual agent (Study 4).   
Aims of Study 3 
The goals of this study were threefold: (1) to generate items that tap a range of 
properties that could be used in a task with a child sample, including biological 
properties, psychological properties, and the social reciprocities inherent in real and 
imaginary friendships; (2) to assess the biological, psychological and social properties 
that adults attribute to a humanoid virtual agent as compared with the properties 
attributed to a real child (in person and on a video chat program, like Skype™) and an 





orientation, and anthropomorphic tendencies predict variance in adult concepts of a 
humanoid agent.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 144 undergraduate students recruited primarily from 
Psychology 201 and 202 courses at the University of Oregon as part of their coursework 
requirements (mean age = 20.10 years, SD = 3.82, age range = 18 years – 51 years, 114 
females and 30 males).  Of these participants, over half identified as European-American 
(68.1%).  The remainder of the sample identified as Asian (13.9%), Latino (6.3%), mixed 
race (5.6%), African-American (2.1%), Pacific Islander (1.4%), Native Alaskan, 
American or Hawaiian (1.4%), Asian-Indian (0.7%) and Other (0.7%).  An additional 
eight participants were excluded from the analyses, four because they consented to 
participate but failed to provide any data, and four because they spent less than 15 
minutes total on the study3.  
Students signed up for the Human Subjects Pool through the electronic system 
SONA, which is maintained by the Departments of Psychology and Linguistics at the 
University of Oregon.  Through SONA, students had access to all ongoing studies with 
adults in both departments and self-selected to participate in this study.  Note that 
                                                 
3 Time spent on the study in minutes was used to identify cases in which participants 
failed to attend the tasks.  I used a combination of box plots and stem and leaf plots to 
identify participants at the extreme upper end of the distribution (n = 17, range = 85.62 
minutes – 9536.00 minutes).  After excluding these participants, I obtained the mean and 
standard deviation for the total amount of time spent on the study (M = 33.43 minutes, 
SD = 15.25).  Participants who fell one standard deviation below the mean (n = 4) were 
excluded.  Examination of their individual responses revealed that these participants 
provided identical values for each item on the properties task and on some of the 
individual differences inventories.  These values were the preset midpoints of the scale 





minimal information was given to potential participants during the self-selection process.  
The study name listed on SONA did not reveal any information about the study, and 
potential participants only had access to information about the type of study (i.e., 
laboratory experiment or online study), time commitment, and the amount of credit 
awarded.  Participants received one course credit for participation.  
Properties Task 
The Properties Task assessed adult concepts of a real child, a child on a video chat 
program (e.g., Skype™), a virtual child, and a doll.  Participants were first introduced to 
each type of child with vignettes presented in a randomized order:   
“Sarah/Noah is a little girl/boy who lives next door.  You interact with 
Sarah/Noah after school and on weekends at your home.” 
 
“Beth/Ben is a little girl/boy who lives in another state.  You interact with 
Beth/Ben on a computer with a video chat program, like Skype™.” 
 
“Sam is an artificially intelligent girl/boy that exists in a sophisticated virtual 
world.  You interact with Sam when you enter the virtual world.” 
 
“Pat is a doll that resembles a girl/boy.  You interact with Pat after school and on 
weekends at your home.” 
 
Next, participants were presented with a series of questions about the child (see 
Appendix A) and asked to respond to each question using a 6 point yes/no Likert scale 
where “0” indicated “definitely not”, “1 – 2” indicated “probably not”, “3” indicated 
“maybe”, “4 – 5” indicated “probably yes”, and “6” indicated “definitely yes”.  
Participants provided responses to questions about each type of child separately.  The 







Items in the Adult Properties Task 
 Items developed for the Adult Properties Task (n = 39) were designed to tap a 
range of concepts, including: (1) autonomy (e.g., “Can X do things when you are not 
around?”); (2) biology (e.g., “Is X alive?”); (3) creative control (e.g., “Do you control 
what X is doing to do?”); (4) embodiment (e.g., “Could you give X a hug?”; (5) 
psychology (e.g., “Can X think?”); and (6) the social reciprocities inherent in children’s 
real friendships, (e.g., “Could X keep you company?”) (see Appendix A).  Because these 
items were designed to be used in Study 4 with children, items were generated based on 
young children’s concepts of living and non-living kinds (e.g., Jipson & Gelman, 2007; 
Margett & Witherington, 2011), children’s reasoning about real, imaginary, and robotic 
entities (e.g., Jipson & Gelman; Kahn et al., 2006; Sharon & Woolley, 2004), and 
children’s concepts of real and imaginary friendships (Gleason, 2002; Gleason & 
Hohmann, 2006).  In the instructions to the Properties Task with adults, participants were 
informed that their responses would be used to select items for a task with children (see 
Appendix B); however, they were instructed to respond to each item based on their own 
intuitions.  
Measures 
Because little is known about how adults conceptualize virtual entities, I included 
several individual difference measures that might predict variation in responses.  These 
measures were selected based on supporting evidence from other relevant literatures (i.e., 
anthropomorphism, imagination, virtual reality, and robotics) indicating their potential 
importance in predicting individual differences in adult concepts of a humanoid agent 





2002).  Note that one participant did not complete the majority of the individual 
differences measures.  Therefore, results from the individual differences measures are 
based on a sample of N = 143 participants, unless otherwise specified.   
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983).  The IRI (Davis) is a self-
report measure designed to assess four different features of empathy: perspective taking 
(M = 3.56, SD = 0.56), empathic concern (M = 3.84, SD = 0.60), personal distress (M = 
2.82, SD = 0.65), and fantasy (M = 3.52, SD = 0.68).  The inventory consists of 28 items, 
with seven items each per subscale (see Appendix C).  Participants were presented with a 
series of descriptive statements and then asked to rate the extent to which each item 
described them on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 (“does not describe me at all”) to 5 
(“describes me very well”).  Three of the four subscales (fantasy, perspective taking and 
personal distress) showed good internal consistencies, αs ≥ .78.  The internal consistency 
for the perspective taking subscale was acceptable, α = .75.  For this study, I focused 
specifically on the fantasy subscale as an individual difference predictor because it 
measures absorption in fictional experiences.  
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ) (Waytz, 
Cacioppo, et al., 2010).  The IDAQ (Waytz et al., 2010) is a 30 item self-report measure 
designed to assess individual differences in anthropomorphism for a range of different 
entities, including five items about natural environments (e.g., the ocean) (M = 3.29, SD 
= 1.25), five items about animals (M = 6.19, SD = 1.82), and five items about 
technological artifacts (e.g., cars, computers, robots) (M = 1.59, SD = 1.60) (see 
Appendix D).  Fifteen additional items serve as controls (M = 5.63, SD = 1.05).  





will?”) and asked to respond using a 10 point Likert scale, from 0 (“not at all”) to 10  
(“very much”).  Internal consistencies for the three subscales ranged from acceptable, αs 
= .72 (technology and animals) to good, α = .80 (nature).  For all of the items designed to 
assess anthropomorphic tendencies, internal consistency was acceptable, α = .77.  For the 
technology and nature subscales, the distribution of scores was positively skewed.  
However, average scores across all of the anthropomorphism items were normally 
distributed.  Therefore, these composite scores were used as an individual difference 
predictor for variance in attribution scores on the Properties Task.   
Imaginary Companions Questionnaire (Taylor et al., 2002).  Participants were 
asked about current and past imaginary companions, using a method adapted from a 
study conducted by Taylor et al. (2003)) with adult fiction writers (see Appendix E).  
Participants read the following description of imaginary companions:  
“An imaginary companion is someone who is make-believe; an imaginary person or 
animal that you talk to or think about a lot.  Sometimes an imaginary companion is 
completely invisible and sometimes it is an object, like a very special stuffed animal or 
doll.”   
Participants were then asked to report whether or not they had a current imaginary 
companion, and if so, to indicate whether it was invisible or based on a personified object 
(such as a toy stuffed animal, or doll) and to provide a brief description.  Participants who 
reported having a personified object were also asked to describe how it differed from 
other personal artifacts. Participants who indicated that they did not have a current 
imaginary companion were asked whether or not they had one in the past.  If they 





Two independent coders who were not involved in data collection coded 
participants as having a past or current imaginary companion if they responded 
positively.  Participant were categorized as not having an imaginary companion if (a) 
they reported not having an imaginary companion, (b) they reported having an imaginary 
companion but they described generic fantasies (e.g., thinking about what a future wife 
might look like), (c) they described an imaginary companion based on a stuffed animal or 
doll, but the description did not go beyond physical characteristics (i.e., the toy appeared 
to function more as a comfort object than as a friend), or (d) their descriptions were 
unintelligible.  The agreement for the two coders was 90%; disagreements were resolved 
by discussion.  
Forty-seven participants (32.6%; 8 of 30 males and 39 of 113 females) met the 
criteria for having an imaginary companion.  Of these companions, 6 (12.8%; 1 male and 
5 females) were described as current companions and 41 (87.2%; 7 males and 34 
females) were described as past companions.  These included 22 invisible friends (46.8%; 
4 males and 18 females), 24 personified objects (51.1%; 3 males and 21 females), and 
one virtual character (.02%; male).  Having an imaginary companion was not related to 
gender, χ2 (1, n = 144) = 0.62, p = .43.  Because of the low number of current imaginary 
companions, I collapsed across past/current status in subsequent analyses. 
Digital Technologies Questionnaire.  Although digital devices are now a 
pervasive presence in American culture, attitudes towards new technologies might vary 
widely, particularly for technologies that are at the forefront of simulated social 
experiences.  For this study, I developed a questionnaire to assess attitudes towards 





current digital experiences, their interest in immersive virtual worlds, their role play (both 
on and offline), and the extent to which it could be possible to form friendships with 
“Siri” (the popular virtual agent) and with future humanoid robots (see Appendix F).  I 
specifically chose to ask about Siri because participants were likely to have some 
experience with this type of virtual agent.  I also included a question about sophisticated 
humanoid robots because these personified technologies exist, although they are not yet a 
pervasive presence in the United States. However, the distribution of the scores on the 
Siri item showed a floor effect (M = 0.78, SD = 1.31, N = 119), and was positively 
skewed for social robot item (M = 1.72, SD = 1.62, N = 142).  Therefore, I did not 
include these items to assess individual differences.  
Additional exploratory data analysis indicated that the base rate for participation 
in sophisticated online role-playing games was low (7%; n = 10).  This was not wholly 
unexpected, as large descriptive studies of Massively Multi-player Online Role-playing 
Games (MMORPGS) indicate that, unlike college students, typical players are in their 
mid-twenties and employed full time (see Yee, 2014 for a review).  However, gender was 
related to online game play, frequency of digital game play and participation in online 
virtual worlds (mostly MMORPGS).  Males (53.3%, n = 16) were significantly more 
likely than females (0.9%, n = 7) to select digital games as one of their favorite things to 
do online, χ2 (1, n = 144) = 39.41, p < .001, and reported playing digital games more 
frequently (M = 5.70, SD = 1.56) than females (M = 3.81, SD = 2.15), t (141) = 4.52, p < 
.001, d = 1.01.  Additionally, a greater proportion of males (23%, n = 7) reported 
participating in online virtual worlds, such as League of Legends® and World of 





Across the sample, there was a broader range of interest in fully immersive virtual 
reality technologies.  Forty percent of participants (n = 56) indicated that they would be 
interested in purchasing and using fully immersive virtual technologies, while 25% (n = 
35) indicated they were uncertain and 37% (n = 53) said they had no interest in these 
experiences.  Interest in this fully immersive technology was also related to gender.  The 
majority of the males (80%, n = 30) reported that they would definitely be interested in 
purchasing these technologies, compared with less than half of females (28.3%, n = 32).   
The gender differences that emerged among items in this inventory replicates 
previous work in the field indicating that both interest in virtual games, as well in game 
content (e.g., games with social content vs. games with no social content) varies based on 
gender (see Yee, 2014 for a review).  Therefore, I included gender as a factor in all of my 
subsequent analyses. I also included the item assessing the frequency of digital game play 
to investigate the contribution of familiarity with virtual environments to responses on the 
Properties Task.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the Properties Task and the individual difference measures 
through an online survey, administered through Qualtrics software (Qualtrics Research 
Suite, 2015) and the University of Oregon SONA system. Via SONA, participants 
accessed a link to the online survey.  On the first web page, participants read the 
informed consent form and were given the option to agree or to decline participation.  If 
they declined, they were thanked for their time and the survey ended.  If they agreed to 
participate, they first provided some basic demographic information (see Appendix G) 





in the following order: (1) the IRI (Davis, 1983), (2) the Digital Technologies 
Questionnaire, (3) the IDAQ (Waytz et al., 2010), and (4) the Adult Imaginary 
Companions Questionnaire (Taylor et al., 2003).  After the questionnaires were 
completed, participants were presented with a debriefing form, which detailed the goals 
and hypotheses of the study, and how their participation contributed to growing 
knowledge in the field.  After participants read the debriefing form, they were instructed 
to submit their responses and then were awarded one credit toward their required 
coursework.  
Hypotheses 
Pattern of Responses on the Properties Task 
On the Properties Task, I hypothesized that adults would not differentiate between 
the real child and the child on the video chat program on autonomy, creative control, 
biology, psychology and social properties.  However, my predictions about embodiment 
were less certain.  I thought that adult concepts of embodiment might depend on their 
interpretation of the description.  If participants responded based on what was possible 
for a child in the physical world, then they should attribute embodiment properties to the 
child on a video chat program.  However, if participants only thought about what was 
possible given the nature of interactions with the child via a virtual medium, then they 
might be less willing to attribute embodiment properties to the child on the video chat 
program.  
For the virtual child and the doll, I anticipated differentiation on autonomy, 
creative control, and embodiment.  I expected that the virtual child would be perceived as 





but embodied.  Based on the robotics literature (e.g., Kahn et al., 2013), I had further 
hypothesized that adults would recognize that both a virtual child and a doll are not alive 
(no differentiation), but still attribute more psychological functioning to the virtual child.  
However, I was less certain about the social properties adults would attribute to a virtual 
child and a doll.  Based on the result of Study 2, physical embodiment might matter for 
the social properties that are attributed to a virtual child and a doll.  In addition, I 
anticipated individual differences in the extent to which adults attribute psychological 
and social properties to a virtual child, and in the extent to which social properties are 
attributed to a doll. 
Individual differences 
To examine individual differences, I focused specifically on the attributions made 
to the virtual child and the doll.  I hypothesized that participants with higher scores on the 
fantasy subscale of the IRI (Davis, 1983) and participants who play digital games 
frequently would be more likely to attribute psychological and social properties to a 
virtual agent.  Additionally, I expected that adults with higher anthropomorphic 
tendencies would be more likely to attribute psychological and social properties to a 
virtual child and a doll.  Finally, I thought that participants with past or current imaginary 
companions might also be more likely to attribute psychological properties and social 
properties to a virtual child and a doll.  
Based on results from the Digital Technologies Questionnaire and previous 
findings in the gaming literature (e.g., Yee, 2014), I included gender as an individual 
difference.  I expected that males might be more willing to attribute psychological and 





research on children’s imaginary companions (e.g., Gleason et al., 2000; Harter & Chao, 
1992), I thought that gender differences might emerge in the psychological and social 
properties attributed to a doll.  I expected that females would be more likely to attribute 
social and psychological properties to the doll. 
Results 
Pattern of responses on the Adult Properties Task 
Exploratory data analysis revealed scattered missing data points across items on 
the Properties Task.  However, the overall incidence of missing data was low.  Of the 
22,464 attribution scores (39 items × 4 entities × 144 participants), only 104 data points 
were missing (0.5% missing).  Therefore, I did not correct for missing data, and when 
possible, I used a pairwise deletion method for all subsequent analyses.  
 Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for the six property categories 
(collapsing across individual items) as a function of type of entity.4   As expected, 
participants were consistent in reporting that the real child and the real child on a video 
chat program were biological entities who could function independently and possessed 
similar psychological attributes. However, when a real child appeared on a computer 
screen, adults treated the child as lacking a physical body.  In addition, adults attributed 
significantly less social opportunities to the child on a video chat program compared to 
the real child, t (143) = 8.54, p < .001, d = .71.  The difference in social opportunities 
                                                 
4 This method has been used in previous research to examine property attributions across 
a range of items developed to assess biological, psychological and social properties (e.g., 
Bernstein & Crowley, 2008; Kahn et al., 2012; Jipson & Gelman, 2007).  Although this 
method does not ensure that the items successfully capture their latent properties, the 
pattern of differentiation between entities described in this section provides some support 
for my interpretation of the individual items. Additionally, for attributions to the real 
child (where I had the strongest overall predictions), items within each property were 





between the real child and the child on a video chat program was related to differences in 
embodiment, r = .33. p < .001.  The more adults perceived differences between the real 
child and the child on a video chat program in embodiment, the more they favored the 
real child for social opportunities.  This finding suggests that for adults, relationships 
with real people that occur through a virtual medium might be perceived as less available 
or desirable for social interaction. 
 
Table 3 









However, the primary focus of the Adult Properties Task was to examine 
concepts of the virtual child, and how these concepts might differ from the other target 
entities.  To address these questions, I first obtain difference scores comparing with 
virtual child to the other target entities for each property.  These difference scores were 
obtained by subtracting the average property attribution scores for the three other entities 
(real child, child on a video chat program, and doll) from the virtual child.   I then used 
Property Real child Skype Child Virtual Child Doll
Autonomy (4 items) 5.09 (0.82) 5.20 (0.88) 2.01 (1.52) 1.53 (1.06)
Creative Control (4 items) 0.74 (1.03) 0.64 (0.89) 2.45 (1.64) 4.13 (1.71)
Biology (5 items) 5.49 (0.94) 5.74 (0.97) 0.94 (1.39) 0.40 (1.09)
Embodiment (5 items) 5.15 (1.13) 1.29 (1.56) 1.24 (1.63) 3.41 (1.21)
Psychology (10 items) 5.25 (0.92) 5.24 (0.94) 2.22 (1.31) 0.74 (1.13)






these difference scores as the dependent measure in a 3 (comparison; virtual – real, 
virtual – video chat, virtual – doll) × 6 (property; autonomy, creative control, biology, 
embodiment, psychology, social) mixed model ANOVA with gender as the between 
subjects factor.   
The main effects of comparison and property were significant, F (2, 286) = 
188.78, p < .001, η2 = .57 and F (5, 715) = 184.19, p =.01. η2 = .56, respectively.  The 
main effect of gender was also significant, F (1, 142) = 7.71, p =.01. η2 = .05, but the 
effect size was small, and there were no significant interaction effects with the within-
subjects factors, ps > .05.  The results for this task are best understood in light of a 
significant comparison by property interaction, F (10, 1430) = 316.56, p < .001. η2 = .69.  
To explore this interaction, I ran simple effects tests with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (see Figure 2 for a graphical representation).  In what follows, I 
report how the virtual child compared to each of the other target entities.  
How does the virtual child differ from the real child and real child on video 
chat program?  As is shown in Figure 2, the pattern of differentiation between the 
virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and the child on a video chat program 
were essentially identical for autonomy, creative control, biology, and psychology, ps = 
1.0.  As hypothesized, autonomy, biology and psychology were attributed equally more 
to both the real child and the child on a video chat program than to the virtual child, and 
creative control was attributed equally more to the virtual child than to the real child and 
the child on a video chat program.  In other words, compared to the real children, the 







Figure 2. Pattern of differentiation between the virtual child and the other entities. 
 
However, for embodiment and social properties, there was significantly less 
differentiation between the virtual child and the child on the video chat program 
compared to the differentiation between the virtual child and the real child, ps ≤ .002.  
For embodiment, the difference between the virtual child and the child on a video chat 
program was close to zero, whereas there was nearly a four-point difference in favor of 
the real child over the virtual child on this property.  Adults perceived both the virtual 
child and the child on a video chat program as similarly disembodied. 
For the social property, the difference between virtual child and the real child was 
greater than the difference between the virtual child and the child on a video chat 
program.  Social properties were still attributed more to the child on a video chat program 





that adults perceived the greatest social opportunities with people who are physically 
present. 
How does the virtual child differ from the doll?  For the virtual child and the 
doll, the pattern of differentiation was significantly different from the pattern of 
differentiation between the virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and the 
child on a video chat program, ps < .001.  Greater autonomy, biological and 
psychological properties were attributed the virtual child, and greater creative control was 
attributed to the doll.  One-sample t-tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that these 
average difference scores were all significantly different from zero, ps < .001, ds = .57 – 
2.28.  In other words, compared to the doll, the virtual child was perceived as more 
autonomous, with greater capacity for biological and psychological functioning.  For 
embodiment, there was significantly more differentiation between the virtual child and 
the doll than the virtual child and the child on a video chat program, p < .001. Adults 
perceived the doll as more embodied than the virtual child, and even more embodied than 
the child on a video chat program.   
Overall, the difference for the social property between the virtual child and the 
doll was near zero.  Adults perceived both the virtual child and the doll as affording 
similar social opportunities.  However, I was particularly interested in the sub-set of 
items in social property that were designed to capture the extent to which the relationship 
was reciprocal.  Of the 11 social property items, there were 4 pairs (8 items) that 
addressed the same feature (e.g., love) but in different directions (i.e., self to agent vs. 
agent to self).  To provide descriptive information about the way the participants viewed 





reciprocal if the participant indicated that both of the items in the pair were possible (e.g., 
scores of 4 or greater for both “can X love you?” and “can you love X?”), (2) self-to- 
agent unilateral if the score for the self (e.g., “can you love X”) was 4 or greater, but the 
score for the agent (e.g., “can X love you”) was 3 or less; (3) agent-to-self unilateral if the 
score for the agent (e.g., “can X love you”) was greater than 4, but the score for the self 
(e.g., “can you love X”) was 3 or less; or (4) no relationship if both scores were 3 or less. 
Table 4 shows the relationship categories for each of the four pairs of item for the 
virtual child and the doll.  As is shown in Table 4, a substantial minority of participants 
viewed the relationships as reciprocal.  Unilateral relationships in which the participant 
told the agent secrets, loved and protected the agent, and kept the agent company were 
more common than the reverse (e.g., the virtual child telling the participant secrets, etc.) 
The most common response for the doll was to view the relationship as unilateral in 
which the participant told the doll secrets, loved and protected the doll, and kept the doll 
company.   However, a substantial minority of the participants viewed the relationship 
with the doll as reciprocal (e.g., 33.33% for the questions about keeping company).    
Because artificially intelligent agents are capable of simulating verbal and non-
verbal forms of social reciprocity, I had predicted that adults would attribute greater 
opportunities for receiving social input from the virtual child compared to the doll.  There 
was no evidence of this in the comparison of reciprocal relationships. A paired samples t-
test on the number of times the participants’ responses were categorized as endorsing a 
reciprocal relationship (out of four) revealed no significant difference in reciprocity for 
the virtual child (M = 0.69, SD = 0.98) and doll (M = 0.63, SD = 0.96), t (139) = 0.53, p > 





self were less rare for the virtual child than for the doll.  In particular, participants were 
more likely to endorse the possibility that the virtual child might tell secrets (M = 2.61, 
SD = 1.99) than the doll (M = .91, SD = 1.84), t (141) = 7.34, p < .001, d = .61.    
 
Table 4 
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In addition to categorizing the nature of the relation as reciprocal, unilateral or no 
relationship, I created relationship composite scores by averaging the scores (ranging 
from 0 to 6) across the 4 pairs of reciprocal items.  An average score near 0 on this 
composite indicated that no relationship of any kind was possible. The more the 
participant endorsed the possibility of a relationship, the higher the composite score.  In 
particular, the endorsement of reciprocal relationships contributed to higher scores. Thus, 
this measure was interpreted as an index of the extent to which the participant viewed it 
possible to have a relationship with the agent.  The relationship composite scores for the 
virtual child (M = 2.59, SD = 1.21) were normally distributed and were not related to 
gender, t (142) = 0.19, p = .85. The comparison of the composite scores for the virtual 
child and the doll showed a small but significant preference for the doll, t (143) = -2.84, p 
= .005, d = .47.  
In Study 2 with preschool age children, a preference for the stuff dog was found 
for items about friendship, specifically companionship, protection and love.  This 
preference might have emerged due to differences between the stuffed dog and the virtual 
dog in their embodied forms and in opportunities for creative control.  Therefore, I was 
particularly interested in examining the extent to which adults’ overall preference for the 
doll on the relationship composite was related to these properties.  To investigate how 
attributions of autonomy, creative control and embodiment to both the virtual child and 
the doll uniquely predict differences in the relationship composite, I first ran a set of 


























* p < .05, ** ps ≤ .007 
 
From these correlations, attributions of autonomy to both the virtual child and the 
doll, and attributions of embodiment to the virtual child emerged as possible predictors.  I 
then ran an initial linear regression model with the difference scores for the composites 
between the virtual child and the doll as the dependent measure.  The overall model was 
significant, F (3, 140) = 13.24, p < .001 and accounted for 22% of the variance in the 
 Autonomy Control Embodiment 
Composite 
Difference 
Autonomy 1    
Control -.47** 1   
Embodiment .48** -.15 1  
Composite Difference .30** -.04 .35** 1 
 Autonomy Control Embodiment 
Composite 
Difference 
Autonomy 1    
Control .03 1   
Embodiment .26** .27** 1  





difference scores.  In this model, autonomy for the virtual child (b = 0.16) and the doll (b 
= -0.33), and embodiment for the virtual child (b = 0.22) were all significant predictors of 
the difference in the relationship composite scores for the virtual child and the doll, t 
(140) = 2.29, p = .02, t (140) = -3.68, p < .001, and t (140) = 3.64, p = .001, respectively. 
As attributions of autonomy and embodiment increased, opportunities for social 
relationships shifted toward the virtual child.  For the doll, as attributions of autonomy to 
the doll increased, opportunities for social relationships shifted towards the doll.  I also 
ran a hierarchical linear regression analysis with changes in R2 to examine the unique 
contributions of each predictor to the variance accounted for by the overall model.  The 
greatest overall contribution to the model was the autonomy attributed to virtual child 
(9%), followed by attributions of autonomy to the doll (7%), and lastly embodiment 
attributed to the virtual child (6%). 
Relationship Composite and Properties Attributed to the Virtual Child 
In this study, I was particularly interested in the extent to which attributions 
autonomy, creative control, and embodiment correlate with opportunities for relationship 
with this entity.  Because research findings indicate that psychological functioning is 
attributed more to social robots than to inanimate artifacts (e.g., Kahn et al., 2013), I was 
interested in the degree to which attributions of psychological functioning to the virtual 
child would correlate with the opportunities for relationships with this entity.   
I initially ran a set of Pearson’s r correlations for the virtual child with a 
Bonferroni correction for all pairwise correlations.  Table 7 shows the pattern of 
correlations for the virtual child, with significant correlations that survive the Bonferroni 





correlated with psychology, r = .60, p < .001, autonomy, r = .38, p < .001, and 











** ps ≤ .008 
 
Based on these initial correlations, I ran a linear regression model predicting the 
relationship composite for the virtual child from autonomy, embodiment and psychology.  
The overall model was significant, F (3, 140) = 37.43, p < .001 and accounted for 46% of 
the variance in the difference scores.  In this model, autonomy (b = -0.16), embodiment 
(b = 0.25), and psychology (b = 0.56), were all significant predictors of the relationship 
composite, t (140) = -2.14, p = .03, t (140) = 4.65, p < .001, and t (140) = 6.97, p < .001, 
respectively.   However, examination of multicollinearity diagnostics revealed significant 
problems with high inner correlations among the predictors, particularly for the relation 
between autonomy and psychology.  To remedy this problem, I created a new psychology 
variable by regressing psychology onto autonomy and obtaining the standardized 
 Autonomy Creative Control Embodiment Psychology Composite 
Autonomy 1     
Control -.47** 1    
Embodiment .48** -.15 1   
Psychology .69** -.22** .38** 1  





residuals.  These residuals (the variation in psychology not due to autonomy) were then 
used in a second model predicting the relationship composite from autonomy, 
residualized psychology, and embodiment.  This new model remained significant, F (3, 
140) = 37.43, p < .001 and accounted for 46% of the variance in the relationship 
composite scores.   All of predictors were statistically significant, ps ≤ .003, and 
multicollinearity diagnostics reached acceptable levels.   
In this model, autonomy (b = 0.18), embodiment (b = 0.25) and psychology (not 
due to autonomy, b = 0.54) positively predicted the relationship composite, t (140) = 
3.10, p = .002, t (140) = 4.66, p < .001, and t (140) = 6.97, p < .001, respectively. As 
expected, increases in the attributions of autonomy, embodiment and psychology 
(independent of autonomy) predicted increases in opportunities for relationships with a 
virtual child.  To examine the unique contributions of each predictor to the variance 
accounted for by the overall model, I ran a hierarchical linear regression analysis with 
changes in R2.  The greatest overall contribution to the model was the psychological 
functioning (independent of autonomy) attributed to the virtual child (19%), followed by 
autonomy (15%), and lastly embodiment (10%).    
Individual Differences 
To examine individual differences, I focused specifically on the social and 
psychological properties attributed to the virtual child, and the social properties attributed 
to the doll.  I did not include the attribution of psychological properties to the doll 
because the distribution of average attribution scores showed a floor effect (See Table 3).  





as a predictor of differences in the relationship composite, I chose to include these scores 
as a dependent variable in my individual differences analyses. 
Individual differences in the properties attributed to the virtual child.   
Neither the IRI nor the having an imaginary companion was correlated with the 
attributions of autonomy, psychology or social properties to the virtual agent, so these 
variables were dropped from the remaining analyses, ps ≥ .55.   
Individual differences in anthropomorphism as assessed by the IDAQ were 
positively correlated with the attributions of autonomy, r = .19, p = .02 and psychological 
properties to the virtual child. r = .19, p = .03, but not with social property attributions, r 
= .14, p = .09.  Additionally, gender was related to the autonomy, t (142) = 3.22, p = .002, 
d = .67 and psychological properties attributed to the virtual child, t (142) = 2.62, p = .01, 
d = .53; in both instances, males were significantly more likely to attribute these 
properties to this entity than females.  Additionally, the frequency with which participants 
reported playing digital games was positively correlated with the attribution of 
psychological properties to the virtual child, r = .20, p = .02, but not was not related to 
the attribution of autonomy, r = .10, p = .22, or social properties, r = .03, p = .68. 
Because none of the individual difference measures were correlated with the 
social properties attributed to the virtual child, I ran two regression analyses: (1) 
predicting variance in the attributions of autonomy from gender and IDAQ composite 
scores, and (2) predicting variance in psychology from gender, IDAQ composite scores, 
and the frequency of digital game play.  For the attribution of autonomy to the virtual 
child, the overall model was significant, F (1, 140) = 7.22, p = .001, and accounted for 





6.7% of the variance in the overall model, t (140) = -2.96, p = .004.  The addition of the 
composite IDAQ scores (b = 0.20) to the model was marginally significant, t (140) = 
2.01, p = .05, and accounted for an additional 2.6% of the variance in the overall model.    
For the attribution of psychological properties to the virtual child, the overall 
model was significant, F (4, 139) = 5.04, p = .002 and accounted for 9.8% of the total 
variance.  In the full model, the composite IDAQ score (b = 0.20) was a significant 
positive predictor of psychological attributions, t (139) = 2.31, p = .004, and frequency of 
digital game play (b = 0.11) was marginally significant, t (139) = 2.02, p = .05.  
However, despite the size of the coefficient, gender (b = -0.41) was not a statistically 
significant predictor of variance in psychological attributions to the virtual child, t (139) 
= -1.47, p = .14.  I suspected that this might be due to the strong relation between gender 
and frequency of digital game play.  Examination of the multicollinearity diagnostics 
revealed some potential problems with these parameter estimates.  To address this 
problem, I created new variable for the frequency of digital game play by regressing this 
variable onto gender and obtaining the standardized residuals.  These residuals (variation 
in digital game play not due to gender) were then used in a second model predicting the 
attributions of psychological properties to the virtual child from gender, IDAQ composite 
scores, and residualized frequency of digital game play.  In the new model, all of 
predictors were statistically or marginally significant, ps ≤ .05, and multicollinearity 
diagnostics reached acceptable levels.   
In this model, gender (b = -0.62), and IDAQ scores (b = 0.20) significantly 
predicted the attribution of psychological properties to the virtual child, t (139) = -2.36, p 





to gender, b = 0.22) was also marginally significant, t (139) = 2.01, p = .05.  To examine 
the unique contributions of each predictor to the variance accounted for by the overall 
model, I ran a hierarchical linear regression analysis with changes in R2.  The greatest 
overall contribution to the model was gender differences (4.6%), followed equally by 
IDAQ composite scores (2.6%), and frequency of digital game play (2.6%).    
Individual differences in social properties attributed to the doll.   As was 
found in analyses with the virtual child, the IRI was not correlated with the attribution of 
these properties to the doll, nor was past or current history of imaginary companions, ps ≥ 
.41.  Additionally, gender was not related to the autonomous and social properties 
attributed to the doll, t (142) = -0.13, p = .90 and t (142) = -0.11, p = .91, respectively. 
However, strong positive correlations were found between IDAQ scores and the 
attribution of autonomy and social properties to the doll, r = .36, p < .001, and r = .25, p 
< .001, respectively.  In reach case, higher anthropomorphic tendencies were associated 
with greater attributions of autonomy and social properties to the doll.  Simple linear 
regression analyses indicated that IDAQ composite scores were significant, positive 
predictors of the variance of in autonomy (b = .31, R2 = .13) and social properties (b = 
.19. R2 = .06) attributed to the doll, t (141) = 4.54, p < .001 and t (141) = 2.92, p = .004, 
respectively. 
Item Selection for the Child Task 
In addition to examining the properties adults attribute to a humanoid agent, one 
of the primary aims of this study was to develop a set of items that could successfully 
capture aspects of biological, psychological and social functioning for a follow-up study 





adult data.  First, I wanted to ensure that the items I selected were based on theoretical 
claims about the characteristics of high-quality friendships.  Second, I wanted to ensure 
that the selected items captured variation in aspects of a particular property (e.g., 
thinking, feeling), rather than repeating the same feature in slightly different ways (e.g., 
“Can X do things without you?” and “Can X do things when you are not around”).  
Finally, given the problems with attrition in Study 2, I wanted to find a parsimonious 
number of items that captured the main properties of interest (biological, psychological 
and social functioning). 
For items designed to describe features of autonomy, biology, creative control, 
and embodiment, I first examined the mean attribution scores and frequency distributions 
for each item.  I then obtained difference scores for each that maximally differentiated the 
real child from the doll (or the real child from the virtual child for embodiment items).  
The items that were closest to their expected mean values and maximally differentiated 
the real child from the doll were selected for the child study.  This included one item 
about autonomy (“Can X do things when you are not around?”), one item about creative 
control (“Can you control what X is going to do?”), and two items about biological 
functioning (“Is X alive?” and “Does X have a heart that beats?”).  However, none of the 
individual items designed to assess embodiment were particularly strong.  Therefore, 
embodiment items were not included the Child Properties Task.    
 For psychological properties, many items appeared worthy of inclusion in the 
Child Properties Task.  To reduce the total number of items, I examined the items that 
assessed similar attributes (e.g., “feelings”) and then used the one that had the most 





“Can X feel lonely?” both indicate that the entity can have feelings.  However, “Can X 
feel lonely?” described a more concrete emotional experience that might be more easily 
recognizable, especially by young children.  I also included the item, “Can X listen to 
what you say?” in lieu of other strong items because of the surprising lack of 
differentiation between the real child and the doll (as indexed by the difference score).  
Thirty-eight percent of the adult sample (n = 55) thought it was possible or even likely 
that a doll could possess this ability (attribution scores ranging from 3 – 6).  I was 
therefore interested to see how children might attribute this item to the four types of 
entities. 
 Finally, because the theoretical focus of this research is on children’s concepts of 
the social reciprocities that are possible in real and imaginary friendships, six of the eight 
items that assessed bi-directional features of high quality friendships (e.g., Furman & 
Burhmester, 1985; Parker & Asher, 1993) were selected for the Child Properties Task.  I 
chose not to include the bi-directional items about protection because I was concerned 
about the extent to which differences in embodiment might influence children’s 
attributions.  Because I did not include embodiment items in the child task, it would not 
be possible to examine how items about protection and items about embodiment might be 
related.  I also included the item, “Can X help you feel better when you are sad?” because 
of the surprising lack of differentiation between the real child and the doll in this study 
(mean difference = 0.71).  Eighty-six percent of adults sampled (n = 124) thought it was 
possible or even likely to be comforted by a doll (attribution scores ranging from 3 – 6).  
Appendix H lists the complete set of items (N = 16) that were used in the Child 





status of each type of child (“S/he is a pretend kid” and “S/he is a real kid”).   Note that 
the items were reworded as declarative statements based on the way the paradigm for the 
child task was designed. 
In what follows, I report the results of repeat analyses with adults from the 
reduced set of items.  This includes the overall pattern of responses on the Adult 
Properties Task and the reduced items that captured social reciprocity. 
Pattern of Responses with the Reduced Items 
On the reduced data, one participant was excluded due to missing data on items 
about autonomy and creative control.  Therefore, the remaining analyses are based on a 
sample for 143 participants. Because there was only one item remaining for properties of 
autonomy and creative control, I ran a Pearson’s r correlation with attributions to the real 
child to examine the relation between these two items in cases where I had the strongest 
predictions.  The correlation between these two items was strong for the real child, r = -
.49. p < .001.  Therefore, I chose to collapse these two items into one property 
(“autonomy and creative control”) for the subsequent analyses.  I first recoded the item 
about creative control and then aggregated across the two items for each entity.   
 As in the original analyses, difference scores were obtained by subtracting the 
average property attribution scores across properties for the three other entities (real 
child, child on a video chat program, and doll) from the virtual child.  I then ran a 3 
(comparison; virtual – real, virtual – video chat, virtual - doll) × 4 (property; autonomy 
and creative control, biology, psychology, and social) mixed model ANOVA with gender 
as the between subjects factor and difference scores as the dependent measure.  The 





Only two differences were found.  First, the main effect of gender was significant, F (1, 
141) = 8.88, p =.003. η2 = .06, and gender interacted with the main effect of comparison, 
F (2, 282) = 5.93, p =.003. η2 = .04.  A separate 2 (gender; males, females) × 3 
(comparison; virtual – real, virtual – video chat, virtual - doll) mixed model ANOVA 
revealed that males differentiated between the virtual child and the real child, and the 
virtual child and the child on a video chat program significantly less than females, ps ≤ 
.004.  However, there was no difference between males and females on the differentiation 
between the virtual child and the doll, p = .56.  In other words, compared to females, 
males viewed the virtual child as being more similar to the real child and the child on a 
video chat program.  Second, although adults still favored the doll on opportunities for 
social relationships, this difference was no longer statistically significant, t (143) = -1.19, 
p = .24. 
Discussion 
 The primary goals of this study were to develop items that successfully capture 
concepts of biological, psychological and social functioning for a follow-up task with 
children, as well as to examine the properties adults attribute to a humanoid agent and the 
extent to which individual differences contribute to concepts of this entity.  On the Adult 
Properties Task, my hypotheses were largely supported.  For properties of autonomy, 
creative control, biology and psychology, adults treated the real child and a child on a 
video chat program as inherently similar.  However, significant differences emerged 
between these two entities on embodiment and social properties.  Adults viewed a child 
on a video chat program as disembodied in the same way as the virtual child.  This could 





location of the child on a video chat program, they might have been primed to focus on 
what was possible in the current context, rather than what was possible in the physical 
world.  
 In addition, adults differentiated the social opportunities between the virtual child 
and the child on a video chat program to the lesser degree than they did with the real 
child and the virtual child.  The difference in the social opportunities attributed to both 
the real child and the child on a video chat program was related to differences in 
embodiment.  The more adults differentiated between the two children on embodiment, 
the more they differentiated the social opportunities that were possible with each child.  
Given that items for the social property were developed based on features of high quality 
friendship, this result suggests that social interactions with real people that occur through 
virtual mediums might be perceived by adults as somewhat lower quality, perhaps due to 
the lack of physical presence and the absence of possibility for physical contact.   
 For the virtual child and the doll, my hypotheses about the attribution 
psychological and biological properties were supported.  Adults clearly recognized that 
both a virtual child and a doll are not alive, but they were nevertheless more likely to 
attribute psychological functioning to the virtual child compared to the doll.  This result 
replicates previous findings in the robotics literature indicating that both children and 
adults attribute properties to these entities that cut across living and non-living kinds 
(e.g., Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kahn et al., 2012).   
In addition, my intuition about the positive relation between attributions of 
psychological functioning and social relationships with the virtual child was supported.  





they were to attribute possibilities for relationships with this entity.  Moreover, the 
attribution of psychological functioning to the virtual child was the strongest predictor of 
scores on the relationship composite.  
 However, gender differences were found among attributions to the virtual child. 
Males were significantly more likely than females to attribute psychological functioning 
and autonomy to virtual child.  In addition, on the reduced set of items, males 
differentiated less between the virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and 
the child on a video chat program compared to females.  These gender differences could 
be due in part to differences in interest and experience with digital games.  However, 
given the disparity in the distribution of gender in my sample, these results should be 
interpreted with caution.  Moreover, the frequency of digital game play was predictive of 
the psychological functioning attributed to the virtual child, above and beyond gender 
differences.  And individual differences in anthropomorphic tendencies further predicted 
attributions of psychological functioning to the virtual child.  Taken together, these 
findings suggests that increased familiarity with virtual agents, as well as the tendency to 
anthropomorphize, might be associated with the perception of virtual agents as thinking, 
feeling beings.  
Interestingly, greater attributions of psychological functioning to the virtual child 
did not translate into increased opportunities for social relationships with the virtual child 
compared to the doll.  On the full set of items, adults favored the doll on opportunities for 
social relationships.  This finding was not associated with gender differences, or 
attributions of embodiment and creative control to the doll.  Instead, attributions of 





doll, and adults with higher anthropomorphic tendencies were more likely to attribute 
autonomy and social properties to the doll.  Although not assessed in my study, it is also 
possible that greater familiarity and experience with these artifacts might be associated 
with a preference for the doll over the virtual child on opportunities for social 
relationships.    
The results from this study mirror what I found with preschool-age children in 
Studies 1 and 2.  Despite adult perceptions of the virtual child as more autonomous and 
more psychological than the doll, there were no added social benefits for these simulated 
experiences.  At the very least, adults did not differentiate between the virtual child and a 
doll on opportunities for social relationships, and when they did, they favored the 
inanimate artifact.  This finding raises important questions about the design goals for 
artificially intelligent agents, and they functions they are intended to serve in our 
everyday lives.  The results of this study suggest that despite their sophisticated 
programming, artificially intelligent entitles are akin to inanimate toys in the social 














STUDY 4: THE BIOLOGOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROPERTIES 
CHILDREN ATTRIBUTE TO A VIRTUAL AGENT 
Introduction 
In Study 3, adults attributed greater psychological functioning to a virtual child 
than to a doll, suggesting that virtual agents are perceived in ways that cut across 
ontological categories of living and non-living kinds.  However, for the virtual child, the 
perception of having a greater capacity to think and feel did not translate into beliefs 
about enhanced social opportunities.  Although adults perceived the doll as a non-
biological and non-psychological entity, it was perceived as affording social 
opportunities similar to the virtual child.  Do children take a similar view of a virtual 
child, and the social opportunities that such an entity can provide?   In this study, I 
examined children’s concepts of a child virtual agent, and the extent to which their 
concepts of this entity differ from concepts of a real child, real child on a video chat 
program and an inanimate doll. 
To investigate children’s concepts of humanoid agents, I adapted the procedure 
and stimuli developed in Study 3 with adults for use with preschool and school-aged 
children.  Child participants were introduced to four agents (real child, child on a video 
chat program, virtual child and doll) and asked about the biological, psychological, and 
social properties of each.  I had four main objectives in developing an alternative to the 
Social Affordances Task used in Studies 1 and 2: (1) to include a wider range of agents 
than was possible in Studies 1 and 2, (2) to use the results of Study 3 to select an optimal 





the task interactive so that children would stay engaged, (4) to capture greater variation in 
children’s intuitions about the target entities, and (5) to develop a paradigm that involved 
human agents rather than the dogs.  In Study 4, I piloted this new properties task with 
children aged five to eight years to assess its age-appropriateness.  I also included 
measures of media use, imaginary companions, and parasocial relationships, but given 
the small number of participants in this pilot, the goal was limited to providing 
preliminary information about individual differences that might be helpful for informing 
future research.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants were thirty children aged five to eight-years-old and their parents, 
including four sibling pairs, who were recruited from a database of children born in a 
local, middle class community (mean age = 85.79 months, SD =11.81, age range = 63.5 
months – 105.5 months, 17 females and 13 males).  Of these children, four were 5-year-
olds (13.33%), eleven were 6-year-olds (36.67%), 10 were 7-year-olds (33.33%) and five 
were 8-year-olds (16.67%).  Twenty-five children were European-American, and five 
were of mixed ethnicity.  An additional six children were dropped from the study: three 
because they did not understand the stimuli used in the Properties Task (i.e., they claimed 
that the real child was pretend), two because of inattention, and one because she thought 
that the child on a video chat program was a character on a TV show. 
Materials for the Child Properties Task 
Description of the picture stimuli.  Participants were introduced to four gender-





virtual child and a doll.  The virtual child and the child on the video chat program were 
portrayed on desktop computer screens to show that the social interactions that occur 
with these entities take place in a virtual medium.  To help control for response biases 
due to idiosyncratic details of the individuals in the pictures, I selected four different 
images of real boys and four different images of real girls within the appropriate age 
range to use as base images.  In these photographs, the children were looking directly at 
the camera with pleasant, closed-mouth smiles.  Graphic designers then used these 
photographs to create images of the child on the video chat program, the virtual child and 
the doll.  Thus for each image of real child, there was a corresponding image of a child on 
a video chat program, a virtual child, and a doll that looked similar.  In total there were 
32 images used in the task (16 images of boys and 16 images of girls). 
Participants were shown four 5.5" × 6.5" cards with a description of each agent 
typed underneath its image.  Participants saw one version of each of the target children. 
As determined by a Latin Square Design, across participants each of the target children 
occurred equally often as a real-life child, a child on a video chat program, a virtual child 
and a doll.  For example, one male participant was introduced to real boy #1, a boy on a 
video chat program based on the image of real boy #2, a virtual boy based on the image 
of real boy #3, and a doll based on the image of real boy #4.   Another Latin Square 
Design was used to determine the introduction order of each type of child.  Tables 8 and 
9 show the full set of images used in the Child Properties Task, including the 16 girl 

























































Property items.  The 14 property items were selected based on the results from 
Study 3 with adults: two items designed to assess autonomy and creative control, two 
items designed to assess biological functioning, three items designed to assess 
psychological functioning, and seven items designed to assess social functioning (7 


























to assess the reality status of each type of child: “S/he is a pretend kid” and “S/he is a real 
kid” (see Appendix H for the complete list of 16 items). 
The items were worded as declarative statements which were printed on 3.5" × 4" 
cards beneath pictures of each type of child.  Children were asked to indicate how true 
each item was for the target agent on the card on a 4-point yes/no Likert scale.  They 
indicated their response by placing the card in one of four 11" × 7.5" boxes.  As shown in 
Figure 3, one box was marked with a large X (“definitely not”), one with a small x 
(“probably not”), one with a small check mark (“probably yes”) and one with a large 
check mark  (“definitely yes”)5.   
 
Figure 3. Boxes representing the four-point Likert scale response options. 
 
                                                 
5 I had originally planned to use three boxes representing the response options, “definitely 
yes”, “definitely no”, and “maybe”.  If children selected the “maybe” box, then they 
would be asked a clarifying question about the two midpoints of the scale, “Probably yes, 
or probably no?”  However, in pilot testing, children clearly understood the 3-point scale, 
and found the follow up question for the “maybe” response option awkward.  
Additionally, some children sorted the images of the entities too quickly to allow the 
experimenter to follow-up after the “maybe” box was selected.  Therefore, I opted to use 






The individual difference measures selected for this study were adapted from 
research on children’s imaginary companions, children’s digital media use, and children’s 
parasocial relationships (Bond & Calvert, 2014; Gleason, 2013; Rideout et al., 2010; 
Taylor, 1999).  Both parents and children were asked to report on experiences with screen 
and print media, as well as a range of real and imaginary relationship partners.  For media 
use, parents were asked to report on access, frequency of use, and attitudes about their 
children’s media use, and children were asked to report on the content of their media 
experiences.  For real and imaginary relationships, information was collected from both 
parents and children.  In what follows, I describe the parent report measures, followed by 
the child report measures.   
Children’s Media Use Questionnaire (CMUQ; parent report). The CMUQ is 
a 66-item questionnaire adapted from a comprehensive telephone survey conducted by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation on media use in children ages 0- to 6-years-old (Rideout et 
al., 2003) (see Appendix I).  The survey was designed to assess both media saturation and 
culture in American households, as well as young children’s exposure to and familiarity 
with screen-based technologies.  The original survey was updated to include devices that 
were not widely available in 2003 (e.g., computer tablets, eReaders, and smartphones).  I 
organized the survey into three sections: (1) household media saturation and culture, as 
well as children’s general media use; (2) children’s media use and other play activities on 
a typical day, and (3) children’s familiarity with video chat programs (e.g., Skype™) and 
participation in online virtual worlds for children.  Under the section on general media 





and movie viewing, computer use, video game play, and time spent reading.  Parents 
responded to these items on 5-point Likert scales, where “1” indicated very negative 
views, “3” indicated neutral views and “5” indicated very positive views.  One parent did 
not complete this inventory; therefore, the results are based on a sample of 29 parents. 
The children in this sample had access to a wide range of electronic devices in 
their households.  Twenty-six of the 29 parents (89.7%) reported owning televisions 
(mean number = 1.53, SD = 0.78, range = 0 to 3), as well as desktop, laptop, and/or 
computer tablets (mean number = 3.36, SD = 1.75, range = 1 to 10).  In addition, 20 
parents (69%) reported owning video game consoles and smartphones.  Twenty-one of 
the 29 parents (72.4%) indicated that their children watched TV shows or movies on a 
typical day; fourteen parents (48.3%) indicated that their child typically watched TV 
shows and/or movies on desktop, laptop or computer tablets and 22 parents (75.9%) 
indicated that their child had streamed TV programs and movies on the Internet without 
assistance from an adult.  Streaming television shows and movies online without adult 
assistance was not related to age, t (27) = -1.32, p = .20.   
Of 29 parents who responded to this question, thirteen (44.83%) indicated that 
their children played computer games or video games on a typical day.  The relation 
between playing digital games on a typical day and gender was trending, χ2 (1, n = 29) = 
2.66, p = .10.  Males (61.54%%, n = 8) were somewhat more likely to play computer and 
video games on a typical day compared to females (31.25%, n = 5).  Nevertheless, most 
children had at least some experience with digital games; only four children (13.33%), 





Parental attitudes towards children’s television viewing, computer use and digital 
game play were normally distributed and positively correlated with each other, rs = .47 - 
.56, ps ≤ .005.  Parents who expressed positive views about their child’s television 
viewing were also likely to express positive views about computer use and digital game 
play.  However, parental attitudes about children’s computer use and digital game play 
were not associated with children’s responses on the Child Properties Task.  Further, 
given the lack of overall variance in children’s exposure and experience with screen 
based devices, I focused specifically on children’s digital game play on a typical day as 
an individual difference measure. 
Parasocial Relationships Questionnaire (parent report).  The parasocial 
relationships questionnaire was adapted from a measure by Bond and Calvert (2014) to 
assess the development of 5- to 8-year-old children’s relationships with media characters 
and the experiences that characterize these relationships (see Appendix J).  Parents were 
asked for qualitative descriptions of their child’s favorite media character, and the 
mediums in which the child experienced the media character (e.g., videogames, 
television, toys).  Using the 12-item inventory developed by Bond and Calvert, parents 
were then asked to report on their child’s feelings, beliefs and experiences of their 
favorite media character, using a 5-point Disagree/Agree Likert Scale.  This inventory 
consists of three subscales, measuring character personification (the extent to which 
children attribute psychological properties to the character and treat the character as a 
friend, M = 3.64, SD = 0.42, n = 5 items), social realism (the extent to which children 
experience the media character as “real”, M = 2.25, SD = 0.83, n = 3 items), and 





0.62, n = 3 items).  Two of the three subscales (attachment and social realism) showed 
good internal consistencies, αs ≥ .80.  However, the internal consistency for the 
personification subscale was poor, α = .49.  
Children were identified as having a parasocial relationship if their parents 
indicated that their child had a past or current favorite media character, and if they were 
able to provide a description (e.g., who the media character is, how their children learned 
about it, and the ways in which the child engages with it). Three parents did not complete 
this inventory, thus the results are based on a sample of 27 parents. Twenty-two children 
(81.5%; 10 males and 12 females) met the criteria for having a parasocial relationship 
(e.g., Princess Lea from the star Star Wars™ series, Sponge Bob from Sponge Bob 
Square Pants®).  Having a parasocial relationship was not related to age, t (25) = 1.54, p 
= .14. 
Given the large number of parasocial relationships reported by parent in this 
sample, I did not include a dichotomous variable for the presence or absence of a 
parasocial relationship in the individual differences analyses.  I instead focused on the 
three parasocial experiences subscales in relation to children’s attributions on the Child 
Properties Task.  However, none of the three subscales correlated with children’s 
responses on the Child Properties Task; therefore, this measure was excluded from all 
remaining analyses.     
Parent Role-play Questionnaire.  The Parent Role-play Questionnaire is a 25-
item inventory designed to assess parents’ familiarity with their children’s imaginary 
companions (Taylor et al., 2004).  Parents were first asked if their child had a best friend, 





items because I had expected that the absence of real friends might correlate with 
children’s attributions to the virtual child and the doll on the Child Properties Task.  
However, the majority of the children in this sample were identified as having a best 
friend (68.97%), a group of friends (96.67%), and many children had both (68.97%).  
Therefore, I did not include these items in the individual differences analyses. 
Parents were then given a description of an imaginary companion, as asked if 
their child had a past or current imaginary companion.  If parents indicated that their 
child had an imaginary companion, they were asked a series of forced-choice and open-
ended questions about the physical characteristics and personality of the imaginary 
companion, the duration of the role-play and the other people involved (see Appendix K). 
Child Measures 
In addition to parent reports, information was collected from children about the 
content of their media use (e.g., the names of their favorite video games, and descriptions 
of these games), their favorite media characters, and relationships with imaginary 
companions.   
Brief Media Use Interview.  Exploratory data collected as part of Study 1 
indicated that children might be better reporters than their parents about the content of 
their media experiences (e.g., the names of the favorite video games, television shows).  
Therefore, I developed this measure to identify children’s favorite media activities and 
the content of those activities, as well as children’s favorite media characters and their 
descriptions of these characters (see Appendix L).  In this inventory, children were asked 
a series of questions in a semi-structured interview about their favorite books, television 





whether or not their parents had any rules regarding each activity and how they perceived 
their parents’ attitudes towards these activities.  However, children in this sample were 
often uncertain about how their parents felt about their screen-time and had difficulty 
recalling their parents’ rules for their media use.  Additionally, because little is currently 
known about the content of children’s digital media experiences, I did not have specific 
hypotheses about how the content of children’s digital media experiences might relate to 
responses on the Child Properties Task.  Therefore, I did not include this measure in 
subsequent analyses.  Instead, I used the descriptive information collected from children 
on this measure to discuss the overall findings.  
Role-play Interview.  In the role-play interview, children were first asked if they 
had a best friend, and if they had a group of friends that they liked to play with.  
Participants were then asked about imaginary companions using a semi-structured 
interview developed by Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson (1993), with the following 
introduction: “Some friends are real, like the kids that live on your street, the ones you 
play with.  And some friends are pretend friends.  Pretend friends are make-believe, ones 
that you pretend are real. Do you have a pretend friend?”  Children who responded 
positively were asked questions about the age, sex, physical characteristics, vividness, 
competency, and autonomy of the imaginary companion (see Appendix M).  
Two independent coders who were not involved in data collection reviewed the 
following inventories: (1) children’s initial responses to the role-play interview (2) 
parents’ initial responses to role-play questionnaire (see parent measures) (3) notes based 
on follow-up discussions with parents regarding children’s responses (see procedure) 





Children were coded as having an invisible friend if both the parent and child agreed that 
the child had either a current or past invisible friend and either the parent or the child was 
able to provide a “good” description (e.g., a description of the invisible friend’s physical 
characteristics and personality).  In addition, children who provided a particularly 
detailed description were coded as having an invisible friend even if the parent did not 
confirm the child’s responses, because past research indicates that parents do not always 
know about their children’s invisible friends (Taylor et al., 2004).   
The criteria for coding personified objects were similar, except that the 
description had to include information about the objects’ personality and/or mental states.  
This was required in order to differentiate transitional objects that were used primarily for 
comfort (Winnicott, 1953) from personified objects that children treat as characters with 
distinct personalities.  The reliability for invisible friends and personified objects was 
91%; disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Seventeen children (56.67%, 8 boys and 9 girls) met the criteria for having an 
imaginary companion: 12 were invisible friends (70.59%, 5 boys and 7 girls) and 5 were 
personified objects (29.41%, 3 boys and 2 girls).  Of these imaginary companions, 12 
(70.6%) were described as current companions and 5 (29.4%) were described as past 
companions. Having an imaginary companion (past or current) was not related to gender, 
χ2 (1, n = 30) = 0.22, p = .64, or age, t (28) = 0.71, p = .48.  Children’s descriptions were 
diverse (e.g., a stuffed dog, who was good at “hide and seek” but “still has a lot to learn”, 
an invisible fly who slept on the child’s head and got “smelly” when he rummaged 







Following the informed consent procedures, the lead experimenter escorted 
children into the testing room while a second experimenter remained with parents in the 
waiting area.  Parents provided some basic demographic information (i.e., age, gender, 
ethnicity, occupation, marital status, and education level) and then completed the CMUQ, 
the Parent Role-play questionnaire, and the Parasocial Relationships Questionnaire.  
In the testing room, the lead experimenter began with the Properties Task by 
describing the purpose of the task and the response scale.  The experimenter told 
children, “First I’m going to need your help describing some kids.  Let me show you 
what I mean by that.”  The experimenter then introduced children to the boxes that 
represented the 4-point response options.  To assist children’s understanding of the scale, 
the experimenter showed children four pictures of the same snowman (see Figure 4), with 
statements printed underneath that corresponded to all the possible response options: (1) 
“He is wearing a hat” (definitely yes), (2) “He is metal” (definitely no) (3) “He was made 













The experimenter modeled selecting a response option for each picture separately, 
and provided an explanation for selecting that particular response option.  For example, 
for the picture of the snowman with the statement, “He is in a driveway”, the 
experimenter said,  “Well, he could be in a driveway, but a driveway is not a very good 
place for a snowman!  He could get knocked over!  So I think “probably no”.  Let’s put 
him into this box right here.  This is the ‘probably no’ box.” 
After the experimenter modeled all of the response options, she began the task by 
introducing children to the four different types of entities with accompanying pictures in 
an order determined by a Latin Square: 
“This is [boy: Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [girl: Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha].  
[Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha] is a little boy/girl that you 
play with.” 
 
“This is [Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha]. 
[Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha] is a little boy/girl that you 
play with on a video chat program, like Skype™ or FaceTime®.” 
 
“This is [Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha]. 
[Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha] is a little boy/girl character 
that you play with in a video game.” 
 
“This is [Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha]. 
[Ben/Noah/Patrick/Sam] [Beth/Patty/Sarah/Samantha] is a little boy/girl doll that 
you play with.  
 
The experimenter said, “I’m going to show you pictures of four boys/girls and tell 
you a little bit about them.  Then, like with the pictures of the snowman, I’m going hand 
you pictures of the four boys/girl and read what is says under the pictures.  Then, you’re 
going to decide where each picture goes.”   As the experimenter introduced each entity, 
the 5.5" × 6.5" pictures of each type of child with the description typed underneath were 





were presented.  This allowed children to reference them while making their judgments 
during the task.  However, note that unlike Studies 1 and 2, participants did not have 
direct exposure to each of the four child agents featured in the pictures. 
For the child on a video chat program and the virtual child, the experimenter 
verified that participants were familiar with video chat programs and virtual characters by 
asking, “Do you know what Skype™ or Facetime® is?” and “Do you know what a video 
game character is?”  All 33 children indicated that they understood what a video game 
character was, and only six children (18.2%) initially said they were unfamiliar with 
video chat programs.  In these instances, the experimenter provided the following 
explanation of video chat programs: “It’s like talking to someone on the phone, except 
it’s on a computer, and you can see them, and they can see you.”  After providing this 
explanation, most children indicated that they had used a video chat program before, 
usually to chat with extended family members.  Additionally, only one of the 29 parents 
that completed the CMUQ indicated that their child had not used a video chat program 
before.  
To help ensure that participants would respond on the Properties Task based on 
their own intuitions, the experimenter then said, “Sometimes, you might put the pictures 
of the four boys/girls into the same box.  Sometimes, you might put them into different 
boxes.  That’s okay!  There are no right or wrong answers.  I just want to know what you 
think.”  The experimenter then began the task by presenting the first item, in a set of four 
3.5" × 4" images (of the real child, the child on a video chat program, the virtual child 
and the doll) and reading the identical statement that typed underneath each of the four 





make their judgments, saying, “Now you decide if it’s true for each boy/girl and where 
each picture should go- into the ‘definitely yes’ box, the ‘definitely no’ box, the 
‘probably yes’ box, or the ‘probably no’ box.”  Items were presented to children in 
unique randomized orders, in sets of four images that were randomly shuffled.  Unless 
they showed signs of hesitation or confusion, children were not prompted after the first 
item.  Children were not given any feedback on their responses. 
Following the Properties task, the lead experimenter thanked children for their 
help.  She then administered the Role-play interview, followed by a free play session in 
which children either drew pictures of their imaginary companions, or pictures of real and 
imaginary people.  The second experimenter sat in the testing room with children during 
the free play session, while the lead experimenter followed-up with parents about 
children’s responses to the Role-play interview.  If parents described imaginary 
companions that the children did not mention, the lead experimenter re-interviewed 
children immediately following the free-play session.  Otherwise, the lead experimenter 
proceeded with the Brief Media Use Interview.  The entire session lasted between forty-
five minutes and one hour.  Children were given $10 for participating. 
Hypotheses 
Property Attributions 
Research findings consistently show that young children attribute properties to 
social robots that cut across living and non-living kinds, including perceptual and 
psychological properties (e.g., Kahn et al., 2006; Jipson & Gelman, 2007). Therefore, I 
hypothesized that children in this study would recognize that the virtual child was a non-





expected that the attribution of psychological properties to a virtual child would vary as a 
function of age and individual differences.  For example, older children might be less 
willing to attribute psychological properties to a virtual child, whereas children with 
imaginary companions (regardless of age) might be more willing to attribute 
psychological properties to a virtual child.  I also anticipated that children would be less 
likely to attribute psychological properties to a doll, but that this would also vary as a 
function of age and individual differences. 
 Based on the results from Study 2, I anticipated that children would attribute some 
features of social reciprocity to a virtual child (Aguiar & Taylor, 2015).  In Study 2, 
children were more likely to attribute items about comfort, protection and love to the 
stuffed dog.  It possible that these differences were primarily driven by differences in the 
embodied form of the entities (the presence or absence of a physical body).  If so, then 
children in Study 4 might be less willing to attribute items about love and companionship 
to both the virtual child and the child on a video chat program, and more willing to 
attribute them to a real child and a doll.  However, because I sampled an older age cohort 
and used an inanimate artifact that is typically marketed to girls, I anticipated possible 
age and gender differences.  I also expected the social reciprocities attributed to a virtual 
child and a doll would vary as a function of other individual difference measures, 
including imaginary companions and experience with digital media. 
 Based on the results of Studies 1 and 2, my predictions about autonomy and 
creative control were less clear.  For the virtual child, I hypothesized that children would 
recognize the agent’s capacity for autonomous movement.  And if my intuitions about the 





recognize a lack of creative control over the virtual child’s behaviors.  However, I was 
more uncertain about the extent to which children would attribute properties of autonomy 
and creative control to a doll.  In Studies 1 and 2, children were equally likely to attribute 
agentic properties to both the virtual dog and the stuffed dog.  Therefore, I also expected 
some variation in the attributions of autonomy and creative control to the doll.   
Reality status 
Because many virtual agents can move autonomously and are capable of 
producing socially contingent responses based on human input, I hypothesized that 
children would perceive the virtual child as more real than imaginary.  I expected that this 
would be particularly true for children who attribute psychological and social properties 
to the virtual child.  I further expected that the perceived reality status of the virtual child 
would vary as a function of age and individual differences.  For example, older children 
who have had more experience with digital games might be more likely to attribute 
fantasy status to the virtual child.  It was also possible that the presence of an imaginary 
companion would predict the extent to which children viewed the virtual child as real. 
Children readily understand that their imaginary companions are not real (Taylor, 1999), 
and thus they might also assume that the virtual child was not real, even if they were 
aware that the entity could operate outside their creative control.  
Results 
Pattern of Responses on the Child Properties Task 
Table 10 shows the means and standard deviations for the five property categories 
(collapsing across individual items) by age and as a function of type of entity.  As 





psychological functioning to the real child and the child on a video chat program.  In 
addition, children perceived both of these entities as “real”. 
 
Table 10 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for each entity by property and by age 
 
However, as in Study 3, the primary focus of the Child Properties Task was to 
examine concepts of the virtual child, and how these concepts might differ from the other 
target entities.  To examine the pattern of differentiation between the virtual child and the 
three other entities (real child, child on a video chat program and doll), I used a similar 
method employed in Study 3.  I created difference scores by subtracting the average 
property attribution scores for the real child, child on a video chat program, and doll from 
the virtual child.  I then ran a 3 (comparison; virtual – real, virtual – video chat, virtual – 
Entity Autonomy & Control Biology Psychology Social Reality Status
Real
5-year-olds (n=4) 1.88 (0.48) 2.13 (0.85) 1.83 (0.43) 2.14 (0.55) 2.5 (0.58)
6-year-olds (n = 11) 2.55 (0.57) 2.77 (0.52) 2.61 (0.49) 2.56 (0.43) 2.41 (0.77)
7-year-olds (n = 10) 2.85 (0.47) 2.90 (0.32) 2.90 (0.16) 2.84 (0.21) 2.95 (1.16)
8-year-olds (n = 5) 2.70 (0.27) 3.00 (0.00) 2.67 (0.41) 2.60 (0.57) 3.00 (0.00)
Average score 2.58 (0.56) 2.77 (0.52) 2.61 (0.50) 2.60 (0.45) 2.80 (0.41)
Video chat
5-year-olds (n=4) 1.50 (1.08) 1.63 (0.48) 2.33 (0.61) 2.04 (0.32) 2.00 (1.41)
6-year-olds (n = 11) 2.18 (0.75) 2.64 (0.55) 2.33 (0.63) 2.29 (0.45) 2.32 (0.72)
7-year-olds (n = 10) 2.70 (0.54) 2.80 (0.35) 2.70 (0.33) 2.53 (0.58) 2.80 (0.35)
8-year-olds (n = 5) 2.70 (0.27) 3.00 (0.00) 2.87 (0.18) 2.46 (0.57) 3.00 (0.00)
Average score 2.35 (0.77) 2.62 (0.58) 2.54 (0.51) 2.36 (0.51) 2.63 (0.72)
Virtual
5-year-olds (n=4) 0.88 (0.63) 0.88 (0.25) 1.67 (0.72) 1.39 (0.32) 0.25 (0.50)
6-year-olds (n = 11) 0.59 (0.66) 0.82 (0.75) 1.09 (0.60) 1.09 (0.50) 0.77 (0.96)
7-year-olds (n = 10) 0.75 (0.92) 0.35 (0.82) 0.80 (0.80) 1.21 (0.72) 0.20 (0.63)
8-year-olds (n = 5) 0.60 (0.42) 0.30 (0.45) 0.93 (0.55) 1.23 (0.55) 0.40 (.55)
Average score 0.68 (0.70) 0.58 (0.71) 1.04 (0.70) 1.20 (0.56) 0.43 (0.86)
Doll
5-year-olds (n=4) 1.25 (.65) 0.63 (0.63) 1.29 (0.34) 1.03 (0.79) 0.75 (0.96)
6-year-olds (n = 11) 0.77 (0.75) 0.37 (0.55) 0.88 (0.64) 1.49 (0.62) 0.45 (0.57)
7-year-olds (n = 10) 0.20 (0.48) 0.30 (0.79) 0.70 (0.92) 1.76 (0.61) 0.35 (0.60)
8-year-olds (n = 5) 0.60 (0.89) 0.60 (0.65) 1.20 (0.69) 1.49 (0.75) 0.50 (0.50)






doll) × 5 (property; autonomy/creative control, biology, psychology, social, reality status) 
mixed model ANCOVA with gender as the between subjects factor, age in months as the 
covariate, and difference scores as the dependent measure.   
Between subjects, the main effect of gender was not significant, F (1, 27) = 0.00, 
p = .99.  In addition, there were no significant interaction effects involving gender: 
gender by comparison, F (2, 54) = 1.28, p = .22; gender by property, F (4, 108) = 0.72, p 
=.58; gender by comparison and by property, F (8, 216) = 0.14, p = .65.  Within subjects, 
the main effect of comparison was not significant, F (2, 54) = 1.52, p =.23, and the main 
effect of property was trending, F (4, 108) = 2.21, p =.07. η2 = .08.  However, there was a 
significant comparison by property interaction effect, F (8, 216) = 3.03, p = .003. η2 = 
.10.  Figure 5 shows the patterns of differentiation between the virtual child and the other 









How does the virtual child differ from the real child and the real child on a 
video chat program?  For autonomy/creative control, biology, psychology and social 
properties, the pattern of differentiation mirrors what was found in Study 3 with adults.  
Collapsed across age, the patterns of differentiation between the virtual child and the real 
child, and between the virtual child and the child on a video chat program were similar 
for the properties of autonomy/creative control, biology, and psychology, ps ≥ .22.  These 
properties were attributed more to the real child and the child on a video chat program 
compared to the virtual child.  In addition, the patterns of differentiation between the 
virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and the child on a video chat program 
were similar for reality status, p = .60.  This property was attributed more to both the real 
child and the child on the video chat program than to the virtual child.  In other words, 
compared to the real children, the virtual child was perceived as lacking autonomy, as 
well as biological and psychological functioning.  In addition, the virtual child was 
perceived as significantly less real than both the real child and the child on a video chat 
program.    
For the social property, there was a trend for less differentiation between the 
virtual child and the child on the video chat program compared to the differentiation 
between the virtual child and the real child, p = .08.  As was found in Study 3, social 
properties were attributed more to the child on a video chat program than to the virtual 
child, but to a somewhat lesser degree than the real child.  This finding suggests that, like 
adults, children are sensitive to a social partner’s physical presence when making 





How does the virtual child differ from the doll?  Children did not differentiate 
between the virtual child and the doll for reality status or autonomy/creative control. 
They were equally likely to view both the virtual child and the doll as pretend entities that 
were within their creative control (low autonomy scores and high control scores). Paired 
sample t-tests indicated that children did not differentiate between the virtual child and 
the doll for biological t (29) = 1.06, p = .30, or psychological properties, t (29) = 0.75, p = 
.46.  However, children attributed more social properties to the doll than to the virtual 
child, t (29) = 2.40, p = .023, d = .44.  Thus, children in this study viewed the inanimate 
toy as affording more social opportunities than the virtual child.  
Of the 7 social property items, there were 3 pairs (6 items) that were designed to 
capture the extent to which the relationship was reciprocal.  To provide descriptive 
information about the way the participants viewed the relationships, I categorized the 
participants’ responses for each pair of items as (1) reciprocal if the participant indicated 
that both of the items in the pair were possible (e.g., scores of 2 or 3 for both “can X love 
you” and “can you love X”), (2) self-to-entity unilateral if the score for the self (e.g., “can 
you love X”) was 2 or 3, but the score for the entity (e.g., “can X love you”) was 0 or 1; 
(3) entity-to-self unilateral if the score for the entity (e.g., “can X love you”) was 2 or 3, 
but the score for the self (e.g., “can you love X”) was 0 or 1; or (4) no relationship if both 
scores were 0 or 1. 
Table 11 shows the relationship categories for each of the three pairs of items for 
the doll and the virtual child.  Self-to-entity unilateral relationships were relatively 
common for both the virtual child and the doll, but the entity-to-self unilateral direction 




















A paired samples t-test comparing the number of times the participants’ responses 
were categorized as entity-to-self unilateral (out of 3) was significant, with the scores for 
the virtual child (M = 0.67, SD = 0.76) higher than the scores for the doll (M = 0.30, SD = 
0.47), t (29) = 2.48, p = .019, d = 45.  A substantial minority of participants viewed the 
relationships as unilateral.  A paired samples t-test on the number of times the 
participants’ responses were categorized as endorsing a reciprocal relationship (out of 3) 
revealed a significant difference, with the scores for the doll (M = 0.97, SD = 1.03) higher 
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One of the social items (“He can make you feel better when you are sad”) was not 
part of a reciprocity pair, but provides additional evidence of the superiority of the doll 
over the virtual child for a relationship.  Children were significantly more likely to 
indicate that the doll (M =1.70, SD = .92) could make them feel better than the virtual 
child (M = 1.23, SD = .94), t (29) = 2.19, p = .04, d = .40.  
As in Study 3, I also examined social relationships by creating a composite 
relationship score averaging across the paired reciprocal items (n = 3 pairs, n = 6 items) 
for each entity (e.g., “Can X love you?  Can you love X?”) (see Table 12 for descriptive 
statistics).   
 
Table 12 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for each item designed to assess social reciprocity 
 
The relationship composite scores ranged from 0 to 3, where averages near 0 
indicated that a relationship of any kind with a virtual child or doll was not possible, 
averages near 1.5 indicated a possible unilateral relationship, averages near 3 suggesting 
a possible reciprocal relationship with the virtual child and the doll.  The relationship 
composite scores for both the virtual child (M = 1.19, SD = 0.61) and the doll (M = 1.49, 
SD = 0.68) were normally distributed and positively correlated, r = .36, p = .049. The 
Item Real child Video chat child Virtual child Doll
S/he can tell you secrets. 2.56 (0.73) 2.40 (0.72) 0.87 (0.94) 0.67 (0.88)
You can tell him/her secrets. 2.60 (0.72) 2.27 (0.94) 0.87 (0.94) 1.50 (1.20)
S/he can keep you company. 2.63 (0.72) 2.30 (0.84) 1.60 (1.04) 2.00 (0.94)
You can keep him/her company. 2.67 (0.80) 2.43 (0.82) 1.00 (0.91) 1.37 (1.03)
S/he can love you. 2.63 (0.81) 2.43 (0.82) 1.13 (1.11) 1.16 (1.05)
You can love him/her. 2.70 (0.65) 2.50 (0.82) 1.67 (1.06) 2.23 (1.01)






relationship composite was not related to age (in months) for either the virtual child, r = 
01, p = .97, or the doll, r = .123 p = .48.  It was also not related to gender for either the 
virtual child or the doll, t (28) = 27, p = .79 and t (28) = 0.10, p = .92, respectively.   
To examine the extent to which children differentiated opportunities for social 
relationships between the virtual child and the doll, I obtained difference scores by 
subtracting the relationship composite scores for the doll from the virtual child.  
Differentiation between the virtual child and the doll was not related to age, r = -.12, p = 
.54, or gender, t (28) = -0.13, p = .90.  A one sample t-test indicated that that the mean 
difference (M = -0.30, SD = 0.73) was significantly different from zero, t (32) = -2.25, p 
= .03, d = .41.  The direction of the difference indicates that relative to a virtual child, 
participants were significantly more likely to view a doll as a potential relationship 
partner. 
Because children in Study 2 differentiated between a stuffed dog and a virtual dog 
on specific features of high quality friendship (e.g., love and companionship), I also 
conducted an individual item analysis on each bi-directional features of social reciprocity.  
Six paired samples t-tests revealed that children differentiated between the virtual child 
and the doll on the unidirectional item “You can love him/her” (mean difference = -0.57, 
SD = 1.22), t (29) = -2.54, p = .02, d = .46, and on the unidirectional item “You can tell 
him/her secrets” (mean difference = -0.63, SD = 1.25), t (29) = -2.79, p = .009, d = .51.  
The bi-directional items “S/he can keep you company” (mean difference = -0.40, SD = 
1.33) and “You can keep him/her company” (mean difference = -0.37, SD = 1.03) were 
trending, t (29) = -1.65, p = .11, d = .30 and t (29) = -1.94, p = .06, d = .36, respectively.  





these items.  The differentiation between the virtual child and the doll on these items was 
not related to gender, ps > .50.  Age was not related to the differentiation between the 
virtual child and the doll on items about companionship and love, rs = -.05 – -.02, ps ≥ 
.77; however age was related to the item about intimate disclosure, r = -.38, p = .04.  
Younger children were more likely to favor telling secrets to the doll than older children.  
However, it is important to note that these findings should be considered suggestive, as 
they would not survive a Bonferroni correction. 
I had also planned to examine the extent to which differentiation between the 
virtual child and the doll on the relationship composite was associated with attributions of 
autonomy and creative control to both entities, as well as children’s perception of the 
reality status for these entities.  However, exploratory data analyses revealed floor effects 
for these properties.   
 Age related differences. Age (in months) interacted with the main effect of 
property, F (4, 108) = 2.73, p = .03, η2 = .09, and the main effect of comparison, F (2, 54) 
= 8.72, p =.001, η2 = .24, but was best understood in light of a three-way interaction 
between age, comparison, and property, F (8, 216) = 4.26, p < .001, η2 = .14.  To ease 
conceptual understanding of this three-way interaction, I ran a 3 (comparison) × 5 
(property) ANOVA with age group (5-and 6-year-olds vs. 7- and 8-year-olds) as the 
discrete, between subjects factor.  Simple effects tests with a Bonferroni correction were 
then used to examine all significant age related differences (see Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics by age)6.  
                                                 
6 I planned to parse the three-way interaction effect using regression analyses.  However, 
significant problems with multicollineary emerged.  Efforts to address these problems 





For the property of autonomy/creative control, no age differences were found in 
the patterns of differentiation between the virtual child and the three other entities, ps ≥ 
.11.  However, for biological, psychological, social, and reality status properties, age 
differences emerged.  All of these differences were for the patterns of differentiation 
between the virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and the child on a video 
chat program.  No age related differences were found in the pattern of differentiation 
between the virtual child and the doll.  For biological, psychological, social and reality 
status properties, younger children (5- and 6-year-olds) differentiated significantly less 
between the virtual child and the real child, and the virtual child and the child on a video 
chat program than older children (7- and 8-year-olds), ps ≤ .03.  Taken together, these 
findings indicate that younger children viewed the virtual child as more similar to both 
the real child and the child on a video chat program than the older age cohorts.   
Although there appeared to be age differences on the Child Properties Task, four 
of the initial seven 5-year-olds had to be dropped from the analyses because their 
responses indicated that they did not understand what the stimuli were meant to portray 
or could not attend to the task.  Given the small sample size within each age cohort, age 
related findings are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution.  More generally, 
the Child Properties Task did not work that well for the 5-year-olds in this study and 
might not be appropriate for children under 6 years of age.  The video guessing game task 
used in Studies 1 and 2 worked better for this younger age group.  
Individual Differences 
To examine individual differences, I focused specifically on psychological and 





examined in relation to the following individual difference variables: gender, digital 
game play, and imaginary companions.  Note that due to the small number of 
observations in each cell, I collapsed across past and current imaginary companions, as 
well as type of imaginary companion for the subsequent analyses.  In what follows, I first 
report on the results of the individual differences analyses for the virtual child, followed 
by the doll. 
For the virtual child, gender was not associated with attributions of psychological 
and social properties to the virtual child, t (28) = -0.13, p = .90 and t (28) = -0.17, p = .87, 
nor was having an imaginary companion, t (28) = -0.30, p = .77 and t (28) = -0.82, p = 
.42, respectively.  Although playing digital games on a typical day was not related to 
psychological attributions to the virtual child, t (28) = -0.16, p = .87, it was marginally 
associated with social attributions, t (28) = -2.10, p = .04, d = 0.38.  Children who played 
digital games on a typical day attributed greater social opportunities to the virtual child 
(M = 1.44, SD = 0.34) than children who did not play these games on a typical day (M = 
1.02, SD = 0.64).   
For the doll, gender was not associated with psychological nor social property 
attributions, t (28) = .87, p = .39 and t (28) = 0.16, p = .87, respectively.  However, both 
digital game play on a typical day and the presence of an imaginary companion were 
associated with attributions to the doll. Children who played digital games on a typical 
day were significantly less willing to attribute psychological properties to the doll (M = 
0.56, SD = 0.42) compared to children who did not play digital games regularly (M = 
1.20, SD = 0.86), t (27) = 2.42, p = .02, d = .44.  In addition, children with no past or 





to the doll (M = 1.18, SD = 0.48) compared to children with a past or current history of 
imaginary companions (M = 1.75, SD = 0.68), t (28) = 2.59, p = .02, d = .47; however, 
the same was not true for psychological properties, t (28) = -0.29, p = .77.   
 Given the disparities in attributions to the doll that emerged as a result of different 
forms of play, I thought it might be possible that digital game play was negatively related 
to role-play for children in this sample.  However, digital game play on a typical day was 
independent of a past or current history of imaginary companions, χ2 (1, n = 29) = 0.08, p 
= .77.  Children who played digital games on a typical day were just as likely to have 
imaginary companions as children to who did not play digital games daily. 
Discussion 
The primary aim of this research was to develop a paradigm that could 
successfully capture concepts of humanoid agents with children from a broad age range.  
Overall, for children over five years of age, the paradigm used here was successful in 
eliciting concepts of a child virtual agent, and the ways in which it might differ from a 
range of other social partners. Children aged six and older clearly understood the 
response scale, and the combination of fewer items paired with a card-sorting task helped 
younger age cohorts stay focused and engaged.  In addition, they had sufficient 
experience with digital games and video chat programs to warrant the use of picture 
stimuli for both introducing the entities and sorting the items presented in this study.  
Finally, the use of a counterbalanced set of images helped control for responding due to 
the idiosyncratic features of the children pictured in the study. 
These preliminary findings suggest some age related differences in responses to 





items suggests that the youngest children tended to doubt the reality status not only of the 
virtual child and the doll, but also the real child and child on a video chat program.  It is 
possible that these responses could be due the use of picture stimuli. However, there is 
other research indicating that in some circumstances, young children can be more 
skeptical about the reality status of real people, places, and events than older children and 
adults (see Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013 for a review).  
For children over five years, there was a clear differentiation between the 
biological and non-biological entities on reality status items.  Children ages 6-years-old 
and up clearly perceived the real child and the child on a video chat program as probably 
or definitely real, and the virtual child and the doll as “probably not” real or “definitely 
not” real.  Indeed, after being introduced to all four children, one 6-year-old girl stated 
that she was going to sort all of the items based on whether or not the children were 
“fake” or “real”.  This spontaneous comment might explain why the base rate for the 
attribution of social opportunities to the virtual child and the doll was somewhat lower 
than expected.  It is possible that pitting the virtual child and the doll against real children 
primed child participants to attribute properties based on this overarching distinction.   
 Because all children in this sample were fairly confident that the virtual child was 
not real, there was no other support for the hypothesis that virtual agents are ontologically 
ambiguous entities that are distinct from inanimate toys.  For example, although children 
were somewhat more likely to attribute psychological functioning to the virtual agent 
compared to doll, this difference was not statistically significant.  Moreover, children 
across age cohorts viewed both the virtual child and the doll as lacking in autonomy and 





as entirely pretend and within their creative control might be reflective of their current 
experiences with digital games.  In the Brief Media Interview, children frequently cited 
favorite digital games such as MINECRAFT™ and Super Mario Brothers™, which 
feature pixilated, cartoon-like agents that lack sophisticated programming.  Given these 
experiences, it is not surprising that children would readily identify such characters as 
pretend.  It would be interesting to see how attributions might change based on 
interactions with more sophisticated humanoid agents, much like those that are being 
designed and programmed by Cassell and colleagues to serve as peer tutors (e.g., Yu et 
al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2014).  
 However, the lack of differentiation between a virtual child and a doll on 
autonomy/creative control was not found for the social property.  Overall, children 
attributed the social property more to the doll than to the virtual child, and children were 
more likely to favor the doll as a reciprocal relationship partner.  In addition, as was 
found in Study 2 with preschool age children, specific features of high quality friendship 
were attributed more to the doll than to the virtual child.  These features included the 
capacity to feel love towards the entity, to disclose secrets to the entity, and to experience 
a reciprocal sense of companionship.  Because I was not able to examine embodiment 
directly in this study, it is not possible to determine if these distinctions were based on the 
presence or absence of a physical body.  As was found in Study 3 with adults, the 
somewhat lower social attributions to the child on a video chat program relative to the 
real child suggest that children recognize the importance of physical presence in 
opportunities for high quality relationships.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 





replicated in Study 4 with a different embodied artifact -- one that was hard and plastic 
rather than plush and soft.  
Analyses of individual differences hint at the potential role experience might play 
in children’s concepts of virtual agents and inanimate toys.  Children with a past or 
current history of imaginary companions attributed greater social opportunities to the doll 
compared to children who did not engage in this form of role-play.  It is possible that 
children with imaginary companions were more practiced in simulating social 
relationships with inanimate toys, and were therefore more likely to see potential for 
relationships with these artifacts.  Similarly, children who played digital games daily 
were more likely to attribute psychological functioning to the virtual child, and less likely 
to attribute psychological functioning to the doll.  Therefore, it is possible that interest in 
and familiarity with virtual games influences children’s concepts of the agents that 
inhabit these digitized spaces, and the ways in which they perceive more traditional toys.  
However, it is important to note that gender was associated with digital game play on a 
typical day.  As was found in Study 3 with adults, males were more likely to engage in 
this actively daily than females.  This preliminary finding raises questions for researchers 
interested in developing virtual agents for the purpose of educational interventions.  For 
example, if females are less familiar with and less interested in virtual games and virtual 
characters, will this have an impact on their ability to establish rapport with a virtual 
agent, and their ability to learn from them? 
Because of the small sample size and wide age range, the findings reported here 
should be considered exploratory, and will need to be replicated with a larger sample.  





light on children’s concepts of virtual agents, and how they differ from more traditional 
toys.  Despite the differences in the virtual entities and artifacts presented to children, age 
ranges, and paradigms used to assess children’s intuitions about these entities, the results 


























Summary of Major Findings 
Across all four studies, one surprisingly consistent finding emerges: children and 
adults rarely differentiated between a virtual agent and an inanimate artifact on 
opportunities for high quality friendship, but when they did, these features were attributed 
more to the inanimate artifact than the virtual agent.  These findings emerged across age 
ranges and across the embodied forms of the target entities. 
Summary of Studies 1 and 2   
In Study 1, preschool age children failed to differentiate between a virtual dog and 
a stuffed dog when asked about autonomous movement.  This was particularly surprising, 
given that they had direct exposure to the virtual dog and could clearly see that the dog 
was capable of moving on its own and responding in socially contingent ways.  In Study 
2 when children were forced to choose between the virtual dog and the stuffed dog on 
opportunities for friendship, education and entertainment, the two dogs were endorsed 
equally often for items about autonomous movement, as well as for items about 
opportunities for learning.  However, some items about entertainment elicited a greater 
preference for the virtual dog.  Discrimination was also shown on specific features of 
high quality friendship, including comfort, protection and love.  For these items, children 
tended to favor the stuffed dog over the virtual dog.  
The results of these preliminary studies suggest that children might favor 
opportunities for friendship with an inanimate toy and opportunities for entertainment 





dog versus a virtual dog is consistent with social provisions theory developed by Weiss 
(1974), indicating that relationships provide specific social affordances that can 
sometimes overlap across different types of relationships-- including those with 
imaginary friendships (Gleason & Hohmann, 2006).  However, the items developed to 
assess features of friendship in these studies did not capture social reciprocity, which is 
the foundational feature of friendships (Gleason, 2013; Rubin et al., 2013; Rubin, 
Bukowski, & Parker, 2006).  In addition, differences in the embodiment of the virtual dog 
and the stuffed dog might have influenced children’s responses to the friendship items, 
particularly those about comfort and protection.  And because the entities used in this 
study were dogs, these results are not generalizable to other virtual agents and toys.  
Finally, children’s spontaneous utterances during the task suggested some ontological 
ambiguity about the virtual dog that was not captured in the Social Affordances Task.  
For example, a number of children claimed that the virtual dog was “real”, or appeared 
confused about the reality status of the dog (e.g., specifically asking the experimenter 
whether or not the virtual dog was a real dog.)   
It is unlikely that confusion about the status of the virtual dog was due to a more 
general inability to distinguish fantasy from reality.  Across a number of studies, research 
findings indicate that young children are able to distinguish fantasy from reality in many 
different contexts (see Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013 for a review).  Moreover, when they 
make mistakes in their judgment, they are just as likely to mistake real people and events 
for imaginary ones (Woolley & Ghossainy).  One possibility is that confusion about a 
virtual dog reflects the ontological complexity of new personified technologies.  In the 





still attribute psychological and perceptual properties to these agents (e.g., Kahn et al., 
2006; Jipson & Gelman, 2007).  To examine the extent to which this might be true for 
children’s concepts of virtual agents, in Studies 3 and 4, I investigated the biological and 
psychological properties children and adults attribute to a humanoid agent, and how the 
social reciprocities inherent in real and imaginary relationships might relate to 
ontological ambiguities.   
Summary of Study 3 
With adults, there was evidence to suggest that virtual agents are also 
conceptualized in ways that cut across living and non-living kinds.  Adults clearly 
recognized that both a virtual child and a doll were not alive, but they were more likely to 
attribute psychological functioning to the virtual child than to the doll.  In addition, 
attributions of psychological functioning to the virtual child were associated with 
increased attributions of the features that define high quality friendships.  The more 
adults attributed psychological functioning to the virtual child, the more they perceived 
potential for relationships with this entity.   
The attribution of friendship features to the virtual agent was also related to 
embodiment.  Although the virtual agent was perceived as significantly less embodied 
than a doll, the more participants perceived the virtual agent as having a physical body, 
the more likely they were to attribute opportunities for unilateral and reciprocal 
relationships to the agent.  Finally, relative to a doll, adults were more likely to view a 
virtual child as having some capacity for autonomous functioning.  On average, adults 






However, both gender and anthropomorphic tendencies were associated with 
attributions of autonomy and psychological functioning to the virtual child.  Males were 
more likely to attribute these properties to the virtual child than females, perhaps due to 
greater interest in and familiarity with virtual reality and virtual games found in my 
sample.  This finding is not surprising, given that gender differences in digital game play, 
including interest in digital games and motivations for play, are well established in the 
literature (e.g., Lucas & Sherry, 2004; Olsen, 2010; Yee, 2014).  Adults higher in 
anthropomorphic tendencies were also more likely to attribute autonomy and 
psychological functioning to the virtual child.  Although the current literature has focused 
on the role of an agent’s anthropomorphic features in influencing social behavior online 
(see Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011 for a review), to the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first study to show a link between an individual’s orientation towards anthropomorphic 
thinking and basic concepts of artificially intelligent agents.  In general, this finding 
suggests the individuals with higher anthropomorphic tendencies might be more willing 
to view as virtual agent as sentient, and this could have implications for the types of 
experiences and relationships they might foster with such entities.   
Nevertheless, despite greater attributions of psychological functioning to the 
virtual agent, and despite the individual differences that were associated with these 
attributions, adults did not attribute greater opportunities for reciprocal relationships to 
the virtual child relative to the doll.  Instead, differences emerged in the types of 
unilateral relationships that were possible with a virtual child and a doll.  Although adults 
did not think it could be possible for a doll to communicate love and secrets to them, they 





consistent with the idea that virtual agents are capable of responding in socially 
contingent ways.  However, the recognition that the virtual child might be more capable 
of providing one side of a relationship compared to a doll did not translate into greater 
opportunities for both unilateral and reciprocal relationships with the virtual child.  
Across all of the items designed to assess different aspects of social functioning, 
including reciprocity, attributions to the virtual child were mostly indistinguishable from 
attributions to the doll.  And within the subset of items designed to assess opportunities 
for social reciprocity, adults favored the inanimate doll as a potential relationship partner.  
Taken together, the results of Study 3 with adults mirror what was found among 
preschool age children in Studies 1 and 2.   When adults differentiated between the 
virtual child and the doll on features of high quality friendships, the inanimate doll was 
viewed as a more likely relationship partner.   
Summary of Study 4 
In Study 3, adults attributed properties to a virtual child in ways that cut across 
both living and non-living kinds.  They conceptualized a virtual child as a non-biological 
entity that might nevertheless possess the capacity to think and feel.  This finding is 
consistent with the “new ontological category hypothesis”, suggesting that artificially 
intelligent agents are conceptualized as simultaneously “alive and not alive” (Kahn et al., 
2013; Severson & Carlson, 2010).  However, 5- to 8-year-old children in Study 4 did not 
demonstrate ontological ambiguity in their judgments about a virtual child.  Like their 
judgments about the doll, children conceptualized the virtual child as non-living entity 
who was unlikely to be able to think and feel.  In addition, children viewed both the 





opportunities for creative control.  This finding sheds some possible light on the lack of 
differentiation between the virtual dog and the stuffed dog on items designed to assess 
agency in Studies 1 and 2.  Children’s failure to differentiate between the stuffed dog and 
the virtual dog on these items might have been driven by the overall perception that both 
entities could be entirely within their creative control.   
As was found with adults, children in Study 4 indicated a preference for the doll 
on items within the social property.  Overall, children attributed this property more to the 
doll than to the virtual child, and also indicated a preference for the doll on opportunities 
for reciprocal relationships. An analysis of the individual features of high quality 
friendships revealed a preference for the doll on items assessing love, companionship, 
and intimate disclosure.  Children indicated that they were more likely to love a doll, 
more likely to tell a doll secrets and more likely to experience a reciprocal sense of 
companionship with the doll. This finding replicates the preference for the stuffed dog in 
Study 2 on items about companionship and love.  Because I was not able to assess the 
role embodiment in Study 4, it is not possible to determine if this preference for the doll 
would still hold after controlling for differences in physical presence.  However, the 
lower social attributions to the child on a video chat program relative to the real child 
suggests that physical embodiment might play an important role in opportunities for high 
quality friendships.  In future research, the role of embodiment in children’s concepts of 
these entities should be assessed.   
In my original hypothesis, I had speculated that the recognition of a virtual child’s 
ability to simulate social reciprocities would be related to attributions of psychological 





doll.  However, in addition to perceiving the virtual child as non-autonomous, non-
psychological entity that affords more limited social opportunities than a doll, children 
were unequivocal about viewing both the virtual child and the doll as entirely pretend.  
Although age related differences were found among the attributions of real/pretend status, 
these differences could be due to some of the 5-year-olds’ skepticism about the reality of 
all four entities, including the real child and the child on a video chat program.  The use 
of picture stimuli in Study 4 might account for some of the doubt expressed by 5-year-
olds in my sample, but is consistent with other research indicating that in certain contexts, 
young children can doubt the reality status of real people and plausible events (Woolley 
& Ghossainy, 2013). 
Individual differences emerged in the social opportunities attributed to the virtual 
child and the doll.  Children who played digital games on a typical day (the majority of 
whom were males) were less likely to attribute psychological functioning to the doll, and 
more likely to attribute social opportunities to the virtual child than children who did not 
play digital games daily.  In addition, children with past or current imaginary companions 
were more likely to attribute social opportunities to the doll than children who did not 
engage in role-play.  Because the sample size was small, these findings are preliminary, 
but suggest that future research should investigate how familiarity and interest in 
different types of play is related to perceptions of these entities as social partners.  For 
example, it is possible that children who play digital games regularly are more likely to 
view a virtual agent as a potential friendship partner than inanimate toys. 
Nevertheless, children’s overall judgments about the virtual child point to one 





relationship partner than the virtual child.  In other words, children conceptualized the 
virtual child in ways to suggest that they are somewhat inferior to other inanimate toys 
they might play with.  These findings are surprisingly consistent with those found in 
Studies 1 and 2 with preschool age children and Study 3 with adults.  In each of the four 
studies presented in this dissertation, children and adults were more likely to attribute 
social opportunities to an inanimate artifact than they were to a virtual agent.  Moreover, 
unilateral features of high quality friendships – love in particular – were attributed more 
to the inanimate artifact.  Across all four studies, children and adults reported that they 
were more likely to love an inanimate artifact than a sophisticated virtual character.  
These findings have important implications about the design goals for virtual agents.  
Efforts to create a range of sophisticated intelligent agents that can show signs of 
thinking, feeling and caring for us might not translate into meaningful relationships with 
these entities.  And this, in turn, could affect how we treat these entities, as well as the 
degree to which we can care for and experience companionship from them.  On the other 
hand, there was some indication that children and adults expect that virtual agents are 
capable of providing social input.  In Studies 3 and 4, adults and children were more 
likely to attribute opportunities for unilateral relationships in which the entity provides 
social feedback to the virtual child than to the doll. The expectation of input from virtual 
agents is consistent with the view of these agents as providing one directional social 
opportunities, such as entertainment and education.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although findings across all four studies were fairly consistent, there are 





warrant discussion.  These include (1) the role of familiarity in child and adult concepts 
of virtual agents and inanimate artifacts, (2) parasocial relationships and the role parents 
play in shaping children’s experiences with virtual agents and artifacts, and (3) how 
measurement issues can cloud interpretation within the four studies presented in this 
dissertation.  Each of these limitation and future directions will be discussed in turn.    
The Role of Familiarity  
The consistency with which children and adults judged the inanimate artifact as 
the preferred entity for love, in combination with the results of individual difference 
analyses underscores the important role familiarity might play in the conceptualization of 
virtual agents and inanimate artifacts.  It is likely that many – if not all – of the adults 
sampled in Study 3 grew up with inanimate stuffed animals and/or dolls that they loved 
and treated like comfort objects.  And for some of these adults, their beloved childhood 
toys became the basis of imaginary companions that they remembered and described in 
the Imaginary Companions Questionnaire.  Therefore, their long-term familiarity with 
inanimate artifacts like dolls might have influenced their judgments about the social 
experiences such entities could provide. 
 In addition, based on the most recent data available (Rideout, 2013), younger 
children have more limited experiences with virtual characters in apps, websites and 
video games, which might partially account for their preference for the stuffed dog for 
items about comfort, protection, and love.  For these affordances, it is likely that children 
had more direct experience with the comfort, protection and love that is possible with 
stuffed animals.  The wider age range of children in Study 4 was included in part to 





effort was largely successful; all of the children were familiar with virtual characters and 
one parent reported that their child had a parasocial relationship with a character in the 
popular video game MINECRAFT™.  The increased familiarity with virtual characters 
might account for the ways in which children perceived the virtual child as providing 
them with some social feedback.  Moreover, the individual differences in digital game 
play and role-play were associated with perceptions of both the virtual child and the doll 
as potential relationship partners.   
 As artificially intelligent agents become a more ubiquitous presence in the lives of 
children, it will be important in future research to more systematically unpack the roles 
familiarity and experience plays in children’s concepts of virtual agents and the social 
opportunities they provide.  In addition, given the lack of information currently available 
about the content of children’s digital media experiences, it would be invaluable to 
examine how the content of children’s experiences with virtual games, and the social 
experiences they have in these settings, influences their understanding of artificially 
intelligent agents.  Finally, the nature of virtual environments is shifting increasingly 
away from two-dimensional screens and towards fully immersive digital experiences.  As 
these technologies pervade American households, it will important to investigate how 
experiences with virtual characters in immersive environments differ from screen-based 
entities, as well as the extent to which differences in media platforms shape children’s 
concepts of the entities that inhabit these digitized spaces.   
The Roles of Parents and Parasocial Relationships 
For young children, familiarity with virtual characters and inanimate toys is 





generally choose the virtual characters that children will experience in apps, websites and 
video games.  Games that closely simulate real world experiences might be off-putting 
for many parents of young children.  For example, parents might worry that highly 
realistic virtual games could hamper their children’s ability to differentiate real 
experiences from fantastical ones.  Parents might also be concerned that virtual characters 
that simulate real world experiences might unduly influence children’s behaviors, 
particularly for virtual games with more mature content.  This might partially explain 
why game developers create virtual worlds for young children like those that were 
described by children in Study 4: digital games that focus on animals, are clearly 
fantastical, or feature virtual agents that have cartoonish features.   
Given the range of experiences described by children in Study 4, it is unlikely that 
they would have encountered humanoid agents like the ones I used in the Child 
Properties Task.  Therefore, it is likely that children attributed properties to the virtual 
agent based on their current experiences.  Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
virtual child was perceived as a pretend entity.  In future research, it would be interesting 
to examine the extent to which direct exposure with sophisticated humanoid agents, such 
as the “peer tutors” developed by Cassell and colleagues (e.g., Yu et al., 2013; Zhao et 
al., 2014), might influence the properties children attribute to such entities.   
Parents might also provide some insight into the ontological status of virtual 
agents through the conversations they have with their children about these entities.  For 
example, parents might encourage young children to think of virtual agents as pretend 
entities that are not capable of thinking, feeling, and acting on their own.  However, a 





scaffold ambiguities in children’s judgments about artificially intelligent entities.  In this 
study, parents spoke to their 3- and 5-year-old children about a robotic dog in ways that 
were similar to both a living animal (e.g., psychological and sensory properties) and an 
inanimate toy (e.g., breakable).  Moreover, these conversations had the greatest influence 
on children’s intuitions about unobservable properties (e.g., psychological and sensory 
properties).  Finally, across biological, psychological, sensory and artifact properties, 
children’s talk about the robotic dog closely mirrored that of their parents.  Future 
research should examine the ways in which parents talk to their children about artificial 
intelligence and virtual agents, and how these conversations might shape children’s 
intuitions about these entities.   
In addition to scaffolding children’s knowledge about personified technologies, it 
is likely that parents influence children’s interest in pretend play with inanimate toys.  
Because parents today grew up playing with dolls and stuffed animals (and not 
sophisticated personified technologies), they might be more likely to encourage play with 
stuffed animals and dolls than with virtual characters in digital games.  This in turn could 
shape children’s thoughts about virtual characters, and the properties they attribute to 
them.  In Study 4, parental attitudes toward media use were not associated with children’s 
responses on the Child Properties Task.  However, this could be due restricted sample 
size and the wide age range assessed in Study 4.  Future research should consider the 
ways in which parental attitudes and encouragement shapes children’s intuitions about 
personified technologies. 
Some of this research is already underway.  Recent work has shown that parents 





from other media platforms, such as television and film.  For example, Bond and Calvert 
(2014) found that parental encouragement (e.g., desiring children to form relationship 
with the media character), in combination with repeated media exposure and toy 
engagement were predictive of the development of children’s parasocial relationships. 
Given that many characters featured in movies and television programs now also appear 
in popular apps, websites and video games, it is likely children would experience these 
socially relevant virtual characters in ways that are different from more generic virtual 
agents (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011).  A number of studies have shown that children 
are more likely to trust and to learn from socially relevant television characters than they 
are from unfamiliar characters (Lauricella et al., 2011; Schlesinger, Flynn, & Richert, 
2016).   
Interactions with beloved media characters embodied as sophisticated virtual 
characters could have a profound impact on children concepts of these entities, as well as 
their perceptions of the social affordances they provide.  This might be particularly true 
for applied contexts, in which virtual agents are designed to train academic and/or social 
skills.  Indeed, both adults in Study 3 and children in Study 4 recognized that even a 
generic virtual child had some capacity to provide social feedback, suggesting that they 
might recognize some opportunities for learning from these entities.   
Nevertheless I suspect that socially relevant media characters might not have a 
lasting impact on children’s lives in the ways that both real and imaginary friendships can 
have.  The typical parasocial relationship lasts about two years, and parasocial “breakup” 
commonly occurs because children outgrow the media character (Bond & Calvert, 2014).  





imaginary friends can grow with children.  In future research, it would be worthwhile to 
investigate how children’s concepts of a socially relevant virtual agent differs from a 
generic one, and the ways in which this might impact an agents’ influence on children’s 
learning and behaviors.  It would also be interesting to examine if parasocial breakup 
with media characters degrades their perceptions of these entities, and if this in turn could 
have deleterious effects on their ability to learn from these characters.   
Measurement Issues 
 In addition to the ways in which familiarity, parental influence and limited social 
relevance might have influenced child and adult judgments about virtual agents, the 
development of the properties used in all four studies presented some interpretive 
challenges that warrant caution.  In Studies 1 and 2, many of items that were primarily 
designed to capture friendship features were also rated by an adult sample as highly 
correlated with agency (the ability to move and act independently).  Therefore, for many 
items, interpretation was somewhat difficult.  Study 3 was designed to address some of 
the difficulties we experienced in Studies 1 and 2; however similar problems emerged, 
particularly for items designed to assess autonomy and psychological functioning.  
Although adult attributions to the real child and the child on a video chat program were 
largely consistent with my expectations, the interpretation of any one item was 
problematic.  For example, the item “S/he can listen to what you say” was designed to 
assess psychological functioning, but could also be interpreted as an item about 
perceptual abilities (e.g., “S/he can hear”).   
 In addition, some of the items were interpreted in ways that I had not expected.  In 





ways consistent enough for use in Study 4 with children.  Adults largely treated the child 
on a video chat program as disembodied, perhaps due to the location cues I presented in 
the vignette.  If the child had been described without cues to location, the attribution of 
this property to the child on a video chat program might have been different.  In addition, 
some adult participants showed evidence of over-interpreting a given item, particularly 
for those assessing autonomy and creative control.  Because the target entities were all 
children, some adults believed both the real child and the child on a video chat program 
had more limited abilities to move about freely -- perhaps because children are not adults 
who can say and do as they please.   
Some children in Study 4 also interpreted items in ways that were unexpected.  
For example, for the item “S/he can do things when you are not around”, one 6-year-old 
girl indicated, “probably yes” for the virtual child and doll.  She spontaneously justified 
her response by explaining that her younger brother could play with both the virtual child 
and the doll when she was not around, so in her mind, it was likely that both entities 
would be able to do things without her.  This justification makes intuitive sense, although 
it was not how I had intended the item to be interpreted.  
In addition to the difficultly in interpreting individual items, developing a means 
to capture social reciprocity was challenging.  For Studies 3 and 4, I developed bi-
directional features of high quality friendships that were operationalized in two ways.  
The first was to code attributions on these items into relationship types (no relationship, 
unilateral, and reciprocal).  However, this categorical approach loses information and 
might mischaracterize the perceived nature of at least some of the relationships when 





create a relationship composite score, where the possibility for relationships was 
measured on a continuum.  Although this method was able to capture the degree to which 
children and adults thought a relationship was possible with each of the four target 
entities, it did not clearly capture their concepts of social reciprocity.  These issues could 
potentially be address in future research, using a combination of behavioral measures in 
which behavioral reciprocities are coded, as well as property attribution measures, much 
like those used in this research and elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Jipson & Gelman, 
2016).   
 Overall, the measurement issues present within each of the four studies warrants 
caution in interpretation, and these findings should be replicated in future studies with 
larger and more representative samples.  However, the overall consistency with which 
children and adults attributed items across all four studies in this dissertation research 
provides some confidence in my interpretation of the items and in my overall findings.  
Final Comments 
According to Blascovich and Bailenson (2011), “the shift to an ever more virtual 
world – of which the Internet was only one step – may be something close to inevitable” 
(pp. 8).   Although virtual agents have been present in children toys for several decades 
(e.g., “Simon Says®” and Speak and Spell®) (Turkle, 2011), children now spend more 
time with digital media than they spend in school; time spent in these virtual realities is 
usurped only by sleep (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013).  And recent advances in 
AI have lead to the creation of new, sophisticated types of virtual entities that serve a 





(2011), the goals for synthetic agents have shifted from building knowledge or helping 
children practice skills to providing companionship.  
Studies with social robots suggest that children attribute at least some features of 
real-life friendships to imaginary others.  With advances in the programming of social 
reciprocities in virtual agents, children might increasingly view virtual agents as potential 
friendship partners.  Given that friendships with real peers and imaginary companions 
have the capacity to influence shape children’s development, it is possible that virtual 
agents could also impact children’s lives, in ways similar to both real and imaginary 
friendships.  Indeed, intervention research suggests that virtual agents are capable of 
shaping short-term academic performance and social functioning (Finkelstein et al. 2012; 
Finkelstein et al., 2013; Milne et al., 2010).  
My foray into research on children’s concepts of virtual agents began seven years 
ago when during a phone interview about imaginary companions, an 8-year-old boy 
asked me, “Does an imaginary companion count if it’s on a video game?”  The 
preliminary studies described in this dissertation provide an empirical foundation for 
beginning to address this question.  Based on the children and adults sampled in this 
research, the overall findings of this dissertation research suggest that virtual agents are 
similar to imaginary companions in many ways.  For children, these entities are much 
like imaginary companions in that they are pretend characters that operate entirely within 
their creative control.  However, unlike imaginary companions, virtual agents afford 
more limited social opportunities and are less likely to be loved by children and adults 
alike.  These results raise important questions about the role virtual agent are intended to 





closely simulate the social relationships we have with real people in the real world.  The 
ultimate goal for these artificially intelligent agents is to create thinking, feeling entities 
with whom we can share our lives (Turkle, 2011).  However, the results of these studies 
suggest that these efforts might be misguided.  Despite the sophisticated capacity to 
function as social partners, children and adults appear more likely to turn to the simple, 
open-ended artifacts for social opportunities, and for love in particular.  This raises an 
important, final point: Personified technologies are increasingly able to simulate real-life 






























ITEMS FOR THE ADULT PROPERTIES TASK 
Autonomy (4) 
Can X always interact when you want to? 
Does X have a life of his/her own? 
Can X do things without you? 
Does X do things when you are not around? 
 
Biological (5) 
Does X breathe? 
Can X sweat? 
Is X alive? 
Does X have a heart that beats? 
Does X get hiccups? 
 
Creative Control (4) 
Do you control what X is going to say? 
Do you control what X is going to do? 
Do you decide what X likes and what X doesn’t like? 
Do you decide where X goes when s/he’s not with you? 
 
Embodiment (5) 
Could you give X a hug? 
Could you hold X’s hand? 
Could you tie X’s shoe? 
Could you accidentally bump into X? 
Could you try on X’s jacket? 
 
Psychological (10) 
Could X get his/her feelings hurt? 
Could X think? 
Could X pretend?  
Could X tell a lie? 
Could X feel lonely? 
Could X make a mistake? 
Does X know what s/he wants to be when s/he grows up? 
Could X understand your feelings? 
Could X be amused by something you said? 
Could X listen to what you say? 
  
Social (11) 
Can like your more than he/she likes other people? 
Could X tell you secrets? 





Could X keep you company?   
Could you keep X company? 
Could X love you? 
Could you love X? 
Could X protect you? 
Could you protect X? 
Could X help you feel better when you are sad? 





Probably not Maybe Probably yes Definitely 
yes 






































ADULT PROPERTIES TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions for adults: 
In this next activity, you will be asked to make judgments about: (1) a child, (2) a 
child on a Skype video chat, (3) a virtual child character in a videogame, and (4) a doll.  
First, you will be asked to imagine a simple scenario.  Next, you will be asked a series of 
“yes or no” questions.  The responses you give are really important!  We will be using 
your responses, along with others, to select items for a follow up study with children.  
The wording of the questions is designed for children, but we are really interested 
in knowing what you think.  Please take your time and read each of the questions 



























INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
The following statements ask about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  
For each statement, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
number.  Read each statement carefully.  Answer as honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
Does not 











1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to 
me. (F) 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. * (PT) 
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. * 
(EC) 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (F) 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get 
completely caught up in it. * (F) 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them. (EC) 
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
(PD) 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from   
their perspective. (PT) 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. * 
(F) 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.* (PD) 
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. * (EC) 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
        people's arguments. * (PT) 
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (F) 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them. * (EC) 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. * (PD)  
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. (F) 





25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
(PT) 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (F) 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 












































INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ANTHROPOMORPHISM QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. To what extent is the desert lethargic?  
2. To what extent is the average computer active? 
3. To what extent does technology—devices and machines for manufacturing, 
 entertainment, and productive processes (e.g., cars, computers, television sets) have 
 intentions?* 
4. To what extent does the average fish have free will?* 
5. To what extent is the average cloud good-looking? 
6. To what extent are pets useful?  
7. To what extent does the average mountain have free will?* 
8. To what extent is the average amphibian lethargic?  
9. To what extent does a television set experience emotions?* 
10. To what extent is the average robot good-looking?  
11. To what extent does the average robot have consciousness?* 
12. To what extent do cows have intentions?* 
13. To what extent does a car have free will?* 
14. To what extent does the ocean have consciousness?* 
15. To what extent is the average camera lethargic?  
16. To what extent is a river useful?  
17. To what extent does the average computer have a mind of its own?* 
18. To what extent is a tree active?  
19. To what extent is the average kitchen appliance useful?  
20. To what extent does a cheetah experience emotions?* 
21. To what extent does the environment experience emotions?* 
22. To what extent does the average insect have a mind of its own?* 
23. To what extent does a tree have a mind of its own?* 
24. To what extent is technology—devices and machines for manufacturing, 
 entertainment, and productive processes (e.g., cars, computers, television sets)—
 durable?  
25. To what extent is the average cat active?  
26. To what extent does the wind have intentions?* 
27. To what extent is the forest durable?  
28. To what extent is a tortoise durable?  
29. To what extent does the average reptile have consciousness?* 





Note. IDAQ items are marked by *. All items are rated on a 0 (not at all) to 10 (very 







ADULT IMAGINARY COMPANION QUESTIONNAIRE 
An imaginary companion is someone who is make-believe; an imaginary person or 
animal that you talk to or think about a lot.  Sometimes an imaginary companion is 
completely invisible and sometimes it is an object, like a very special stuffed animal or 
doll.   
 
1.  Do you currently have an imaginary companion?   yes ______   no ______ 
 -If yes, is it invisible or is it an object? ________________ 
 -If object, how is this stuffed animal, doll, or object different from other stuffed 
animals, dolls, or objects?__________________________________________ 
 -Please describe your imaginary companion ____________________________ 
 
2.  What about when you were younger, when you were a child?  Did you have an 
imaginary companion then? yes ______   no ______ 
 -If yes, was it invisible or was it an object? ________________ 
 -If object, how was this stuffed animal, doll, or object different from other stuffed 
animals, dolls, or objects?____________________________________________ 





















DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire is about electronic/digital games and your opinions about new 
technologies, such as virtual assistants (like Siri for iphone) and social robots. 
This first set of questions asks about games played on any of the following devices: 
desktop/laptop computers, game consoles (like an Xbox), hand-held game consoles (like 
a Nintendo DS), video game consoles paired with headsets or simulators, apps on 
smartphones (like an iPhone), and apps on computer tablets (like an iPad).  Please think 
about all of these devices as your respond to the following questions. 
 
1.  How often do you play electronic/digital games?  
 Never (1) 
 Less than once a month (2) 
 About once a month (3) 
 About 2 -3 times a month (4) 
 About once a week (5) 
 About 2 – 3 times a week (6) 
 Several times a week (7) 
 Everyday (8) 
 
2.  What device do you typically use to play digital games?  Check all that apply. 
 A TV with a game console 
 A computer with a game console  
 A console with a virtual headset (like Oculus Rift) 
 A computer with Internet access 
 A hand-held game console  
 A computer tablet  








3.  What are your favorite things to do online?  Check all that apply: 
 Streaming TV shows, movies, or online videos (e.g., youtube) 
 Participating in social networking sites (like Facebook) 
 Participating in online forums (like reddit) 
 Playing online videogames 
 Streaming/reading online news 
 Streaming/reading celebrity gossip/entertainment 
 Buying and selling things (like on Etsy, Ebay) 
 Conducting online research for fun (like Wikipedia) 
 Other:___________________________________ 
 
4.  In 2016, fully immersive virtual games will be available for people to play at home.  
In other worlds, people will be able to transform their living rooms into an immersive 
virtual world.  If this were affordable, would you be interested in purchasing and using 
this new technology? 
 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 Don’t know/not sure 
 






For the next set of questions, we are interested in your familiarity with online virtual 
worlds, including role-playing games like Final Fantasy, EverQuest, and World of 
Warcraft.  We are also interested in your familiarity with other types of role-playing 
games.  Finally, we are interested in your familiarity with virtual assistants, such as Siri 
for iPhone, and your opinions about social robots. 
 
5.  Do you currently participate in online virtual worlds, such as SecondLife, or 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs), like World of Warcraft 
or Eve Online? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
6.  How frequently do you participate in these virtual worlds/virtual games? 
 Never (1) 
 Less than once a month (2) 
 About once a month (3) 
 About 2 -3 times a month (4) 
 About once a week (5) 
 About 2 – 3 times a week (6) 
 Several times a week (7) 
 Everyday (8) 
 
7.  What are the names of the virtual worlds/MMORPGs where you have accounts? 
 
8.  Do you play other types of offline role-playing games, such as Dungeons and 
Dragons? 
 Yes (1) 








9.  What offline role-playing games do you play? 
 
10.  Did you dress up for Halloween this year? 
 No, I didn’t 
 Yes, but I didn’t put much effort into my costume 
 Yes, and I put some effort into my costume 
 Yes, and I put a lot of effort into my costume 
 Other________________________________ 
 
11.  Do you participate in costume play/costume conventions, like Comic-Con or Star 
Wars conventions? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
12.  What costume play/costume conventions do you participate in? 
 





14.  How often do you use a virtual assistant? 
 Only one time (1) 
 Less than once a month (2) 
 About once a month (3) 
 About once a week (4) 
 Several times a week (5) 







15.  Using the scale below, do you consider your virtual assistant a close companion or 
friend, with “0” indicating not at all, and “6” very much? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all 
possible  
  Somewhat 
possible 
  Very 
possible 
 
16.  Please explain your answer. 
 
17.  Japanese roboticist, Hiroshi Ishiguro, has developed some of the first human-like 












If these robots could perform household chores, such as cooking, cleaning, washing 
dishes and doing laundry, would you want one in your home? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Don’t know/not sure 
 






19.  Using the scale below, do you think these types of robots could become close 
companions or friends, with “0” indicating “no, not likely”, and “6” indicating “yes, 
likely”? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
No, not at 
all possible 
  Somewhat 
possible 
  Very 
possible 
 
20.  Please explain your answer. 
21.  This questionnaire is a work in progress.  We would greatly appreciate your 
feedback.  Is there anything about your use of new technologies that you think is related 





















ADULT DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
What is your age?___________ 
 
What is your gender?     Male       Female       Transgender      Prefer not to respond 
 
What is your cultural background/ Race-Ethnicity?: 
  White/Caucasian  
  Mixed race/ethnicity 
  Black/African American  
  Hispanic, Latino or Spanish 
  Asian    
  Asian Indian    
  Hawaiian Native 
  Pacific Islander   
  Middle Eastern    
  Alaskan Native or Native American 
  Other group (Please write in):________________________________________ 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
What is the highest education level you have attained? 
  No formal education 
  Grade school 
   Some high school 
   Some college or 2-year degree 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Graduate degree 
   Other (please specify) ____________________________________________ 
 
What is the highest education level your mother has attained? 
  No formal education 
  Grade school 
   Some high school 
   Some college or 2-year degree 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Graduate degree 
   Other (please specify) ____________________________________________ 
 
Year in school:   Freshman       Sophomore       Junior       Senior       Post Baccalaureate 
Other: ____________________ 
 






ITEMS FOR THE CHILD PROPERTIES TASK 
Autonomy/Creative Control (2) 
S/he can do things when you are not around. 
You can control what s/he is going to do. 
 
Biological (2) 
S/he is alive. 
S/he has a heart that beats. 
 
Psychological (3) 
S/he can think. 
S/he can feel lonely. 
S/he can listen to what you say. 
  
Social (7) 
S/he can tell you secrets. 
You can tell him/her secrets. 
S/he can keep you company.  
You can keep him/her company. 
She can love you. 
You can love him/her. 
S/he can help you feel better when you are sad. 
 
Reality Status (2) 
S/he is a pretend kid. 
S/he is a real kid. 
 
 
Definitely not Probably no Probably yes Definitely yes 













CHILDREN’S MEDIA USE QUESTIONNAIRE (PARENT REPORT) 
Media Use Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is about your child's media use.  This includes electronic media 
(such as computers and cell phones) and print media (such as books and magazines). 
 
The first set of questions is about media use in your household and your child's 
general media use.  Please think about the electronic devices and print media in your 
household, including any that are in your bedroom or a child’s bedroom.  In 
answering, please don’t count anything that is not hooked up or is put away in storage.  
 
1. Which of the following electronic devices and print media do you have in your 
household?  Check all that apply: 
 
☐ TVs, DVD players (including Blu-Ray), and/or VCRs  
☐Desktop computers, laptop computers, and/or computer tablets (like iPad) 
☐Video game consoles (like Xbox), hand-held game consoles (like Nintendo DS), and/or 
smartphones (like an iPhone)  
☐Printed books, printed magazines and/or eReaders (like Kindle) 
 
Section A. Television and Movies 
 The following set of questions is about TV shows, movies, and the devices your child 
uses to watch these programs (such as TVs, computers and video game consoles).  If 
you do not have TVs, DVD players or VCRs in your household, AND your child DOES 
NOT watch TV shows or movies, please skip to Section B. 
 
2. How many TVs do you have in your household? Please write a number in the space 
provided. ______ TVs  
 
3. Do you have cable or satellite TV? 
☐ Yes  
☐ No  





4.  How many VCRs and/or DVD players (including Blu-ray) do you have in your 
household? Please write a number in the space provided. 
______ VCRs and/or DVD players 
 
 
5.  Approximately how many videos and/or DVDs for children do you have at home? 
 None  
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  
 More than 50  
 
6.  Has your child ever had any “Baby Einstein” videos or DVDs like “Baby Bach” or 
“Baby Mozart”? 
 Yes  
 No 
 Not sure/Don't know 
 
7.  How often does your child watch TV shows and/or movies?   
 Everyday   
 Several times a week   
 Several times a month   
 Never  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
8.  What device does your child typically use to watch TV shows and/or movies?  Check 
all that apply. 
 A TV  
 A TV with a video game console 
 A TV with a DVD player or Blu-ray player 
 A TV with a VCR  
 A desktop computer, laptop computer or computer tablet  
 A smartphone  
 A hand-held video game console 
 
9.  Where does your child typically watch TV shows and/or movies?  Check all that 
apply. 
 At home  
 At a friend's house 
 In a car, train, bus, and/or airplane 
 At restaurants 
 At parties  






10.  Does your child have a TV or a TV with a video player or DVD player (including 
Blu-ray) in his/her bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
11.  (If your child does not have a TV or video player in his/her bedroom, please skip to 
#12) Please indicate which of the following is true of the TV in your child's 
bedroom.  Check all that apply. 
 It gets some cable or satellite channels  
 It gets only regular channels  
 It is used for watching movies or playing video games  
 It is not currently used or not currently working  
 
12. Please indicate which of the following your child has done by himself or 
herself.  Check all that apply.  Next to each item you check, please indicate at about what 
age your child first did the activity. 
 Turned on a TV ____________________ 
 Changed the channels of a TV with a remote control ____________________ 
 Asked to watch a particular TV show, channel or movie ____________________ 
 Turned on a VCR, DVD, or Blu-ray player____________________ 
 Put in a video or DVD into a player ____________________ 
 Streamed a TV show or movie on the Internet or with 
Netflix____________________ 
 
13.  Do you have any rules about your child's TV and/or movie watching?  If "yes", 
please write in your rules in the space provided below the "yes" response. 






 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
 
14. How do you feel about your child’s TV and/or movie watching?  Please circle a 
number. 

















15. When someone is at home in your household, how often is the TV on? 




 Not sure/Don't know  
 
16.  How often is the TV on when your family is eating meals? 
 Always  
 Sometimes  
 Rarely  
 Never  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
17. When you have something important to do, how likely are you to put on a movie or 
TV show for your child to watch so that you can get it done? 
 Very likely  
 Somewhat likely  
 Not too likely  
 Not all at likely  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
18.  What is your child's favorite TV show? 
 
19. What is your child's favorite movie? 
 
Section B. Computers and the Internet 
The following set of questions is about computers and the Internet.  If you do not have 
desktop/laptop computers or tablets in your household, AND your child DOES NOT 
use these devices, please skip to Section C. 
 
 
20.  How many computers, laptop computers, and/or computer tablets (like an iPad) do 
you have in your household?  Please write a number in the space provided. 
______ Computers 
 
21.  Does your household have Internet access? 
 Yes  
 No  









22.  What type of Internet access do you have in your household? 
 Dial-up  
 Wireless  
 High speed  
 High speed wireless  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
23.  Does your child have access to the Internet in his/her bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
24.  Does your child have any of the following at home?  Check all that apply. 
 A computer mouse designed especially for children  
 A computer keyboard or keyboard topper designed especially for children  
 A toy computer 
 None of the above 
 
25.  How often does your child use the computer?   
 Everyday  
 Several times a week 
 Several times a month  
 Never  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
26.  Please indicate which of the following your child has done by himself or 
herself.  Check all that apply.  Next to each item you check, please indicate at about what 
age your child first did the activity. 
 Turned on a computer ____________________ 
 Used a computer without sitting on a parent's lap ____________________ 
 Used a mouse to point and click ____________________ 
 Put a CD and/or DVD into a computer ____________________ 
 Asked to go to a particular website ____________________ 
 Went to a particular website ____________________ 
 Looked at websites for children ____________________ 












27.  Do you have any rules about your child's computer use?   If "yes", please write in 
your rules in the space provided next to the "yes" response. 






 No  
 Not sure/Don't know 
 
28. How do you feel about your child’s computer use?  Please circle a number. 
 













29.  What is your child's favorite website? 
 
 
Section C. Video Games 
The following set of questions asks about video games played on any of the following 
devices: desktop/laptop computers, game consoles (like an Xbox), hand-held game 
consoles (like a Nintendo DS), apps on smartphones (like an iPhone), and apps on 
computer tablets (like an iPad).  Please think about all of these devices as your respond 
to the following questions. 
 
If you do not have any video game players in your household, AND your child DOES 
NOT play video games, please skip to Section D. 
 
 
30.  How many video game players do you have in your household? 
 





31.  Approximately how many video games and/or computer games does your child have 
at home, including any that are shared with brothers or sisters? 
 None  
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  
 More than 50  
 
32. Does your child have a video game player in his/her bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
33.  How often does your child play video/computer games?   
 Everyday  
 Several times a week  
 Several times a month  
 Never  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
34.  What device does your child typically use to play video/computer games?  Check all 
that apply. 
 A TV with a game console  
 A computer with a game console  
 A hand-held game console  
 A computer tablet  
 A smartphone  
 
35.  Where does your child typically play video/computer games?  Check all that apply. 
 At home  
 At a friend's house  
 In a car, train, bus, and/or airplane  
 At restaurants  
 At parties  












36.  Please indicate which of the following your child has done by himself or 
herself.  Check all that apply.  Next to each item you check, please indicate at about what 
age your child first did the activity. 
 Turned on a smartphone/computer tablet ____________________ 
 Played a game on a smartphone/computer tablet ____________________ 
 Turned on an hand-held video game player ____________________ 
 Played a hand-held video game ____________________ 
 Turned on a video game console ____________________ 
 Played a game on a video game console ____________________ 
 
37.  Do you have any rules about your child's video/computer game playing?   If "yes", 
please write in your rules in the space provided next to the "yes" response. 






 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
38.  How do you feel about your child’s video/computer game playing?  Please circle a 
number. 













39.  What is your child's favorite video game? 
 
 
Section D. Books, Magazines and eReaders 
The following set of questions is about written media, including books, magazines, 
eReaders and eBooks.  If you do not have any books, magazines, or eReaders in your 
household, AND your child DOES NOT read or IS NOT read to, please skip to Section 
E. 
 
40.  Approximately how many printed books do you have in your household? 
 None 
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  






41.  How any eReaders (like a Kindle) do you have in your household? Please write a 
number in the space provided. 
______ eReaders  
 
42.  Approximately how many electronic books (eBooks) do you have in your 
household? 
 None  
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  
 More than 50  
 
43.  Approximately how many printed books for children do you have in your household? 
 None  
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  
 More than 50  
 
44.  Approximately how many eBooks for children do you have in your household? 
 None  
 1 to 10  
 More than 10  
 More than 50  
 
45.  Does your household subscribe to any newspapers or magazines- printed and/or 
electronic? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
46.  What newspapers or magazines - printed or electronic - does your household 
currently subscribe to? 
 
 
47.  Does your child know how to read? 
 Yes (please indicate the age they first learned to read) ____________________ 
 No  












48.  How often does your child read a book alone or with someone else?  
 Everyday  
 Several times a week  
 Several times a month  
 Never  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
49.  When your child reads alone or with someone else, what type of book is typically 
used? 
 A printed book  
 An eBook  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
50.  Do you have any rules about your child's reading activities?   If "yes", please write in 







 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
51.   How do you feel about your child’s reading activities?  Please circle a number. 













Section E. Media Use on a Typical Day 
This next set of questions is about your child’s typical media use.  For the following 
questions, please think about what your child did yesterday.  If yesterday was not a 
typical day, please think back to the last day you and your child followed your typical 
routine. 
 
52.  Did your child spend any time doing the following activities on that day?   
 Watching TV shows or movies 
 Playing computer games and/or video games  
 Using a computer for something other than games  
 Reading or being read to   
 Playing inside with toys  






53.  (If your child did not watch TV or movies, please skip to #56)  How much time did 
your child spend watching TV shows or movies? 
 Less than 1 hour 
 1 hour – 2 hours 
 2 hours – 3 hours 
 3 hours – 4 hours 
 4 or more hours 
 
54.  For most of the time your child was watching TV shows and/or movies, did your 
child do any of that in their bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
55.  For most of the time your child was watching TV shows and/or movies, was 
someone else also watching, or was your child doing this alone? 
 Mostly watched with someone else  
 Mostly watched alone  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
56.  (If your child did not play computer games or video games, please skip to #59)  
How much time did your child spend playing computer games or video games? 
 Less than 1 hour 
 1 hour – 2 hours 
 2 hours – 3 hours 
 3 hours – 4 hours 
 4 or more hours 
 
57.  For most of the time your child was playing computer games or video games, did 
your child do any of that in their bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
58.  For most of the time your child was playing computer games or video games, was 
someone else playing with your child, or was your child doing this alone? 
 Mostly played with someone else 
 Mostly played alone  







59.  (If your child did not use a computer for something other than games, please skip 
to #62)  How much time did your child spend using a computer for something other than 
games? 
 Less than 1 hour 
 1 hour – 2 hours 
 2 hours – 3 hours 
 3 hours – 4 hours 
 4 or more hours 
 
60.  For most of the time your child was using the computer for something other than 
games, did your child do any of that in their bedroom? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
61.  For most of the time your child was using the computer for something other than 
games, was someone else using the computer with your child, or was your child doing 
this alone? 
 Mostly used the computer with someone else  
 Mostly used the computer alone  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
Section F. Video Chat Programs and Virtual Worlds 
For the next set of questions, we are interested in your child’s familiarity with video 
chat programs, like Skype or FaceTime.  We are also interested in whether your child 




62.  Has your child ever chatted with someone on a video chat program, like Skype or 
FaceTime? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
 
63.  How frequently does your child use a video chat program like Skype or FaceTime? 
 Not sure/Don't know  
 Only one time  
 About once a month  
 About once a week  
 Several times a week  






64.  Does your child currently have a membership account in a virtual world for kids, like 
ClubPenguin? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don't know  
 
64.  (If your child does not have a membership account in a virtual world for kids, 




65.  How frequently does your child play in an online virtual world for kids? 
 Not sure/Don't know  
 Only one time  
 About once a month  
 About once a week  
 Several times a week  
 Everyday  
 
 
66.  This questionnaire is a work in progress.  We would greatly appreciate your 
feedback.  Is there anything you would like to tell us about your child's media use that we 






















PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS QUESTIONNAIRE (PARENT REPORT) 
Parasocial Relationships Questionnaire 
Many children have a favorite media character, such as Daniel Tiger from “Daniel Tiger’s 
Neighborhood”, Hans Solo, from “Star Wars”, or Hannah Montana from the Hannah 
Montana show.  Children might watch a TV show, movie or read a book that features their 
favortie media character.  They might have stuffed animals or toys that represent their 
favorite media character.  Children might also play videogames or apps that feature their 
favorite media character, and wear clothing with pictures of their favorite media character.  
 
1.  Does your child currently have a favortie media character?         yes ______      no 
______ 
If no, did your child have a favorite media character in the past?  yes ______      no 
______ 
 
If your child has never had a favorite media character, please skip all of the remaining 
questions. 
 
If your child has ever had a favorite media character, please continue.  
 
Description of media character:  
2.  What is the name of your child’s favorite media 
character?_____________________________ 
 
3.  Is it a person ____________________, an animal (what kind?) 
_____________________, or something else (please 
describe)____________________________________________________? 
 
4.  Is the media character a male ______ a  female ______ or  are you not sure ______? 
  
5.  How did your child first develop an interest in this media character (in other words, how 







6. Does your child own a stuffed animal/or toy of this media character?   yes ______      no 
______ 
 







8. Does your child have clothing, bedding, and/or other household items that feature their 
favorite media character? yes ______no _____ 
 
9.  How do you feel about your child having a favorite media character? 
 
very positive ______   comfortable _______  uncomfortable _____ 
 





Feelings, beliefs, and experiences of a favortie media character: 
You will now see statements that describe children’s feelings, beliefs and experiences of their 
favorite media characters.  Please tell us how well each statement describes your child.  
Please read each statement and decide whether you “Agree” or “Disagree” with description 
of your child’s feelings, beliefs and experiences of his/her favorite media character. Use the 
following scale to indicate how much you agree with each statement: 
 
Please be sure to circle a number for each item.  Thank you very much! 
 
10.  My child knows that this favorite media character is not real. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




11.  This favorite media character makes my child feel safe. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 







1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 





12.  My child believes that this favorite media character has needs. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




13. My child gets sad when this favorite media character gets sad or makes a mistake. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
14.  My child thinks that this favorite media character has thoughts and emotions. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
15.  When my child’s favorite media character acts out a behavior on screen (like dancing, 
singing, or playing a game), my child believes that the character is performing the behavior 
in real life. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
16.  My child believes that this favorite media character has wants. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 









17.  My child believes that this favorite media character is real. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




18.  My child trusts this favorite media character. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




19.  The voice of this favorite media character soothes my child. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




20.  This favorite media character makes my child feel comfortable. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 




21.  My child treats this favorite media character as a friend. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
 






PARENT ROLE-PLAY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
PARENT ROLE-PLAY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please fill out following information about yourself: 
 
1.  Gender     ___ male    ___ female    2.  Age _________ 
 
3.  Your relationship to child: 
 ___ Mother 
 ___ Father ___ Other (please indicate relationship)  ____________________ 
 
4. Education level  (please check highest level attained):  
___ No formal education 
___  Grade school 
 ___  Some high school 
 ___ Some college or 2-year degree 
 ___ Bachelor’s degree 
 ___ Graduate degree 
 ___ Other (please specify) ____________________________________________ 
 
5. Religion    ________________________ 
 
6.  Marital status: (Please check one) 
 ___  Married  ___ Single 
 ___  Divorced  ___ Separated 
 ___ Other (Please specify) ___________________________________________ 
 
7. Occupation   (self)____________________ (spouse)______________________ 
 
8.  What is (are) the age and gender of your child(ren)?  
    (M/ F)_____________________      (M/ F) _____________________ 
    (M/ F)_____________________      (M/ F) _____________________ 
 
9.  Who looks after your child(ren) when they are not in school?  ___________________ 
 
10.   Your cultural background/ Race-Ethnicity (check all that apply) 
___  White/Caucasian   ___  Black/African American  ___  Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish 
___  Asian    ___  Asian Indian     ___  Hawaiian Native 
___  Pacific Islander   ___  Middle Eastern     ___  Alaskan Native or Native 
American 







11.   Your child’s cultural background/ Race-Ethnicity (check all that apply) 
___  White/Caucasian   ___  Black/African American  ___  Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish 
___  Asian    ___  Asian Indian     ___  Hawaiian Native 
___  Pacific Islander   ___  Middle Eastern     ___  Alaskan Native or Native 
American 
__  Other group (Please write in):________________________________________ 
Friendships 
 
1. Does your child have a best friend?   yes ______      no ______ 
 
2. Does your child have a group of friends that s/he likes to play with?  
 




Many children enjoy pretending to interact with someone who is not real.  For example, 
they might talk to an invisible character that they have created or that is based on a real 
person who is not actually present (e.g., a favorite cousin who lives far away).  The pretend 
interactions might also be with a special stuffed animal or doll.  For some children, this 
type of pretend play is frequent and the child is described as having an imaginary 
companion.   
 
1.  Does your child currently have an imaginary companion?         yes ______      no 
______ 
If no, did your child have an imaginary companion in the past?  yes ______      no 
______ 
 
If your child has never had an imaginary companion, please skip to Question #16.  
 
If your child has ever had an imaginary companion, please continue.  
 
Description of imaginary companion:  
2.  Is the imaginary companion completely invisible ______ or is it a toy ______?   
If the imaginary companion is a toy, does your child treat the toy primarily as a 
comfort object (i.e., she or he carries it around and/or sleeps with it) or does she or 
he treat it as if it was another person (e.g., talks to it, listens to what it says, 
describes its life to others, etc.).            
Comfort object ________      another person _________      both ________  
 
3.  What is the name(s) of the imaginary companion(s)?  
_________________________________ 







4.  Is it a person ____________________, an animal (what kind?) 
_____________________, or something else (please 
describe)____________________________________________________? 
 
5.  Is the imaginary companion a male ______ a  female ______ or  are you not sure 
______? 
  
6.  Does your child talk about the imaginary companion as being a particular age (e.g., 4 
years old) or provide any information about its age (e.g., very old, adult, child, infant…)? 
 
 
7.   If the imaginary companion is invisible, what do you know about the physical 
characteristics of the imaginary companion (e.g., size, hair color, clothing)?  
 
 
If the imaginary companion is a toy, please describe the toy:  
 
 
8.  What do you know about the personality and behavior of the imaginary companion 
(e.g., does your child describe the imaginary companion as being funny, shy… )?  
 
 




Types of activities with imaginary companion: 
10a.  Some parents directly observe their child talking to or interacting with the imaginary 
companion.  Other parents learn about the imaginary companion indirectly – their child 
tells them about what the imaginary companion is like and what it is doing.  
Do you see your child interacting with the imaginary companion?  yes ______    no 
______ 




10b.  When your child is playing with the imaginary companion (please check one option): 
 _____ he or she is almost always alone. 
 _____ sometimes he or she is alone and sometimes other people are involved in the 
play. 
_____ almost always there are other people involved in the play (who? _____ 
parent     _____siblings     _____friend) 
Please describe:___________________________________________________________ 
 
11.  Does your child make a special voice for the imaginary companion?    









12.  Does your child use the imaginary companion to escape blame (e.g., says the 
imaginary companion broke the vase) _____, to bargain (e.g., says the imaginary 
companion gets to stay up late) _____ or does she or he us the imaginary companion in 
other types of interactions with you?  Please 
describe__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Duration and frequency of activities with imaginary companion: 
13.  How old was your child when the imaginary companion first appeared? 
__________________ 
Were there any special circumstances that coincided with the appearance of the 
imaginary companion (e.g., birth of sibling, move to new place)? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  For past imaginary companions, when did your child stop playing with the imaginary 
companion? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Were there any special circumstances that coincided with the disappearance?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
15.  During the period in which your child had an imaginary companion, how often did 
your child play with or talk about the imaginary companion? 
Only once or twice _____   occasionally ____   frequently ____    almost every day 
____ 
 
Your reactions to the imaginary companion: 
16.  How do you feel about your child having an imaginary companion (if your child does 
not have an imaginary companion, how would you feel if he or she did)?   
very positive ______   comfortable _______  uncomfortable _____ 
 














BRIEF MEDIA USE INTERVIEW (CHILD REPORT) 
 
Brief Media Use Interview 
 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about the things you like. 
 




















2.  Do you have a favorite TV show or movie show? (If no, skip to #3) yes 









b. Do your parents have rules about the time you spend watching TV or movies?  








c.  Do your parents like you to spend time watching TV shows and movies?  Would they 








3.  Do you play video games- like on a TV, or computer or a phone?   (If no, skip to #5) 





















d.  Do your parents like you to spend time playing video games?  Would they like you to 








5.  Do you have a favorite character - like from a book, TV show, movie or video game?   
(If no, skip to the end)  















































g.  Do you have a toy/stuffed animal/doll/action figure of _________________(name)? 












ROLE PLAY INTERVIEW – CHILD  
 
Now I am going to ask you about friends.   
 
1.  Do you have a best friend?   yes ______ no ______ 
 
2. Do you have a group of friends that you like to spend time with?  yes ______ no ______ 
 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions about pretending.  Some friends are 
real like the kids who live on your street, the ones you play with- like your best friend.  
And some friends are pretend friends.  Pretend friends are ones that are make-
believe, that you pretend are real. 
 
1.  Do you have a pretend friend?   yes ______   no ______ 
If “no”: Have you ever had a pretend friend?  yes ______   no ______ 
If “no”, but parent said “yes”: Who is (name given by parent)?___________________ 
 
2.  What is/was your friend's 
name?__________________________________________________________ 
If many are listed: Which is the one you play with the most? ______________________ 
(At end, ask child for information about the other ICs.) 
  
3.  Was/Is your friend a toy like a stuffed animal or a doll  ______,  or was/is it completely 
pretend ______?  
     (If child says “completely pretend” confirm by saying: “It’s invisible.”  If child says 
“no”, ask, “Is it toy or doll?”) 
Invisible?  yes ______ no _______ Toy or doll? yes ______no ______ 
 
4.  Is it a person ______ animal (what kind)______, or   something else (what is 
it)______________________? 
 






6.  How old is (name of pretend friend)? _______________________________________ 
 
7.  What does (name) look like?_____________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 


























14.  Do you play with (name) a lot or not very much?       A lot ______     not very 
much______ 
 (If  “a lot”)  almost every day______  less than that______ 
(If “not very much”) just one time______   more than that______ 
 
 
15.  When you play with (name), is it just you and (name) or are other people there (e.g., 




























21.  Would you please draw a picture of (name)?   
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